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ABSTRACT

Papers that address implications of linguistic theory for applied linguistics are presented. In "Some Semantic Properties of Some Conjunctions," W. Abraham is concerned with the function of "but" and its translation equivalents in German and other languages. In "Is It Possible and Necessary to Write Text Grammars?," T. P. Krzeszowski examines the theoretical status of text-grammars and the use of sentence connectives. In "Esquisse d'une theorie de 'Do'" (Outline of a Theory of 'Do'), H. Adamczewski examines the anaphoric function of the verb "do" in English texts, and its use as a marker of modality or some other semantic qualification. In "Notes sur l'expression verbale de l'assentiment et de la confirmation en anglais" (Notes on the Verbal Expression of Assent and Confirmation in English), C. Heddesheimer considers research conducted on the speech acts of assent and confirmation. In "Some Metalinguistic Problems in Communicative Language Learning," C. N. Candlin considers research conducted on the rhetorical properties of discourse between doctor and patient. In "Interpretive Procedures and the Importance of Poetry," H. G. Widdowson examines the problem of teaching discourse, concentrating on the problems of interpretation. In "Interpretive Procedures: Seeing, Reading, and Understanding Discourse," S. P. Corder compares the interpretation of discourse with visual perception and the interpretation of pictures. In "Error Analysis and Pedagogical Ordering," A. Valdman describes the use of the results of a systematic error analysis to devise a language teaching syllabus. In "De la necessite de fonder l'enseignement de langues secondes sur l'etude de la langue maternelle" (On the Necessity of Basing Instruction of Second Languages on the Study of the Mother Tongue), E. Roulet considers metalinguistic knowledge development in the learner. (SW)

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S. P. CORDER & E. ROULET (Eds.)

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF LINGUISTIC THEORY FOR APPLIED LINGUISTICS

3rd Neuchâtel Colloquium in Applied Linguistics
in collaboration with AIMAV, AILA, CILA
and the University of Neuchâtel
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INTRODUCTION

Those invited to participate in the annual Neuchatel colloquium are given a considerable freedom in the selection of the topic of their contribution. So long as it deals with some aspect of linguistics — and this is now understood to include both psychological and sociological approaches to language — and so long as its relevance to the problems of language teaching is apparent to the participants, then it is welcome. Once again this year there has been a wide range of topics selected for treatment, but once again the participants found in their discussions of the papers presented a common preoccupation with a current issue in linguistics — that of the interpretation of discourse. In the first colloquium in 1972 there was a common interest in the impact that the notion of 'communicative competence' might have in applied linguistics. Since then the notion has become common currency amongst applied linguists and language teachers. In the meantime a great deal of thought and research has been devoted to the problem of rhetorical functions and the structure of discourse. So it is that two of the papers in this volume give an account of research done in this field — Candlin on the rhetorical properties of discourse between doctor and patient and Heddesheimer on the speech acts of assent and confirmation. Both emphasize however that the theoretical bases for a study of discourse and rhetorical functions are still primitive and that while we may still only be at the 'natural history' stage in this area of sociolinguistics, the applied linguist need not wait on the results of theoretical discussion to make his own contribution to the understanding of linguistic interaction.

Candlin however is not solely concerned with description ; he proposes that the language learner should have appropriate metalinguistic knowledge to help him become aware of the communicative value of the linguistic forms he is learning. Roulet, concerning himself more with grammatical than communicative competence, nevertheless also makes a strong plea for metalinguistic knowledge in the learner and suggests that it should be the function of the study of the mother tongue to develop such knowledge together with the appropriate heuristic strategies for developing it.

Widdowson continues to investigate the problems of teaching discourse skills which he discussed in previous colloquia, concentrating on this oc-

casion on the problems of interpretation. He regrets the diminishing role of the study of poetry in modern language teaching, and argues that such a study could contribute significantly to the development of efficient 'interpretative procedures' or strategies. Corder's paper takes as its starting point Widdowson's argument and by comparing the interpretation of discourse with other interpretative tasks — visual perception and the interpretation of pictures — identifies the nature of such strategies.

It is pleasant that for the first time we can include a paper in Error Analysis. This rapidly developing branch of applied linguistics has attracted more theorising than practical application. In Valdman's contribution we have a report of an experiment in which the results of a systematic error analysis have been put to use in the devising of a language teaching syllabus.

Adamczewski examines the anaphoric function of the verb 'do' in English texts, showing how it is used, not so much as a marker of polarity in repeated predicates carrying no new information, as is often suggested, but more generally as a marker of modality or some other semantic qualification. His study is concerned with the 'textual' function of 'do'. The question is: does one require a 'text-grammar' to account for its use in a principled fashion? Krzeszowski examines the theoretical status of text-grammars, whether they are feasible and, if feasible, necessary. Part of his argument centres on the use of sentence connectives, whose selection he shows must be determined by extra-linguistic factors. Abraham is also concerned with connectives, particularly with the function of 'but' and its translation equivalents in German and other languages. He aims to show the multiplicity of semantic functions performed by this conjunction. What emerges clearly from his paper is the limitation of a purely linguistic-semantic treatment of this problem.

Both the last two papers return us to the unifying preoccupation of the participants in the colloquium, I mentioned above, namely the problem of the interpretation of discourse. To what extent does the interpretation of discourse depend upon purely linguistic knowledge and to what extent on extra-linguistic factors? What are the limits of linguistic theory and description and what other sorts of knowledge must a learner acquire in order to achieve a mastery of the communicative use of a language?

We would like to thank the AIMAV, the University of Neuchâtel and the Swiss National Foundation for Scientific Research, whose financial support made the organisation of the colloquium and the publication of the proceedings possible.

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SOME SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF SOME CONJUNCTIONS

1. It is somewhat surprising, to say the least, that R. Lakoff (1971 : 114-150) in her examination of the conjunction *but* does not even allude to the two different senses in which *but* can be used in the case that some external negation is employed in the preceding sentence. I will make clear by the following examples what the two different interpretations are.

(1e) *Terry does not walk, but she crawls.*
(2e) *The pop singer does not roar, but he sings.*

The first reading that *but* is responsible for in (1) and (2) is that of outright, non-concessive contradiction of what has been stated in the preceding sentence. In other words, if the antecedent parts of sentences (1) and (2) had been stated by speaker$_1$ then speaker$_2$ may "wipe out" the validity of these assertions and replace them as a whole by the consequent sentences in (1) and (2). Let us speak of *but*$_1$ in these instances.

In their second interpretations both (1) and (2) receive a concessive reading. That is to say, in (1) it is conceded in the preceding sentence that Terry has not yet achieved full coordination of her legs as to be able to walk properly, but her defiency is not tantamount to total immobility since she can at least crawl. Similarly in (2) where the highest of a pop singer's achievements is asserted to be roaring — which this particular representative of the species cannot quite make up to ; but in his production of sound he comes true to such normal expectations at least partially in that he sings. Henceforth we shall refer to this sense of the conjunction by *but*$_2$.

Now note that, in contrast to German, French, English and Dutch (as well as a host of other languages) are alike in that they do not discern lexically these two senses of the conjunction. (I am not touching upon the question whether or not these two senses would not be disambiguated in particular contexts by a different phrasing ; for a discussion of such

stylistic disambiguations see the chapters on *but*$_s$ and *but*$_a$ below. I shall also leave out altogether reference to the possibilities of disambiguation through accent and intonation.)

(3f) *Il n'y a pas des livres sur la table, mais des journaux.*
(4f) *Pierre n'est pas bête, mais il est fainéant.*
(see Lang 1974 : 326)
(5d) *Toos loopt niet, maar ze kruipt.*
(2d) *De popzinger brult niet, maar hij zingt.*

For any of these sentences a German translator would have to decide from the context or from other clues which of the two readings are the appropriate ones :

(2g) *Der Popsinger brüllt nicht, SONDERN er singt.*
(2'g) *Der Popsinger brüllt (zwar) nicht, ABER er singt zumindesters/ wohl aber singt er/ aber er singt (zumindest).*
(3g) *Es liegen nicht/ keine Bücher auf dem Tisch, SONDERN Zeitungen.*
(3'g) *Es liegen nicht Bücher auf dem Tisch, (wohl/) ABER Zeitungen (/ schon).*
(3e) (i) *There are no books on the table, but newspapers.*
(ii) *(What lies on the table are no books, but newspapers).*
(3'e) *There are no books on the table, to be true, but (at least) newspapers.*
(4g) *Peter ist nicht dumm, SONDERN faul.*
(4'g) *Peter ist nicht dumm, (wohl/) ABER faul (/ (ist er) schon).*
(4e) (i) *Peter is not stupid but lazy.*
(ii) *Peter is not stupid, Peter is lazy.*
(4'e) *Peter is not stupid, to be true, but (one cannot deny that he is) lazy.*

That these two distinct properties of *but* actually presuppose two diametrically opposed conditions of use can be shown in that the symmetry of the conjunctions is put to test.

(6e) *This is not a house but a building.*
(7e) *?This is not a building but a house.*

Now let us consider that in (6) *but* is interpreted as *but*$_s$ — i.e. where the assertion made by the preceding sentence, p, is outright contradicted and replaced in its entirety by the assertion made in the consequent sentence, q. This sense is rendered by the German version (6g).

(6g) **Dies ist kein Haus, SONDERN ein Gebäude.*

There is no question that (6g) is incorrect in that the preceding sentence and the consequent sentence are not compatible with one another. On the second *but*-interpretation, however, namely but_s, (6g) is correct beyond the shadow of doubt — a disambiguating paraphrase would be: "It is true/You are correct in assuming that this is not a house, but the properties of the object are complementary to those of a house such that it can justly be designated by the more general name 'building'". This sense is rendered in German by (6'g).

(6'g) *Dies ist kein Haus, (WOHL) ABER ein Gebäude.*

Let us now consider sentences where the two nouns are interchanged.

(7e) *?This is not a building but a house.*
(7d) *?Dit is geen gebouw, maar een huis.*

Undoubtedly, under the but_s-interpretation (7) is incorrect; see the German version.

(7'g) *?Dies ist kein Gebäude, (wohl) aber ein Haus.*

With the reading of but_s, on the other hand, this sentence becomes acceptable, however in a very subjective, almost arbitrary, sense.

(7g) (?)*Dies ist kein Gebäude, sondern ein Haus.*

Note, however, that (6g) lends itself to another interpretation under which "building" does not carry the original meaning (i.e. the usual one), but that of a structure the value of which is rated higher than that of a house or of one which is bigger than a house. This use is not at stake here.

These examples make evident that the conditions of appropriate use of the conjunction *but/ maar* are determined also by the inclusion relation between the two nominals in the antecedent and the consequent sentences. The characteristics of acceptability would be identical in cases such as *spruce/ tree, mouse/ mammal, flower/ plant.* Given these lexical relations, $N_1 \subset N_2$ and $N_2 \supset N_1$ with N_1 and N_2 as elements which name things, the following will be found to hold:

Interpretation of	inclusion relation	BUT_s $MAAR_s$ ABER	BUT_s $MAAR_s$ SONDERN
(6), (6')	$NP_2 \supset NP_1$ (house) (building)	T	F
(7), (7')	$NP_2 \supset NP_1$ (building) (house)	F	T(?)

(NP_1 is the hyperonym which includes NP_2 ; p is the preceding sentence ; q is the consequent sentence. The truth predicates, T and F, are to be taken as criteria of adequacy controlling the association of a proposition (e.g. the proposition as it is expressed by one of the complex sentences above) to a set of possible worlds.)

2. It is one thing to determine, for example by means of the comparative method, *necessary* conditions for the appropriate realisation of particular senses of a conjunction. It is a totally different thing, however, to get hold also of *sufficient* conditions of use. Nowadays' use of literary or poetic language will often require us to draw the dividing line between the "sayable" (that which makes sense under all predictable circumstances), the "unsayable" (that which does not make sense under any predictable circumstance), and that which can be said under particular (but not all) circumstances. When asking questions of this sort we are set the task of finding rules of linguistic usage that exhaust the range of what can be said ; that is to say, rules by which we can exclude all that cannot be said.

Modern literary language often plays with this shibboleth. As an instance of such deviant use I would like to quote from *Kaspar*, a piece of the modern German writer Peter Handke (*Kaspar* 1968 : 45f. ; my translation — W.A. ; I am grateful to Don G. Stuart for his help with these delicate examples) :

(8g) "Der Schnee trifft aber genügsam".
(8e) *"The snow hits, but unassumingly"*.
(9g) "Die Fliege läuft über das Wasser aber massvoll".
(9e) *"The fly runs over the water, but with measured gait"*.
(10g) "Der Soldat kriecht durch den Schlamm aber zufrieden".
(10e) *"The soldier crawls through the mud, but contently"*.
(11g) "Die Peitsche knallt auf den Rücken aber ihrer Grenzen bewusst".
(11e) *"The lash cracks on the back, but aware of its limits"*.
(12g) "Der Pferdenarr rennt in die Falle aber mit der Welt versöhnt".
(12e) *"The horse-buff runs into the trap but at peace with the world"*.
(13g) "Der Verurteilte macht einen Luftsprung aber einsichtig".
(13e) *"The condemned man leaps into the air but prudently"*.
(14g) "Das Fabriktor knarrt aber das geht vorbei".
(14e) *"The factory gate creaks, but there will be an end to that"*.

Suffice it here to say that these "sentences" are used by the grown-up *Kaspar* who, up to that point of time, had been exposed to neither

language nor the circumstantial conventions that would govern the semantics of the language and which he is just about to learn. However, while he seems to have mastered the syntax and the phonology, what is still beyond his grasp are the rules which control the compatibility of lexical items and the logical structure of the sayable and the thinkable. With (8)-(14) he imitates sentences of his "prompters", (15)-(25), which comply wholly with the conventions of our language and our world.

(15g) "Der Raum ist klein, aber mein".
(15e) *"The room is small, but mine"*.
(16g) "Der Schemel ist niedrig, aber bequem".
(16e) *"The stool is small, but comfortable"*.
(17g) "Das Urteil ist hart, aber gerecht".
(17e) *"The judgement is hard, but just"*.
(18g) "Der Reiche ist reich, aber leutselig".
(18e) *"The rich one is rich, but affable"*.
(19g) "Der Arme ist arm, aber glücklich".
(19e) *"The poor one is poor, but happy"*.
(20g) "Der Alte ist alt, aber rüstig".
(20e) *"The old one is old, but hale and healthy"*.
(21g) "Der Berühmte ist berühmt, aber bescheiden".
(21e) *"The famous one is famous, but modest"*.
(22g) "Der Irre ist irr, aber harmlos".
(22e) *"The lunatic is crazy, but harmless"*.
(23g) "Der Verbrecher ist Abschaum, aber trotz allem ein Mensch".
(23e) *"The criminal is scum, but in spite of all a man"*.
(24g) "Der Krüppel ist bedauernswert, aber auch ein Mensch".
(24e) *"The cripple is pitiful, but also a man"*.
(25g) "Der Fremde ist anders, aber es macht nichts".
(25e) *"The stranger is different, but no matter"*.

But, if Kaspar really imitates his masterminds, he does so in a strangely superficial, although not always totally uninterpretable, way: (13), for example borders on wholly unmotivated language, just as well as (9) and (8) (that is to say, there is no apparent sense revealed by the conjunction *but* in (8) or (9)); (11) obviously requires particular metaphorical processes to render an interpretation; (14) as well as (12) seem to be trivial under the universal reading; i.e. they are motivated only as against a particular situational background; (10) coordinates two events in such a way that it can only be interpreted when we think of the speaker as being spiteful or deeply pessimistic.

3. Of all the better known European languages it is only Russian (*no/ a*, where the latter governs a complex of additional other senses beyond those of *but*) and Swedish (*men/ utan*, where the latter also stands for the preposition *without*) that make the same, or a similar, lexical distinction between conjunctional senses as German. By Latin *sed* and Greek ἀλλά the same equivocation is evinced as e.g. in English, Italian, Dutch, Danish and French. With this in mind it is perhaps not too surprising to find that R. Lakoff, who departs from English as her native tongue, should not have given this distinction any attention. But certainly we would not be willing to miss in an examination of this topic two distinct categories which would at least cover these two senses as subcategories, particularly since it is from the type of ordinary-language-philosophy approach adopted by Lakoff that one would expect such shades of distinctions to emerge. It should go without saying that even under some such pragmatic aspect of language comparison an attitude like "these are only distinctions on the level of lexicalized elements" is hardly tenable.

It what follows I would like to discuss the two central senses of *but/ maar* and emphasize the contrastive analysis of English-Dutch, as representatives of the non-lexicalizing type of languages, and German, as the representative of the lexicalizing type. The analysis will be almost exclusively semantic. The language of description will be a type of predicate calculus. The objectives of such a description are the following ones:

(a) We should be able to make explicit both differences and common features of the meanings of conjunctions, e.g. those of BUT_1 and BUT_2.

(b) We should be able to mark by means of distinctive conditions of use those meanings which are central, or most normal (universal), and separate from them marginal (highly subjective) ones.

(c) Unless the use of the conjunctions is partially determined by lexical semantics (as could be shown in fig. 1 above), it will be found to mirror the view that a speaker has, or wants to make the addressee(s) believe that he has, of the events which are expressed by the preceding and the consequent sentences and which are brought into a specific interrelation by the very insertion of the conjunction.

In a great number of cases, any two events stand in a pre-established, i.e. conventional, interrelation. Now, if the conjunction, under every circumstantial interpretation, is not compatible with the "conjunctionless", pre-established relation either non-interpretability or a particular unconventional view of the speaker is betrayed which in many cases can be classified as one of the typical speech attitudes (like irony, pessimism, malice). It is hoped that this approach

will yield a long-sought tool for the linguistic description of such figures of style.

(d) Since the meanings of conjunctions will be represented by combinations (usually logical conjunctions) of certain *n*-place predicates the different languages will be seen to select congruently as well as divergently from the register of different combinatorial possibilities of logical units.

4. In what follows my interest will center on the questions raised in (a) and (d). As stated above my point of departure will be that the conjunctional meanings postulate specific interrelations between the events represented by the single conjuncts. As far as the logical characteristics of these events and their possible (conventional) interrelations are concerned I mainly follow Levin (1973) [see also Lang (1974)]. These characteristics will be represented by the following list of predicate constants statable about the events x and y.

4.1. *List of primary predicates and their definitions.*

Let E be a primary set of events: E = {x, y, ..., z} (1)

(26) SIMUL (x, y) ... "x and y are realized at the same time"
(27) x ≃ y ... "x and y almost coincide"
(28) Us (x, y) ... "the event x is usually followed by the event y"
(29) Plus (x) ... "the event x is of a positive character"
(30) Min (x) ... "the event x is of a negative character"
(31) Co (x, y) ... "the events x and y are in opposition to one another"
(32) Prior (x, y) ... "the event x occurs prior to the event y"
(33) Caus (x, y) ... "the event x causes the event y to come about"
(34) Post (x, y) ... "the event x occurs after the event y"

(1) If we want to couple the semantic descriptions of sentences with those conditions under which these sentences are true — hence if in this type of semantics the relations between the truth conditions of the sentences are expressed — then extensions and semantic representations of sentences have to be kept distinct.

This requirement is not met very clearly in our analysis. Thus, it is not reasonable to equate the concept of the sentence/utterance and that of the event. However, quite clearly, the problem is not resolved if we simply substitute "proposition" for such events as x, y, ... z, since by doing so such predicates like PRIOR, POST, PREF, among others, could not be employed any longer in the intended uniform sense.

Possibly this somewhat unsatisfactory situation has farther reaching formal and metaphysical implications than I am able to oversee at the present time. However this may be, I abide by the formal and definitional suggestions made by Levin 1973, since I do not believe that the linguistic considerations would gain in expliciteness or "correctness".

4.2. *Operation*

(35) $\bar{x}$ ... "negation of the grammatical predicate in the sentence describing the event x".

4.3. *Derived predicates*

(36) $N(x, y) =_{def} (\exists z)[Us(x, z) \wedge Us(y, \bar{z})]$

(36') for $y \neq z$ $N(x, y) =_{def} Us(x, \bar{y})$

(37) $Dom(x, y) =_{def} [SIMUL(x, y) \cong x] \wedge \sim [SIMUL(x, y) \cong y]$ ... "x dominates over y".

(38) $Pref(x, y) =_{def} Plus(x) \wedge Min(y)$ ... "x is preferred to y"

(38') $Pref(x, y) =_{def} [Plus(x) \wedge \sim Plus(y)] \vee [\sim Min(x) \wedge Min(y)]$ ... weaker than (38)

(39) $Dep(x, y) =_{def} Us(x, y) \vee Us(y, x) \vee Us(x, \bar{y})$ ... dependency relation

4.4. *Some axioms*

(40) $Us(x, \bar{y}) \rightarrow Us(y, \bar{x})$ (comparable to the canonical contraposition)

(41) $Us(x, \bar{y}) \rightarrow \sim Us(x, y)$ (in distinction from the logical implication)

(42) $\sim Us(x, y) \rightarrow Us(x, \bar{y}) \vee Us(\bar{x}, y)$

(43) $Us(x, y) \rightarrow \sim Us(x, \bar{y})$ ... (in distinction from the logical implication) theoreme derived from (41)

(44) $Us(x, x)$

(45) $SIMUL(x, y) \rightarrow \sim Prior(x, y)$

(46) $Prior(x, y) \rightarrow Us(x, y)$

(47) $SIMUL(x, y) \rightarrow \sim Us(x, y)$

(48) $SIMUL(x, y) \rightarrow \sim Caus(x, y)$

(49) $Caus(x, y) \rightarrow Us(x, y)$

(50) $Co(x, y) \rightarrow Co(y, x)$

(51) $Plus(x) \rightarrow \sim Min(x)$

(52) $Us(x, y) \rightarrow \sim Co(x, y)$

(53) $Us(x, \bar{y}) \rightarrow Co(x, y)$ (not, however, $Co(x, y) \rightarrow Us(x, \bar{y})$!)

5. *BUT*$_a$ — *MAAR*$_a$ — *ABER*

German *aber* is a valid translation of both *but* and *maar* under any of the following readings. Since it is my aim to characterize explicitly particular features of style it seems fruitful to me to consider two subtypes of *but*$_a$: a normal, unmarked one, and one which is marked with respect to the speaker's view of conventions or states of affairs.

5.1. Both uses of but_a can be represented by (54):

(54) $N(x, y) =_{def} Us(x, \bar{y})$ ... see 5.1.1. below.

There is a special case of (54), namely (54'):

(54') $N(x, y) =_{def} (\exists x)[Us(x, z) \wedge Us(y, \bar{z})]$ ... see 5.1.2. below.

5.1.1. (54) is exemplified by:

(55) *He is a boy, but his name is Maria.*
(56) *His name is Siegfried, but he is French.*
(57) *It is snowing, but it is summer.*

In all of these cases "our" experience has taught us that the "event" that somebody is a boy/somebody is called Siegfried/it snows, i.e. (x), is *not* compatible with (does not "entail", in its untechnical sense) the event that this somebody's name is Maria/this somebody is French/it is summer, i.e. (y). It is with reference to which of our experiences are confirmed most often that "usually" (or "normally") has been employed in the definition of the *Us*-relation (see (28)).

5.1.2. The special case, (54'), is somewhat more complicated:

(58e) *He is a small guy, but very famous.*
(58g) *Er ist ein kleiner Kerl, aber sehr berühmt.*
(58d) *Hij is een kleine kerel, maar zeer beroemd.*
(59e) *The scholar is friendly, but a pedant.*
(59g) *Der Gelehrte ist freundlich, aber ein Pedant.*
(59d) *De geleerde heer is vriendelijk, maar een pedant.*

One sees immediately why an analysis following (54) is inadequate: Us $(x, \bar{y})$ cannot be complied with since there is no straightforward entailment association between somebody's smallness/the friendliness of scholars, (x), and anything but this somebody's renown/the scholar's pedantery, (y). The meaning connection is to be sought by a *tertium comparationis*, an *implicatum* common to both x and y, which in the formula above, (54'), is represented by z. The common implicates to be induced for (58) and (59) are the value-neutral (i.e. unmarked with respect to " + " or "—") "experiencedness" and "pleasantness", respectively. In other words, the following meaning relations would be established:

(58') *small* (x) $\leftrightarrow \sim$ *experienced* (x); famous (x) $\rightarrow$ *experienced* (x)
(59') *friendly* (x) $\rightarrow$ *pleasant* (x); *pedant* (x) $\rightarrow \sim$ *pleasant* (x)

The implicatum/implicator character of the predicates is illustrated in the two trees of deduction below (figures 1 and 2).



Fig. 1



Fig. 2

5.2. Another sub-type of the but_a-use is "world-creating" in the sense that a *normal* implicative relation holding between the two single events (i.e. Us (x, y)) is contested by the insertion of the "denial"-but_a.

(60e) *The student studied hard for the exam, but he passed (nevertheless).*

(60d) *De student bereidde zich goed op het examen voor, maar hij slaagde (toch).*

(61e) *The doctor applied artificial respiration, but the victim of the accident (nevertheless) gained his consciousness.*

(61d) *De arts paste kunstmatige ademhaling toe, maar het slachtoffer van het ongeluk kwam weer tot bewustzijn.*

Normally, such relations as Us(x, y), or even Caus (x, y), would appear to hold in (60) as well as (61); see (60'):

(60') *The student studied hard for the exam, therefore he passed.*

This relation is contradicted by the but_a-conjunction. Note that Us(x, $\bar{y}$) $\rightarrow \sim$ Us (x, y) and Us(x, y) $\rightarrow \sim$ Us (x, $\bar{y}$), and further Caus (x, y) $\rightarrow$ Us (x, y).

It appears safe to say that the linguistic analysis of such rhetorical attitudes as irony, malice, and pessimism, all provided that some subordinate conjunction participates in this interpretation, would be complied with any such relation. Note that the following conjunctions and adverbial particles render senses, both alone and in combination with *but*, equivalent to but_a: German *jedoch, allein, trotzdem, dennoch, doch, obwohl*; English *although, however, despite, yet, still, though, nevertheless*; Dutch *(al)hoewel, desondanks, toch.*

(60'g) *Der Student bereitete sich gut auf die Prüfung vor, aber er kam trotzdem/ doch/ dennoch durch.*

(60"g) *Obwohl er sich gut auf die Prüfung vorbereitete, kam er durch.*

(60'e) *The student was well prepared for the exam, but he passed (nevertheless/ in spite of that).*

(60"e) *Although the student was well-prepared for the exam, he passed.*

(60'd) *De student bereidde zich goed op het examen voor, maar desondanks/ toch/ slaagde hij.*

(60"d) *Alhoewel hij zich goed op het examen voorbereidde, slaagde hij.*

Note also the following interesting example the type of which was reported to me to be characteristic of Indian speakers of English.

(61) *He died — but he was ill.*

What will have to be implied for this version (which, for quite a number of native speakers of English is a case with which they do not know what to do) to be accepted in a discourse is something like the following : "If x_1 dies then there must be a reason for that ; if there is no reason then one would exclude that x_1 dies ; if you had known that x_1 was ill then you would have had reason not to exclude that x_1 dies". Now, although this inferential chain cannot directly be covered by the more special but_a-analysis, $(\exists z)$ [Us (x, z) $\wedge$ Us (y, $\bar{z}$)], the range of deductions necessary to account for the intended meaning of (6') would have to include some z and $\bar{z}$ both being the last consequences in the chains of deduction departing from x and y. (In this particular case, z would be "that x_1 died was to be expected".)

5.3. R. Lakoff (1971 : 133f.) pointed out that a categorical distinction should be made between a *but* applying to a semantic opposition and a (pragmatic) *but* which "denies an expectation". These are her examples :

(62) *John is tall, but Bill is short.*

(63) *John is rich but dumb.*

While (62) betrays a semantic opposition, i.e. the antonymy of constituents within the two conjuncts, no such semantic opposition is involved in (63). Rather what we postulate on the basis of our factual experience to make (63) interpretable is a *tertium comparationis*.

(63') Us [*rich* (x), *clever*(x)] and further ANTONYMOUS [*rich* (x), *dumb* (x)] because of *dumb* (x) $\rightarrow \sim$ *clever* (x) and *clever* (y) $\rightarrow \sim$ *dumb* (y) (semantic contradiction).

Lakoff's argument is a traditional one which has split the philosophy of language into two camps. It is essentially the question whether or not a distinction "analytic/synthetic statement" can be based on an all-or-none decision. We can restate this question with respect to our data in the following way. Rendering the logical implication or the Us-relation in ordinary language conjunctions we would arrive at the following exhaustive classification — provided we confine our attempts to inferences departing

from valid premisses : (a) conclusions which are valid on account of their "logical form" — e.g. inferring from the active to the passive form, from the relative attributive clause to the attributive adjective, etc. ; (b) conclusions valid as based on lexical relations : e.g. KILL (x, y) → DIE (y), SELL (x, y, z) → BUY (y, z, x); etc. ; (c) conclusions made valid on account of premisses which themselves are of but restricted validation. This latter class is represented most prominently by such cases as have been analyzed here by the *Us*-relation ("y *normally* follows from x", "y *normally* accompanies x"). Compare also in this connection

(64) *He broke the upper part of his thigh bone but nevertheless grew to become many years older.*

where the *but* and its (presuppositional) condition of use, Us (x, y), can be accounted for only by highly specific premisses such as (65) :

(65) *He was already 100 years old and very decrepit.*

Now what R. Lakoff seems to have in mind is that (62) would have to be explained by an inference of type (b), that (63), however, would necessitate one of type (c) (i.e. (63')) where a deduction of the *Us*-relational type has to be employed). In what follows I would like to show that, although such a classification is not wholly pointless, it must be modified considerably. The result of my considerations will be that the distinction between (b) and (c) is by no means qualifiable as an *all-or-none* dichotomy, but, rather, that it is a gradual one. This is a conclusion that has been propounded for the "analytic/synthetic" question among others by Wittgenstein, Quine, and B. Mates.

First of all it has to be mentioned that a great many asterisk structures such as R. Lakoff's have thoroughly acceptable readings. Compare :

(66) **John is rich, but poor.* (asterisk by R. Lakoff : 134).

Disregarding, first, a stylistically even more acceptable *John is rich, but yet he is poor*, (66) is meaningful in the case that *poor* is read as "mentally poor", "emotionally poor", etc. And this is no singular case : It is not difficult to "switch" to meaningful readings for many such sentences as (66) using antonymous pairs such as *smart/stupid, beautiful/ugly, ill/healthy, dead/alive*, and even a range of colour pairs like *black/white, green/red* (at least in my system of associations) — apparently, there is no limit to interpretability as long as a *tertium comparationis* from any imaginable

(alternative) world can be thought up (i.e. some z that would satisfy $(\exists z)$ [Us (x, z) $\wedge$ Us (y, $\bar{z}$)]) ; or, in other words, as long as some transferred (non-literal) meaning for one of the antonymous pairs can be found. In this sense, *aber*/*but*$_a$/*maar*$_a$ could be called a "world-creating" ("world-changing") conjunction. Under the force of an exception that what is being said has a meaning as derivable from some (more or less specific) context (one of Grice's main conversational implicatures), some interpretation is sought, if necessary under temporary (partial) suspension of the literal meaning of lexical items. Note that ordinarily any conjunction with *but* which may appear ill-motivated on first sight cannot be rejected as meaningless, but, rather, in discourse is the signal for an ascertaining question like "How is that to be understood?" or a signal of capitulation : "I do not understand (you)!". (66), thus, is partially meaningless, namely precisely when we presuppose semantic postulates such as (63'). However, usually such a world cannot "rescue its incompatibility" since, in a practical communicative situation, the conversational implicature is stronger (2).

The second argument is simply that Lakoff's assumption yields a contradiction unless it is modified on the syntactic level. Compare (66') to (62) :

(66') *John is rich, but Bill is rich too.*

One can conclude, then, that although the classification "*semantic* opposition" appears to be intuitively well founded, it cannot be taken as a criterion of the meaningfulness of *but*-sentences. Rather, the only explanation and analysis common to both of Lakoff's paradigms, (62) and (63), is Us (x, $\bar{y}$) or the more complicated expansion of it. This analysis matches with R. Lakoff's second, "pragmatic", category, namely "denial of expectation". Refuting the expectation of the addressee can always be

(2) Undoubtedly, this conclusion is too general since there are cases where the contradiction cannot be avoided. See (i) below :

(i) **His name is Siegfried, but his name is Pierre.*

While this last observation would appear to necessitate further constraints on the conclusion above it certainly marks the heuristics with *but*-versions in modern linguistics as an inconclusive methodological device. Cf. as a particularly clear case in point :

(ii) His name is Siegfried, but he is called Pierre.

(iii) *He ate, but he did not eat* (no asterisk!)

See Karttunen 1972 as a paradigm of such ill-motivated test heuristics, and criticism of it in Abraham 1974.

understood analytically as well as synthetically depending on the state of knowledge of the addressee. If Lakoff's second category can be taken to cover also the first category then the whole dichotomy assumption is not cogent any more. Note that also the entailment association in (62) can be formulated in terms of the special *Us*-analysis, with z = "it was expected that all, inclusive of John and Bill, are tall". Finally, to conclude the argument: naturally, *tall* (x) → ~ *short* (x) is "more analytical" than the relation holding between *rich* and *dumb*. However, how much a decision as to the "grade of analyticity" depends on the individual state of knowledge can be demonstrated by (67):

(67) *x is a prime number, but x is divisible.*

The statement in (67) is overtly false (L-false) for a mathematician. However, anyone not familiar with the strictly axiomatized vernacular of mathematics would infer from (67) that "prime number" and "divisible" usually would not be compatible with one another, but are nevertheless compatible here on account of conditions which are not spelled out — thus rendering (67) by no means "unsayable".

Despite all that the distinction that R. Lakoff suggests has interesting linguistic aspects which can be accounted for by the natural-logic analysis. As Lakoff (1971: 142) has observed the adversative conjunction *while* can be substituted for that *but* which connects constituents in semantic opposition, while this yields infelicitous, or thoroughly unacceptable, versions in the case of the "denial-of-expectation"-*but*. See (68) and (69):

(68) *John is poor, while (whereas,* German *während) Bill is rich.*
(69) *?While John is a Republican, Bill voted for Humphrey* (German *?während*).

(In German, *jedoch* and *hingegen* are possible in both cases!) (3).

(3) Note that R. Lakoff's own examples are inconclusive since the low-degree acceptability of (i), which she compares to (68), is due to the violation of the requirement that in a *while*-conjunction the grammatical subjects are not co-referent, as well as to the semantic opposition argument.

(i) *?While John is a Republican, he voted for Humphrey.*

Compare (ii) and (iii) which are absolutely unacceptable although strict semantic antonymy holds between the conjuncts — something that in Lakoff's evidence had played no role whatsoever.

(ii) **John is poor, while he is rich.*
(*under the literal readings of *poor/ rich*)
(iii) **While John is a Republican, he is a Democrate.*

Also it is interesting to note that in those cases where either the adversative or the tem-

Is there a way to account for this fact? *While (während, terwijl)* asserts that the predicate SIMUL holds for the events x and y : SIMUL (x, y). This is also true for the adversative *while* (= *whereas*) which can connect conjuncts for which the distinctness (opposition) relation holds : SIMUL (x, y) → DISTINCT (x, y). The simultaneity functor adequately accounts for (67) since the events x and y are non-dependent of one another by virtue of the distinctness of the grammatical subjects (which is a syntactic condition characterizing the uses of *while* and *whereas*). In other words, despite the meaning relations for the grammatical predicates, *poor* (x) → → ~ *rich* (x) and *rich* (x) → ~ *poor* (x), their interdependence is erased on the ground that their grammatical subjects are distinct (*poor* (John) DISTINCT *rich* (Bill)). (68), then, presents an instance of explicit cancellation of an otherwise existing semantic dependence. Precisely this instance of cancellation of a semantic dependence, however, is absent in Lakoff's second example, (69) : first because of the coreference of the subjects ; and second since, on the basis of our empirical state of knowledge, we deduce a *tertium comparationis*, z and $\bar{z}$, thereby establishing a relation of dependence between the two events (*Republican* (x) → ~ *Democrate* (x), *Humphrey* (y) → *Democrate* (y)).

Note, however, that *while* cannot be excluded as totally unacceptable in sentences such as (69) (Lakoff 1971 : 142 : "the denial-of-expectation-*but* sounds worse when *while* is substituted"). It is attractive to seek a connection betwern this observation and the *forms* of (non-)dependency which hold in the sentences under inspection. In the first one, a normally explicit dependency relation is overtly cancelled ; in the second, such a dependency does not become manifest until on second sight; i.e. not before one succeeds in establishing contingent associations between the two events. Naturally, such considerations are inconclusive in the absence of further evidence.

As is, more often than not, the case in linguistic descriptions influenced by ordinary language philosophy as well as in traditional "notional" grammars, such subcategories of the *but*-use as "validity-restricting" or the "interaction-sensitive" *yes-but* ... (German "geltungseinschränkend",

poral interpretation of *while* is made implausible by reference to some world the respective alternative interpretation is tried. Thus (ii) is acceptable under what is rather the temporal reading (supported by *at the same time*), while the antonyms *poor/ rich*, on first sight, point at the adversative reading.

(ii) *John is poor, while (at the same time) he is rich.*

"interaktionssensitiv") are not capable of adding new aspects beyond what has been characterized above as the "concessive" conjunction, and which is accounted for by the *Us*-relation. Regardless of the overt distinction, versions such as "... *to be true/ zwar — but/ aber ...*"; "... *— yes, but/ ja, aber...*" can adequately be covered by the specific refutation (x, y), of a preceding (explicit or implicit) assertion, (x, y), with the further motivation of the *Us*-relation between x and y to take care of the requirements for the use of the sentential conjunction.

5.4. *but*$_s$ — *maar*$_s$ — *sondern*.

For *sondern* to be appropriately used the antecedent must contain an explicit negation.

(70g) *NICHT deine Eltern, sondern dich will ich fragen.*
(70n) *NIET je ouders, maar jou wil ik vragen.*
(70e) *It is NOT your parents but you whom I want to ask.*

To make distinct the usage of modern German as compared to earlier stages Lang (1974 : 231 fn. 33) specifies further : "explicit negation" in the antecedent must either be the particle *nicht (not)* or the indefinite pronoun/adjective *kein (no)*, which is to be decomposed into *nicht + ein (not + one)*. Any other negation, either lexicalized or where a negation element can be uncovered decompositionally, fails to meet the required condition of use. Compare :

(71g) *Er ist kein Deutscher, sondern ein Österreicher.*
(71e) *He is not German, but Austrian.*
(72g) *Er ist nicht verheiratet, sondern Junggeselle.*
(72e) *He is not married, but a bachelor.*
(73g) **Er ist unverheiratet, sondern Junggeselle.*
(73e) **He is unmarried, but a bachelor.*
(74g) **Man sah mich selten in der Öffentlichkeit, sondern ich arbeitete immer zuhause.*
(sporadically to be found acceptable as late as in the 19th century ; cf. *Duden-Grammatik* 340).

Now, which requirements, beside the explicit conditions of use above, must be met to employ unequivocally, and keep distinct, *but*$_s$/ *aber* and *but*$_s$/ *sondern*? See (75)-(78) :

(75g) *Nicht Deutschland hat den Währungsverbund verlassen, sondern Frankreich.*
(75d) *Niet Duitsland heeft de monetaire unie verlaten, maar Frankrijk.*

(75e) (i) *Not Germany has left the monetary union, but France.*
(ii) *It is not Germany which has stepped out of the monetary union, (but) it is France.*
(76g) *Nicht Deutschland hat den Währungsverbund verlassen, (wohl/) aber Frankreich (/ schon).*
(76d) *Niet Duitsland heeft de monetaire unie verlaten, maar Frankrijk wel (Frankrijk echter wel).*
Niet Duitsland heeft de monetaire unie verlaten, wel echter Frankrijk.
(76e) *It is not Germany that has stepped out of the monetary union, but France.*
(77g) *Das Baby brüllt nicht, sondern es singt.*
(77d) (i) *De baby huilt niet, maar zingt.*
(ii) *De baby huilt niet, hij zingt.*
(77e) (i) *The baby does not cry, (but) he sings.*
(ii) *What the baby does is not cry, but sing.*
(78g) *Das Baby brüllt nicht, aber es singt.*
(78d) *De baby huilt niet, maar zingt.*
(78e) *The baby does not cry (,to be true,) but he does sing.*

Note that, in order to make overt the sense of either (75)/(77) or (76)/(78), the conjunctionless version may be used as a shibboleth. Thus for the *but*$_s$-sense:

(75e) *It is not Germany which has stepped out of the monetary union, it is France.*
(75d) *Het is niet Duitsland, die de monetaire unie verlaten heeft, maar het is Frankrijk.*
(77e) *What the baby does is not cry, he sings.*
(77d) *De baby huilt niet, hij zingt.*

What does the *but*$_s$/ *sondern*-sense signal in discourse? In the antecedent is defined what range the consequent is to cover. In other words, if Speaker$_1$ asserts x, Respondent/Speaker$_2$ rejects this assertion by X and specifies in the consequent, y, inhowfar he motivates the rejection of x (cf. Lang 1974: 309ff.). The readings that *but*$_s$ as well as *but*$_s$/ *sondern* evoke have one feature in common with respect to antecedent and consequent. In (75) and (77) it is equally presupposed that there is something that Germany and France have in common such that the *corrigens* will have to be selected precisely in accordance with this common characteristic — the monetary union. There is an additional feature characteristic solely of *but*$_s$/*aber*, namely that of compensation: first something

negative is rebutted (in the antecedent) ; in the consequent sentence then, something that is somewhat less negative is conceded *(but France has (stepped out of the union))*. The presupposition in (76) and (78) raised commonly by antecedents as well as consequents is something unpleasant (defection from the monetary union ; noise produced by the baby regardless of what exactly it is : whether crying or singing). The factor of negative concession evolves from the separate evaluations of the antecedent and the consequent in (78) ; it is first rejected that the earstrain is caused by the baby's crying ; but then it is admitted that the baby's singing is disturbing, although at a somewhat lesser degree. This reading of negative concession is accounted for by the special analysis of the preference relation holding between the two events, x and y :

(79) Pref (x, y) . → . ~ Min (x) ∧ Min (y).

The use of *but*$_4$/ *sondern*, on the other hand, is accounted for by *Co* predicated of the two events and specified further in that the antecedent assertion is explicitly rejected as false, whereas nothing but the consequent assertion is confirmed as correct : Co (x, y) → (ℵ , ∧ y) (cf. Lang 1974 : 237).

Finally, let us make one point with respect to the symmetry relation between the conjuncts. Since the meaning of the *but*$_4$-conjunction is taken care of by the asymmetrical Us(x, ℵ), the two conjuncts cannot be exchanged without a change of meaning.

(80e) ?*The baby does not sing, but cry he does.*
(80d) ?*De baby zingt niet, maar hij huilt (wel).*
(80g) ?*Das Baby singt nicht, aber es brüllt.*

(80) can be meaningful only on the understanding that *crying* is preferred to *singing* — which is hardly conceivable except under very special circumstances. This exchangeability is additionally motivated by the asymmetric property of the *Pref*-predicate, which, as has been shown above, holds to explain (76) and (78) (see (79)). Likewise, asymmetry characterizes *but*$_3$-sentences because of the very specific *Co*-relation : (ℵ ∧ y).

The discourse signals, then, in the most general and reduced sense, of *but*$_3$ and *but*$_4$ are distinguishable along these lines : Since there exists at least one complement of y, y', such that for the events x and y' holds the "normally entails"-relation, *but*$_3$/ *aber* implies (for both speaker and hearer) some kind of associability between the reported events, x and y,

thereby weakening the rebuttal of the antecedent by conceding partial validity of it under the dominance of some uniting property; let us call this discourse signal "concessive contradiction".

But$_4$/ sondern, on the other hand, signals uncompromising rejection of some assertion x and the need to replace it, in its entirety, by some wholly distinct y. (The sufficient condition of some characterizeability, common to both x and y, safeguards understandability for *but$_4$*- as well as *but$_4$*-conjunctions).

5.5. German DAFÜR

Dafür is a conjunction for which, in quite a few languages, there is no direct lexical equivalent (however, compare Russian *zato*!), or, if there is as in Dutch, only in specific subsenses.

(81g) *Schmidt wird Bundeskanzler, dafür wird Scheel Bundespräsident.*
(81d) (i) *Schmidt wordt bondskanselier, maar Scheel wordt bondspresident.*
(ii) *Schmidt wordt bondskanselier, daartegenover wordt Scheel bondspresident.*
(iii) *Schmidt wordt bondskanselier, daarvoor wordt Scheel bondspresident.*
(81e) (i) *Since Schmidt becomes federal chancellor, Scheel is made federal president.*
(ii) *Schmidt becomes federal chancellor, consequently Scheel is made federal president.*
(iii) *Schmidt becomes federal chancellor; in compensation for that Scheel is made federal president.*
(82g) *Er ist etwas kurzatmig, dafür hat er sehr lange Beine.*
(82d) (i) *Hij is een beetje kortademig, maar hij heeft erg lange benen.*
(ii) *Hij is een beetje kortademig, daar staat tegenover, dat hij erg lange benen heeft.*
(82e) *He is short of breath, but (to make up for that/ to compensate that) he has very long legs.*

These examples outline which sense constituents an analysis will have to include. In (82), the case of the compensatory *dafür*, a preference relation is involved such that the property predicated of the consequent sentence is preferred to that of the antecedent: Pref (y, x) (cf. Levin for Russian *zato*). However, in (81) this is not at all plausible. It would be safe to assume also the inverse preference relation, or, for that matter, complete neutrality as to any preference. Hence:

(83) Pref (x, y) V Pref (y, x) V ~ Pref (x, y) V ~ Pref (y, x)

However, as seems safe to infer from a larger number of examples that have been looked at, the most frequent (most normal) analysis is Pref (y, x) (Levin, 1973 : 12, arrives at the same conclusion). In addition to *Pref*, somewhat less strongly, a dominance relation is felt to hold such that the consequent receives the stronger accent of the two events : Dom (y, x) (Levin 1973 : 12). Both *Pref*- and *Dom*-relations become apparent at their best when *dafür*- and *und*-versions are juxtaposed.

(84g) *Sie ist klein und wohl proportioniert.*
(84d) *Ze is klein en goed geproportioneerd.*
(84e) *She is small and well-shaped.*
(85g) *Sie ist klein, dafür (aber) wohl proportioniert.*
(85d) *Ze is klein, (maar) daar staat tegenover dat ze goed geproportioneerd is.*
(85e) *She is small, but nevertheless well-shaped.*

While Pref (y, x) holds in (85) we cannot distribute any *Min/ Plus* or *Dom* in the analysis of (84), which would seem to be essentially the asyndetic case failing to evoke any association between antecedent and consequent (hence $\sim$ Us (x, y) $\wedge$ $\sim$ Us (x, $\bar{y}$)).

With respect to the two logical constituents of the semantic analysis, *Pref* and *Dom*, essentially two types of deviation can be envisaged. Let us first bring the preference relation into focus.

(86g) *Meine Orange ist bitter, dafür ist sie schwer zu schälen.*
(86e) *My orange is bitter, but, to make up for that, it is difficult to peel.*

No preference is to be made out in (86),

(87) $\sim$ Pref (y, x) $\wedge$ $\sim$ Pref (x, y)

since the two conjuncts fail to satisfy any two discrete degrees of the *Min*-predicate. Note that we do not have to stick with *Min*-predicates as to arrive at the same type of deviation. This is also the case where two *Plus*-predicates are attributed.

(88g) *Meine Schwester ist intelligent, mein Bruder dafür hat wunderbar lange Haare.*
(88e) (i) *My sister is intelligent, on the other hand my brother has wonderful long hair.*
(ii) *My sister is intelligent, in compensation my brother has wonderful long hair.*

When the normal *Pref*-relation is inverted the result is usually an ironic speech-attitude.

(88g) *Ich habe mich mit meiner Frau versöhnen können, dafür habe ich jetzt Schwierigkeiten mit meiner Freundin.*

(89e) (i) *Since I succeeded in making up with my wife, I am now in trouble with my girl friend.*

(ii) *I succeeded in making up with my wife, on the other hand I am now in trouble with my girl friend.*

(89d) *Ik heb me met mijn vrouw kunnen verzoenen, daarvoor (/ in de plaats) heb ik nu moeilijkheden met mijn vriendin.*

What accounts for (89) is a representation such as (90).

(90) Pref (x, y) → Plus (x) ∧ Min (y).

As for deviations from the normal dominance relation the question is somewhat more subtle. It is far from plain to assign a *Dom*-relation to any case where the necessary condition, i.e. any *Us*-relation between the meanings of the conjuncts, is violated. Compare (91):

(91g) *?Dietrich hat sich am Auge verletzt, dafür hatte er sich vorher die Nägel geschnitten.*

(91e) *?Dietrich has injured his eye, but then he had cut his nails beforehand.*

Wherever the compensatory *dafür* holds in its normal reading its interpretation overlaps with that of *but*$_a$/ *aber*.

(92g) *Sie ist klein, aber wohl proportioniert.*

(92d) *Ze is klein, maar goed geproportioneerd.*

(92e) *She is small, but well-shaped.*

Naturally, then, the same entailment holds as has been observed for *but*$_a$/ *aber*/ *maar*$_a$. In other words, the antecedent conjunct elicits the inference of anything else but what is asserted in the consequent conjunct. Hence, Us (x, y), which holds likewise for (93)

(93g) *klein, dafür verwegen*

(93e) *little, but daring*

(93d) *klein, maar dapper*

with the semantic analysis:

(94) Us (x, y) ∧ Pref (y, x) ∧ Dom (y, x)

Note that (93) can be paraphrased by

(95g) (i) *klein, aber verwegen*

(ii) *klein, jedoch dafür verwegen*

(95e) *small, however, daring*

and, with an inverted dominance relation, also by

(96g) *verwegen, obgleich klein*
(96e) *daring, although small*
(97) Us (x, $\bar{y}$) ∧ Pref (x, y) ∧ Dom (y, x)

(96) and (97), when compared to (94) and (95), make evident of what different sorts the three relations are : *Dom* seems to be dependent upon word order since it alters between (93)/(96) (x and y are exchanged for one another in (94) and (97)!) : *Pref* is a purely semantic (encyclopedic) predicate since it remains identical regardless of the changing word-order ; likewise, *Us* is purely semantic the inversion of x and y being explained by the axiom of contraposition, Us (x, $\bar{y}$) ⟶ Us (y, $\bar{x}$) (see (40)).

5.6. *Sketch of the typical semantics of the three conjuncts* BUT_a : BUT_s : DAFÜR.

ABER BUT_a MAAR$_a$ (ECHTER) NO (concessive)	NICHT... SONDERN NOT... BUT_s NIET... MAAR (contradictory : «false-true»)	(ZWAR...)-DAFÜR BUT/(TO MAKE UP FOR THAT) DAARVOOR/DAARTEGENOVER ZATO (compensatory ; negatively concessive)
assertion : SIMUL (x, y)	*assertion :* (1) SIMUL ($\bar{x}$, y) (2) Co (x, y) ⟶ ($\bar{x}$ ∧ y)	*assertion :* SIMUL (x, y)
presupposition : there must hold : (1) (∃z) [Us (x, z) ∧ Us (y, $\bar{z}$)] or if y ≡ $\dot{z}$, then (∃z) [Us (x, z) ∧ Us (y, $\bar{z}$)] ≡ Us (x, $\bar{y}$) (2) only for the compensatory sense (see 118)) : (1) ∧ Dom (x, y) ∧ Pref (x, y) ⟶ Plus [SIMUL (x, y)] or ⟶ ~ Min [SIMUL (x, y)] (3) other compensatory sense (see (95) ; cf. DAFÜR) (1) ∧ Dom (y, x) ∧ Pref (y, x) ⟶ Plus [SIMUL (x, y)]	*presupposition :* there must hold : (1) the assertion of $\bar{x}$ is presented by either explicit nor or no, none, no one (nicht, kein).	*presupposition :* there must hold : (1) ∧ (2) ∧ (3) (1) Us (x, y) ∨ Us (y, x) ∨ Us (x, $\bar{y}$) ∨ Us ($\bar{y}$, x) ∧ (∃z) [Us (x, z) ∧ Us (y, $\bar{z}$)] (2) Pref (y, x) (3) Dom (y, x) [weak] therefore (cf. compensatory ABER under (3)) : Dom (y, x) ∧ Pref (y, x) ⟶ Plus [SIMUL (x, y)]
there must not hold : (4) Us (y, x), or, more precisely, (Vs) [Q (s) ⟶ $\bar{P}$ (s)] where Q is the grammatical predicate in y, P that in x.	there must not hold : (2) Us (x, y) ∨ Us (y, x) or, more precisely, (3) (Vs) [Q(s) ⟶ P(s)] where where Q is the grammatical predicate in y, P that in x.	there must not hold : (4) (Vs) [P (s) ⟶ Q (s) ∨ (Vs) [Q (s) ⟶ P (s)] where Q is the grammatical predicate in y, P that in x.

Excursus on the dependence relation:

The predicate DEPENDENT is assigned to x and y if at least one relation in the form of meaning postulates holds between the meanings of the conjuncts; i.e. if, for example (cf. Lang 1974; 172f.; Levin 1973: 24f. and 3.3.):

(98) $(\forall s)\,[P(s) \rightarrow \sim Q(s)]$ ... i.e. exclusion (contradiction or contrariness (antonymy)) as between the grammatical predicates of x and y.

(99) $(\forall s)\,[[P(s) \rightarrow Q(s)] \vee [Q(s) \rightarrow P(s)]]$ ... i.e. inclusion.

INDEPENDENCE between the grammatical predicates of the events x and y, then, is defined by (100):

(100) $\sim [(\forall s)\,[P(s) \rightarrow \sim Q(s)] \vee (\forall s)[P(s) \rightarrow Q(s) \vee (\forall s)\,[Q(s) \rightarrow P(s)]$ and, by De Morgan's law,

(101) $(\exists s)\,[P(s) \wedge Q(s)] \wedge (\exists s)\,[P(s) \wedge \sim Q(s)] \wedge (\exists s)\,[\sim P(s) \wedge Q(s)]$ ... i.e. neither the relation of inclusion nor that of exclusion hold for the scopes of the grammatical predicates in x and y.

6. Let us, after this exercise in the formal description of the meanings of sentence conjunctions, turn our attention back to the question raised in 2.: Does Kaspar's use of *but* parallel that of the "prompters" (see (8) through (25))? If it does, are we able to account for the "strangeness" of Kaspar's language in terms of the normal conditions of use of *but* stated in the aforegoing sections? We have become aware of the fact that there are overlapping ranges of the *dafür*- and *aber*-uses. It is precisely this transient sense which characterizes the conjunction in the "conventional" sentences of the prompters, (15)-(25): Except in (25), *dafür* can be substituted for *aber* without losing anything of the essential meaning. In fact, this substitution expresses even more poerfully the speech act characteristic of compensatory lulling by the prompters. These sentences also confirm the typical analysis of *dafür*, namely Pref (y, x); in other words, in the antecedent it is admitted that some event has a *Min*-property, which, however, is compensated by the entire consequent or constituents of it, carrying, without further contextual restrictions, the *Plus*-characteristic: Pref (y, x).→.Min(x) ∧ Plus(y). This relation of compensation is not identical in all of the sentences under inspection though. Note that in (23) and (24), the reported events in the consequent clauses offered as recompense prove to be semantically redundant with respect to the property of the antecedents: *criminal*(x) → *man*(x); *cripple*(x) →

man(x). The compensatory effect is trivially allowed for by the lexical semantics. Hence, the pragmatic effect proposed as solace actually is truistic and is revealed as a form of manipulation. This attitude pervading all the "prompters' " sentences reaches a certain climax in (25) where by the consequent the *Min*-predicate for the antecedent is rejected in the most unconditional manner possible, thus almost trivially satisfying the presupposition conditions of the use of *dafür*.

The following would appear to be true for Kaspar's attempt to form his sentences according to the conventional patterns. Even if we have to take for granted that one of the conversational implicatures is observed, namely *what is said is meaningful*, it is but in few cases that the primary condition of use of *dafür* and *aber* is satisfied. The first presupposition (see chart. p. 28), namely that a common z connects the interpretations of the conjuncts is not observed in (8), (9), (11), and (13). To account for (10) we can induce Us (x, y) without much difficulty:

(102) *crawl through the mud* (x) → ~ *contented* (x)

Such would be somewhat arbitrary, however, in the case of (12) (i.e. only if (103) holds). Note that the last step is somewhat dubious:

(103) *run into the trap* (x) → ~ *contented* (x)
~ *contented* (x) → ~ *be at peace with the world* (x).

(14), finally, violates no conditions of use and hence is absolutely acceptable. Here, however, with strange and unexpected insight, Kaspar parallels the triviality in (25), in that the unpleasantness of the creaking of the gate is excluded for future times although it is not obvious who, or what, would be engaged to prevent the creaking.

Note also that in this last example there is no overlap with the *dafür*-sense, simply because *there will be an end to that* (i.e. the consequent in (14)) can be entailed by almost any event expressed in the antecedent (hence, trivially, (∀s) [Us (x, *there will be an end to x*)]. Finally, the more or less readily interpretable sentences, (10) and (12), follow the pattern of the "prompters" in that *dafür* can be substituted for *aber*. Whether this semantic parallel between the prompters' and Kaspar's sentences does in fact reveal Kaspar's conscious dissociation from the conventional linguistic usage is of course a matter of speculation.

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IS IT POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO WRITE TEXT GRAMMARS?

The idea of writing text grammars was conceived in connection with certain recent developments in linguistics and in disciplines intimately connected with linguistics. Among the chief factors which led to the formulation of the postulate that text grammars should augment traditional sentence grammars are 1. Continued interest in text linguistics and a desire to give a more explicit format to the inquiries into the nature of texts (cf. Fries 1971, Schmidt 1973, Hendricks 1967, 1969, Thorne 1969, 1970); 2. Recent developments in generative grammar, especially the version which can be called somewhat infelicitously generative semantics, in which elements of symbolic logic are employed as metalanguage for semantic representations involving such notions as presupposition, entailment, etc. (cf. Lakoff, 1971a); 3. Renewed interest in pragmatics and its relation to both semantics and syntax (cf. Labov 1970); 4. The realization of the disquieting fact that traditional sentence grammars have very limited applications in language pedagogy (Widdowson 1973, Sharwood-Smith 1973), machine translation (Ludskanov 1973) and contrastive analysis (Krzeszowski 1973, in press a); 5. Lack of conclusive evidence in favour of the claim that sentence rather than text should be considered as a theoretical prime in generative grammars, with which the start symbol for formation rules should be associated (Van Dijk 1972).

We are not going to analyse the contribution that each of these five factors had in the formation of the idea that text grammars should be constructed. It will suffice to say that all these factors have had their share in conducting some investigators to expressing the explicit opinion that the notion of grammaticality should be extended beyond the boundaries of sentence, which immediately involves the concept of text grammars. The most elaborate statement so far made upon this issue comes from Van

Dijk (1972), who claims that a number of grammatical phenomena heretofore dealt with within the limits of sentence, cannot be accurately and adequately accounted for unless longer stretches texts are regarded as primary linguistic data to be explained by the theory. Among these phenomena are definitization, pronominalization and other grammatical processes relying on co-reference and cross-reference. Independently of these grammatical phenomena, it is claimed that cohesion of texts can be adequately treated only if such logical relations as presupposition and entailment are accommodated into the grammar in the form of global constraints upon whole texts rather than as local constraints on particular successions of sentences (Van Dijk 1972, Bellert 1970).

The present article will attempt to investigate the problem whether text grammars can be regarded as substantially different from sentence grammars and consequently whether there is a need to construct them. Answers to these questions depend upon the nature of texts in comparison with the nature of sentences. Therefore we shall have to occupy ourselves with some problems connected with the structure of sentences and the structure of texts, since any differences which should prove to exist have a bearing upon the construction of text grammars in contrast with the already familiar sentence grammars.

The first question which must be answered before any further discussion is attempted is whether it is in principle possible to construct text grammars. The answer to this fundamental question depends upon answers to two more specific questions, which are both concerned with the nature of texts *vis à vis* the nature of sentences. The two crucial questions are the following :

1. Is it possible to associate a particular sentence in any systematic and predictable way with a particular setting in which that sentence might occur?
2. Are sentences in a text syntagmatically related?

If both these questions receive positive answers, then it appears that text grammars can indeed be constructed.

Before we attempt to answer the first of these questions, let us observe that the word "setting" can be understood as either extra-linguistic setting or as linguistic setting. Extra-linguistic setting is the socio-physical environment in which a particular sentence appears, while linguistic setting is the written or spoken text of which a particular sentence is a part. In view of this distinction it is possible to envisage three situations connected

with the appearance of a particular sentence in a setting : (a) sentences can be associated with particular extra linguistic settings. Such an association and its terms can be called *discourse* ; (b) sentences can be associated with particular linguistic settings. Such an association and its terms can be called *text*. (For a similar distinction between discourse and text see Widdowson 1973) ; (c) sentences can be associated both with extra linguistic and linguistic settings. It is convenient to call any association that obtains between a sentence and a set of settings in which it appears as the *use* of that sentence. The associations described in (a), (b) and (c) provide basis for distinguishing between *extra-linguistic* (or *pragmatic*) use of a sentence, *linguistic* use of a sentence and what may be called *normal* (natural) use of a sentence. These distinctions are made solely for the purpose of the present discussion in order to make it clearer. It appears that any arguments pertaining to (a) are also valid with respect to (c) ; likewise any arguments pertaining to (b) are valid with respect to (c), since anything which may be said about pragmatic or linguistic use of sentences has a bearing upon their natural use in communicative situations. Therefore, by showing the impossibility of making systematic predictions about the pragmatic use of sentences we will have shown the impossibility of making systematic predictions about the use of sentences in general. For this reason in our further remarks we need not be concerned with the normal use of sentences and concentrate on the pragmatic and linguistic use of sentences, which make up the normal use.

Having thus delimited the scope of our inquiries, let us resume our attempt to find an answer to our first question. In view of the distinction between extra linguistic and linguistic settings, the first question must now be split into two questions, viz.

1a. Is it possible to associate a particular sentence in any systematic and predictable way with a particular extra-linguistic setting or a set of such settings?

1b. Is it possible to associate a particular sentence in any systematic and predictable way with a particular linguistic setting?

It appears obvious that the first question must receive the negative answer. The reason is that people's verbal reactions to extralinguistic phenomena can only be predicted on *probabilistic* grounds, which excludes the possibility of codifying these reactions in the form of rules which could constitute a grammar where the number of available choices would be finite : any extra linguistic situation may be associated with an infinite

number of linguistic expressions, which constitute a hierarchy of probabilities but nothing more. We shall return to some aspects of this problem in our discussion of coherence of texts.

The negative answer to question 1a does not imply the impossibility of constructing text grammars, provided that 1b can be answered positively. The negative answer to 1a merely means that discourse grammars are not likely to be feasible, which should not be too surprising if it is realized that grammars are properly defined as theories of linguistic forms rather than theories of linguistic forms in association with extra-linguistic objects. On the other hand, linguistic settings do constitute linguistic forms, so that in principle they do fall within the province of grammars, even if the notion "grammar" requires a certain expansion in comparison with its traditional scope relating to sentences rather than to their sequences.

Being left with 1b, pending an answer, one immediately realizes that the problem posed by 1b shades into our second major problem, i.e., whether sentences constituting a text are syntagmatically related. In other words, it must be found out whether there exist such realizations across sentences in a text which yield themselves to valid generalizations. In yet another phrasing it is necessary to see whether sentences constituting texts can be said to be arranged according to some discoverable rules, which, when discovered and formulated would constitute a grammar. In more rigorous terms the problem may be stated as follows: Is it possible to formulate any constraints upon linear ordering of sentences in texts, such that a complete list of such constraints would specify a subset of *well-formed* arrangements of sentences within the set of *all possible* arrangements of sentences in a given language? One must also find out to what extent the violation of such constraints causes anomalies and at what level of representation these constraints operate. In addition it must also be found out whether these constraints are connected with linguistic forms alone, or whether they are in any way dependent on extra-linguistic situations. Without answers to these questions no predictions about the appearance of sentences in the context of other sentences can be made and question 1b cannot be answered positively. It thus appears that the answer to the first question which we formulated in the present notes, i.e. whether it is in principle possible to write text grammars, predominantly depends upon the answer to the more specific question, i.e., the question of whether sentences in a text are syntagmatically related. Only if this question receives a positive answer can we pursue the problem further.

Five possibilities suggest themselves with respect to the problem of

relations between sentences in a text. In investigating these possibilities we shall seek not only an answer to the question of whether text grammars *can* be written (via the more specific problem of whether sentences in a text are syntagmatically related) but also an answer to the other fundamental question formulated earlier on, i.e., whether it is *necessary* to write text grammars, provided they can be written.

The five types of relations between sentences in a text can be expressed in the form of the following claims:

1. Sentences in a text are not syntagmatically related, either semantically or syntactically; consequently, no non-trivial text grammar can be written: the only rule in a text grammar in this case would be a rule schema accounting for the concatenations of sentences in the linear order from left to right.

2. Sentences in a text are syntagmatically syntactically related but syntactic relations between them are not different from syntactic relations obtaining within sentences; consequently the grammar generating texts is not different from the grammar generating sentences.

3. Sentences in a text are syntagmatically semantically related, but sequences of sentences exhibit the same semantic relations as obtain within sentences and in fact the whole text can be viewed as a single sentence, consisting of constituent sentences, either connected by syntactic sentence connectives or not overtly connected. Syntactically, then, such combinations represent the situation described in the first claim, while semantically texts require no special theory; consequently as in the case described in the first claim, no non-trivial text grammar can be constructed.

4. Sentences in a text are syntagmatically semantically related with syntactic markers of such relations optionally expressed. The semantic relations between sentences are different than those within sentences so that although text grammars could be isomorphous with sentence grammars they must be constructed in order to account for the semantic relations which cannot be stated in the corresponding sentence grammars.

5. Sentences in a text are syntagmatically syntactically related. These syntactic relations are different from those that obtain between constituents of sentences. This necessitates writing text grammars accounting for inter-sentential syntactic relations.

Let us examine briefly each of the five claims, trying to investigate empirical evidence which could invalidate some or all of these claims.

The first claim is the most extreme one and cannot be defended on empirical grounds. Its acceptance would require the denial of the obvious fact that people are capable of communicating in a coherent way, by uttering meaningful sequences of sentences rather than paradigms of sentences, each conveying a message in isolation from other sentences.

The second claim too obviously contradicts facts to merit serious consideration. Unlike sentences (with the exception of compound sentences) texts cannot be analysed into hierarchically structured syntactic constituents such as NP's, VP's or other units for which one-to-one correspondence with sentence elements could be established. Whether texts immediately consist of sentences or whether they can be analysed into semantico-syntactic units intermediate between sentence and text is a problem which has to be investigated (For some discussion of this problem see Krzeszowski, in press b).

The third claim in fact involves two claims, one that sentences in a text are syntactically related and another that they are semantically related. The syntactic part of the claim corresponds to the second claim above and in so far as the second claim must be rejected, the third claim must be rejected as well.

There remains the problem of the semantic content of the sentence in comparison with the semantic content of the text. Katz and Fodor (1963), who seem to be advocates of the third claim, have the following to say upon this issue: "for every discourse (text in our terminology T.P.K.) there is a single sentence which consists of the sequence of n-sentences that comprises the discourse connected by the appropriate sentential connectives and which exhibits the same semantic relations exhibited in the discourse" (For related views see also Sanders 1969). The existence of connectives which can join sentences but not their elements, such as *moreover, furthermore, therefore*, etc., seems to speak in favour of syntactic and semantic independence of text grammars with relation to sentence grammars. The presence of such connectives must be accounted for by a syntactic device which cannot be identified with any device which generates sentences. On the other hand sentence connectives have their own semantic readings which cannot be deduced from semantic readings of sentences which they connect. (For some semantic interpretations of certain so-called "logical terms" in their semantic role see Reichenbach 1948). If there exist any semantic relations between sentences constituting a text, they cannot be identical with semantic relations obtaining within sentences, if only because of the existence of sentence connectives which

never conjoin elements within a sentence, even if these elements are themselves sentences. The denial of Katz and Fodor's claim suggests the necessity of writing text grammars to account for inter-sentential semantic relations which can be optionally syntactically marked. It will be seen that such a view is not free from difficulties either.

This brings us to the fourth claim, which, it will be remembered, says that sentences in a text are syntagmatically related semantically and that these semantic relations can be optionally overtly expressed. The overt markers of semantic intersentential relations, apart from the sentence connectives mentioned earlier on, also include definite noun phrases, pronouns as well as certain arrangements of sentence stresses (cf. Szwedek 1974). All these phenomena can be dealt with only in terms of coreference established for stretches of texts longer than a sentence. Unlike sentence connectives, they do not, however, constitute evidence in favour of text grammars, since they can be accounted for in terms of Katz's extended sentence grammars in which each text is seen as a single sentence. For the purposes of the present discussion we can lay these phenomena aside. The position that sentences in a text are semantically interrelated in ways which cannot be accounted for in terms of traditional sentence grammars is most strongly expressed by Van Dijk (1972), who claims that "a text has a semantic coherence which surpasses the micro-structural or local constraints of its individual sentences" (Van Dijk 1972 : 132). He, nevertheless, also claims that "the basic structures underlying whole texts and sentences can be considered to be isomorph ...", (Van Dijk 1972 : 140), being of the opinion that global deep structures underlying texts and constituting semantic abstracts underlying texts can be expressed in terms of the same system of representation, preferably symbolic logic, as is used to represent semantic structures of individual sentences. Van Dijk admits that he is not at all cognizant of how these semantic representations are to be structured, not to mention the rules which are used to expand the abstracts underlying texts to form semantic representations of the constituent sentences. We are not going blame Van Dijk for that since these difficulties have no bearing on the present discussion. The issue which must be considered, however, is whether one can legitimately use the principles of logic to serve as a model for the semantic structure of texts. It is certainly justified to claim that coherence of texts can be ex post *evaluated* in terms of such logical relations as presupposition and entailment, which are in turn dependent upon certain "initial conditions" inherently connected with particular given times and places, i.e., with aspects of the ex-

tralinguistic reality (cf. Van Dijk 1972 : 97). Some of these conditions, for particular sentences, can admittedly be extracted from preceding parts of the text in which these sentences appear. Such is the case with co-reference and cross-reference associated with definite and indefinite NP's, anaphoric pronouns, etc. These problems, however, as was pointed out earlier can be dealt with in terms of extended sentence grammars and thus they do not constitute satisfactory evidence in favour of macro-structures postulated by Van Dijk.

It appears that the same can be said about such problems as entailment and presupposition to account for which it does not seem to be necessary to postulate textual semantic macro-structures which would be formally or substantially distinct from semantic representations of conjoined sentences. In his discussion of presupposition, Van Dijk does not quote a single example which could not be represented as one sentence. As a matter of fact Van Dijk defines as a presupposition of a sentence Si any preceding sentence which can be embedded into Si. Thus in the following examples the underlined words constitute presuppositions :

Peter is ill. John knows that = John knows that *Peter is ill.*
There is a book on the table. Give it to me! =
Give me *the book* which *is on the table.*
John arrived. Do you know when? Do you know when *John arrived*?

In this way Van Dijk involves himself in a vicious circle, since in order to refute Lakoff's view that presuppositions constitute part of the meaning of sentences (Lakoff 1971), or strictly speaking part of their semantic representations, Van Dijk removes presupposition outside the sentence and uses the thus concocted texts to prove his claim that presuppositions account for relations between sentences and in this manner necessitate the construction of text grammars. By admitting that all his examples can be represented as single sentences (by virtue of the embedding criterion whereby presupposition is defined), Van Dijk completes his vicious circle without attempting to provide any external evidence in favour of one or the other solution. In view of this, phenomena connected with presupposition (and likewise entailment) cannot be used as evidence in favour of text grammars.

In brief, on the basis of what has been said so far, the only evidence which so far resists refutation is the existence of sentence connectives. It is therefore necessary to see if those connectives can be used as evidence to defend the fourth claim, i.e., that sentences in a text are semantically

related in such a way that these relations call for the construction of text grammars to explain facts which cannot be explained by extended sentence grammars.

Francis (1958 : 417) lists seven such sentence connectives and calls them "conjunctive adverbs" : *consequently, furthermore, hence, however, moreover, nevertheless* and *therefore*. Sentence connectives differ from other "sequence signals" like *accordingly, afterwards, likewise*, etc. in that the latter can also be used to modify words and groups of words within a sentence. Sentence connectives can be grouped according to their notional content in the following way :

I	II	III
consequently	however	furthermore
hence	nevertheless	moreover
therefore		

The connectives in the first group express the notion of implication. Sentences connected by the connectives of this group can be said to express the presupposition that S*1* *implies* S*2*. The connectives in the second group express the presupposition that S*2* implicitly *contradicts* S*1*. The connectives in the third group express the presupposition that S*2* is *similar* to S*1* (cf. Reichenbach 1967 : 189).

It is possible to demonstrate that like many other presuppositions, those involved in the meaning of sentence connectives strongly depend on extralinguistic reality. A particular sequence of sentences related by one of the sentence connectives can be said to be well-formed only with respect to some set of presuppositions present in the speaker's or the hearer's mind and depending on the circumstances attending the production of such texts (For the notion of relative well-formedness and presuppositions see Lakoff 1971b). It is therefore possible to advance the hypothesis that any two sentences representing the same grammatical type, for example any two declarative sentences or any two general questions, etc., could be connected by any of the sentence connectives and result in a well-formed sequence. The well-formedness of such a sequence depends on extralinguistic circumstances attending the utterance of such texts. Consider as an example two apparently unrelated sentences, taken at random from a textbook of English :

The men and women eat breakfast together.
The nomads become restless in the big town.

The two sentences can be connected by each of the three types of sentence connectives and yield sequences well-formed relative to some extra-linguistic settings:

> Men and women eat breakfast together. Therefore, the nomads become restless in the big town.

In this case the attending circumstances would involve a socio-cultural situation whereby it somehow offends the nomads to learn that men and women should breakfast together, since, may be, in their culture women are not allowed to share food with men as indeed is the case in many societies.

The same two sentences can be related thus:

> Men and women eat breakfast together. Nevertheless, the nomads become restless in the big town.

In this case the attending circumstances could involve somebody expecting that the action expressed in the first sentence would somehow keep the peace among the nomads, who may tend to riot against some laws forbidding to share food with women. The nomads referred to in this text would be obviously much more co-educationally minded than the nomads referred to in the previous example. The presupposition connected with the first sentence that the nomads would keep peace is contradicted by the second sentence, which is formally expressed by the sentence connective *nevertheless*.

Finally, we can also have

> Men and women eat breakfast together. Moreover, the nomads become restless in the big town.

This case may involve the presupposition that both events constitute the violation of law or good order and are thus similar, which is expressed by the sentence connective *moreover*.

In view of these examples, the fourth claim cannot be defended, since those semantic relations between sentences which cannot be accounted for in terms of extended sentence grammars, in fact turn out to depend heavily on extra-linguistic settings, which cannot be systematically predicted from the semantic properties of the sentences alone but have to be sought in extra-linguistic reality. It thus appears that text grammars in the sense defined earlier on, cannot be expected to account for such pragmatically established relations between sentences in the text and hence for the well-

formedness of the text. In other words well-formedness of texts with respect to the only phenomenon which cannot be accounted for in terms of extended sentence grammars (sentence connectives), cannot be accounted for by any text grammar either.

This brings us to the fifth and the last claim, expressing the view that sentences in a text are syntagmatically syntactically related and that *intersentential* relations are not isomorphic with intrasentential relations. In view of everything that has been said so far this claim turns out to be trivial: the only syntactic relations across sentences, which cannot be accounted for in terms of extended sentence grammars are the relations overtly marked by sentence connectives. Thus the only syntactic relation between sentences constituting a text seems to be *coordination*, which can be described by the rule schema $T \rightarrow S\ (\&\ S)^n$, where $n \geqslant 1$. The existence of this rule schema does not provide a sufficient motivation for constructing such text grammars which could be substantially different from extended sentence grammars, since sentence grammars contain an isomorphous rule Schema $S \rightarrow S\ (\&\ S)^n$.

Summing up, there is no linguistic empirical evidence motivating the construction of text grammars if such syntactic phenomena as definitization, pronominalization, etc., as well as such semantic phenomena as presupposition and entailment, can be proved to be explainable by extended sentence grammars accounting for textual cohesion. On the other hand, discourse coherence, optionally marked by sentence connectives, cannot be accounted for by any grammar, since coherence is a function of extra-linguistic circumstances attending the production of texts. Such relations fall beyond the scope of strictly grammatical research. All the same future research into the semantic and syntactic structure of texts, conducted in terms of extended sentence grammars, will have to be focused on semantic and syntactic properties of compound sentences as such sentences seem to constitute that part of linguistic data which is likely to provide the investigator with the most significant facts associated with the structure of texts.

In a sequel to the present paper I am going to verify the claim that each text can be represented as a single sentence as well as of the claim that sentences are immediate constituents of texts.

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ESQUISSE D'UNE THÉORIE DE «DO»

La position des grammairiens transformationnels sur le rôle de DO dans la grammaire anglaise n'a pratiquement pas varié depuis *Syntactic Structures* (Chomsky 1957). En gros, Do devient le support de l'élément TEMPS à chaque fois que la transformation d'attachement d'affixe se trouve être bloquée. Dans le présent article, je me propose de montrer l'inadéquation de la théorie transformationnelle sur ce point précis de la grammaire de l'anglais. La théorie que j'avancerai attribuera à DO un rôle beaucoup plus important que celui qui lui est assigné aussi bien dans les grammaires transformationnelles que dans les grammaires descriptives de type traditionnel.

I. Préliminaires

DO apparaît automatiquement lorsque le prédicat est énoncé pour la deuxième fois dans le discours suivi. DO précède la deuxième occurrence du prédicat. Dans certains cas, DO se présente seul : le prédicat verbal, récupérable grâce au contexte-avant, a été effacé :

1. A — Nothing ever *happens* here (...) Rather dreadful, isn't it?
   B — (...) I've lived in countries where things *do happen*, ever so many at a time... (SAKI 107).
2. A — But how does it *affect* the case?
   B — I don't say *it does affect* it, sir. I'm asking out of curiosity (CRGU 185).
3. A — You should have *rung up*.
   B — I *did ring up*. There was no reply (MIRCR 133).
4. She *visited no* picture galleries and no museums (...) What she *did visit* were the glass and china departments of the large stores. (BH 82)
5. Even when I was a child I was frightened of her but I *didn't know* why. But I *do know* why now. (ECR 157).

6. The hook was now baited : would the fish *bite*? If they *did*, they would do so at once (CRGU 227) (= if they *did bite*...).
7. How was it that, *knowing* women as he *does*, he did not foresee that you would have kept that letter? (BT 96) (= as he *does know* women).

Plus rarement, on trouve le prédicat verbal répété en première position, *suivi* de DO :

8. It was understood that I had *to wait* for the ashes and *wait I did*, while the chimney of the crematorium gently smoked overhead (TRAUN 10).

La première remarque que l'on peut faire, c'est que DO joue un rôle de RAPPEL ; il signale que le prédicat verbal qu'il accompagne n'est plus NOUVEAU. Cette fonction anaphorique fait penser tout naturellement à celle de l'article défini « the » qui reprend l'indéfini « a » utilisé pour introduire un nom pour la première fois.

En schéma :

1re mention	*2e mention*
V	DO + V
a + N	The + N

DO + V (tout comme THE + N) renvoie au contexte-avant. La différence entre les deux constructions se situe au niveau de l'accentuation : DO prend très souvent un accent fort, ce qui n'est pas normalement le cas pour THE.

À propos des exemples (6) et (7) il faut insister sur le fait que *DO ne remplace pas le prédicat verbal*. Si la troncation est possible, c'est uniquement parce que l'élément effacé figure dans le contexte-avant. Tout le jeu du CODE (queues de phrases de tous genres) repose sur ce phénomène :

a) A — I met Peter yesterday.
   B — So *did* I (*meet* Peter)
b) Barbara *did not watch* the film, *did* she? (*watch* the film)
c) A — Did you *read* my paper?
   B — Of course I *did* (*read* your paper)
   (ou : NO, I *didn*'t (read your paper)

Au terme de cette exploration, on pourrait avancer l'hypothèse que dans tous les cas où un prédicat verbal est repris, il devient automatiquement COMPLÉMENT de DO qui jouerait dans ce cas le rôle de *verbe principal*.



L'indicateur syntagmatique ci-dessus n'a qu'une vertu : montrer que le prédicat est DÉCALÉ vers la droite. L'accent fort sur DID réalise en fait ce décalage dans la chaîne phonétique.

Quel statut attribuer à ce prédicat décalé? Le point d'interrogation pourrait être remplacé par NP (nominal phrase) par exemple. Dans ce cas nous serions très près, pour ce qui concerne ce détail, de la position de John Ross dans *Auxiliaries as Verbs* (1967). Pour le moment, l'hypothèse du décalage qui, malgré sa simplicité, rend compte de certains aspects du problème étudié ici, doit être laissée en l'état. Nous y reviendrons ultérieurement.

II. Do, indice de saturation de l'énoncé

La présence d'adverbes de modalité tels que *perhaps, really, actually, always, never* ... dans des énoncés comportant DO + V suggère une analyse plus ambitieuse de DO.

Examinons le passage suivant :

(9) I invited her down here, but got a telegram saying she was *going back to France*. Perhaps she *did go back to France*. We do not know (PADD 165).

Nous retrouvons ici le schéma de rappel que nous avons observé dès le départ : *go back to France* n'est plus un élément nouveau, d'où la présence de DO accentué fortement et, corrélativement, le caractère atone de l'élément répété après *did*.

Mais il y a plus ici. L'adverbe de modalité PERHAPS porte sur *l'énoncé tout entier* :



(le filet droit qui précède *did* signale la présence d'un accent fort)

Dire que *perhaps* s'applique à l'énoncé tout entier c'est affirmer qu'il porte sur la *prédication*, c'est-à-dire sur l'association, la mise en relation

d'un sujet et d'un prédicat, ici *she* d'un côté et *go back to France* de l'autre. D'autre part, pour que le jugement de probabilité exprimé par *perhaps* puisse effectivement porter sur l'énoncé tout entier, il faut nécessairement que ce dernier se présente sous une forme adéquate. Pour s'en persuader, il suffit d'essayer de remplacer *she did go back to France* par *she went back to France* dans le diagramme que nous avons proposé ci-dessus. Ceci s'avère être impossible car dans *perhaps she went back to France*, la portée (scope) de *perhaps* n'est plus la même! Il ne s'agit plus d'un jugement de probabilité sur la réalisation effective d'un présupposé mais d'un jugement de probabilité sur *une hypothèse parmi d'autres* et dans ce dernier cas, «*go back to France*» est *nouveau* (première mention). Or justement DO signale que l'élément qui le suit n'est plus nouveau mais repris. Dans l'énoncé (9) nous nous trouvons en présence d'un *énoncé saturé* qui est, en bloc, l'objet d'un jugement. Ce qui est en cause, c'est précisément l'existence de la prédication, de la connexion, comme dirait Tesnière, qui lie *she* et *go back to France*.

Dans *she went back to France* il y a apport d'une information nouvelle (what did she do? — She went back to France). L'information nouvelle, c'est *go back to France*.

Dans *she did go back to France* l'information nouvelle se situe dans le DID fortement accentué — en d'autres termes, l'information nouvelle c'est l'*affirmation de l'existence de la prédication*. La portée réelle de *perhaps* dans (9) est donc *did*!

Perhaps
↓
she DID *go back to France*

Il me faut revenir sur le concept *d'énoncé saturé*. J'entends par là un *énoncé où la relation qui lie sujet et prédicat, existe déjà au moment de l'énonciation. L'incidence de prédicat à sujet n'est plus à faire, elle est chose faite* (le contexte s'en est chargé). On devrait donc dire de façon plus stricte que ce qui est saturé, c'est cette incidence de prédicat à sujet. *DO est le signe, l'indice de cette mise en rapport déjà réalisée*. Dans (9) *perhaps* EXIGE une relation sujet/prédicat pré-existante. Il ne pourrait pas porter, sur l'énoncé tout entier si la relation sujet/prédicat était POSÉE pour la première fois. Bref un adverbe de modalité de ce genre demande du *préconstruit*, c'est-à-dire, répétons le, une mise en relation qui a déjà été réalisée au préalable et qui, par voie de conséquence, n'a plus à l'être. Seul un énoncé saturé (= préconstruit) peut devenir la cible d'un jugement de l'énonciateur portant sur le nœud prédicationnel. Ici *perhaps* représente ce

jugement que le sujet parlant applique à un objet que le discours a déjà construit et qui de ce fait se présente sous une forme syntaxique que j'ai qualifiée de *saturée*.

Dès lors, ce qui doit être souligné ici c'est l'existence parallèle en anglais de deux types distincts d'énoncés :

1) Des énoncés où le sujet grammatical et ce qui est prédiqué du sujet sont mis en relation *pour la première fois*. L'information nouvelle — le POSÉ — provient de la *nouveauté* du prédicat qui est appliqué au sujet grammatical. Ainsi l'énoncé *she went back to France yesterday* renseigne le questionneur sur les faits et gestes de SHE.

2) Des énoncés où sujet et prédicat sont tous deux connus dans la situation de discours et constituent les deux pôles d'une *relation homéostatique* qui s'oppose à l'asymétrie qui caractérise les énoncés du premier type (c'est cette asymétrie même qui est à l'origine de la nouveauté de l'information). Ici, ce qui est en cause c'est *l'existence même de la prédication*, de la relation PRÉSUPPOSÉE dès le départ entre sujet et prédicat. Plus question d'un sujet dynamique exerçant son rôle de moteur de l'activité nommée par le verbe. L'énoncé saturé est inerte, dévitalisé pourrait-on dire. Il est devenu *simple objet de discours* auquel s'applique le jugement de l'énonciateur. C'est précisément *do* qui constitue la trace en surface de cet état de choses. Nous voilà loin de la fonction de type *explétif* que les grammaires transformationnelles lui avaient attribuée. Avant de poursuivre mon analyse je voudrais examiner quelques exemples du même type que (9).

(10) We have no proof, whatever, that *the letter was written* (...) But on the hypothesis that *he DID write that letter*, there must have been a REASON for so doing. (LED 95) (J'ai souligné à dessein les deux énoncés contenant les éléments WRITE et LETTER).

Le caractère saturé de *He DID write that letter* ne fait aucun doute. En fait nous avons ici deux contraintes qui se conjuguent pour amener DID : d'un côté, le fait qu'il a déjà été question de l'écriture de la lettre dans le contexte-avant ; d'autre part, il y a la présence de *hypothesis* qui commande la subordonnée *that he DID write that letter* tout entière. Pour qu'il puisse y avoir «hypothèse» il faut absolument que la relation qui constitue la trame de cette hypothèse ait *déjà été nouée*. En d'autres termes *hypothesis PRÉSUPPOSE* l'existence de cette relation :



(11) Oh no, I was taken in like everyone else. I thought that someone really did want to kill Letitia Blacklock (MIA 200).

Ici, c'est l'adverbe de modalité REALLY qui exige une relation saturée dans l'énoncé sur lequel il porte :



(12) A — Get along with you, he said. Go and buy what you want (...)

B — oh, but, Will, *I don't know what I want*. Let's — go to Selfridge's or somewhere.

A — *Women never do know what they want* when they go into a shop.

You go in. Just leave it to them. (PAYDEF 79)

Cette fois, c'est l'adverbe NEVER qui constitue l'information nouvelle. NEVER est ici le pivot de tout l'énoncé dans lequel il est inséré. Sa portée (scope) rappelle celle des modaux épistémiques qui, eux aussi, commandent (régissent) une proposition entière. *Never* s'applique en fait à DO, trace visible de la mise en relation déjà opérée de WOMEN et KNOW WHAT THEY WANT.

L'exemple ci-dessous est en tous points semblables à (12) à ceci près que c'est *always* qui représente cette fois le jugement de l'énonciateur :

(13) I do remember Meredith reading aloud the passage from Plato describing Socrates's death. *Very boring* I thought it. *Classics always did bore me* (FLP 128).

Les exemples (12) et (13) sont intéressants dans la mesure où ils illustrent, outre le mécanisme de DO, celui du jugement généralisateur. Dans (12) l'énonciateur A applique à toutes les femmes le prédicat qui, au départ, ne pouvait concerner que la sienne. Dans (13) le jugement émis ne se limite pas à Platon, mais aux Anciens en général (Classics). Dans les deux cas l'opération de l'énonciateur consiste à étendre le jugement qu'il est en droit de porter sur un membre d'une classe, *à la classe tout entière*.

Tous les exemples étudiés dans ce paragraphe concourent à mettre en évidence le rôle capital de DO dans la grammaire de l'anglais. Loin d'être un simple support du « temps » (ce qu'il est aussi puisque c'est lui qui porte effectivement la marque du temps dont le verbe a été dépossédé), DO joue un rôle syntaxique de premier plan qui est de signaler la saturation de l'énoncé où il apparaît et d'attirer l'attention de l'auditeur sur le lien organique qui unit le sujet grammatical et le prédicat. Or il apparaît que ce

rôle a été complètement ignoré des linguistes transformationnels qui, comme je l'ai déjà souligné, ont pourtant fait de la syntaxe le lieu central de la grammaire.

III. DO, INDICE DE LA PRÉSUPPOSITION :

Tous les exemples que j'ai proposés jusqu'ici avaient pour dénominateur commun la fonction anaphorique de DO, fonction qui débouche, nous l'avons vu, sur le rôle d'indice de saturation de l'énoncé que DO est appelé à jouer dans la grammaire anglaise. Dans le paragraphe précédent, je me suis efforcé de mettre en relief la raison d'être de DO dans des énoncés qui étaient l'objet d'un jugement de l'énonciateur sous les espèces d'un adverbe de modalité que j'ai d'ailleurs été amené à comparer à un modal épistémique.

Le caractère *préconstruit* de ces énoncés commandés par des opérateurs tels que *ready, perhaps, never, always* nous est apparu très clairement. À plusieurs reprises j'ai utilisé les termes POSÉ et PRÉSUPPOSÉ, le POSÉ correspondant à l'adverbe de jugement et le PRÉSUPPOSÉ à l'énoncé saturé préconstruit auquel s'applique le jugement.

Nous allons voir maintenant que la fonction anaphorique de rappel n'est pas une condition nécessaire de l'apparition de DO et que ce dernier peut très bien être appelé à jouer son rôle sans que le contexte-avant en soit directement responsable.

(14) I rushed from the horrible scene, ran from the house, and *only next morning in the paper did I learn the dreadful result.* (RSHH 314)

(15) *Only* after he had tasted a new bottle *did he resume his tears* (TRAUN 106)

(16) They yelled and shouted at the top of their voices. *Not* till they were hoarse *did they stop* (PP35).

Les exemples (14) (15) et (16) appartiennent à la catégorie d'énoncés que E. Klima a étudiés dans *Negation in English*. Pour lui, ce qui importait, c'était de proposer des règles de transformation capables de rendre compte de ce qu'il a appelé *l'attraction de AUX 1* (ici l'élément «temps» porté par DO, d'après la grammaire transformationnelle) lorsqu'un élément AFFECTIVE se trouvait être placé en tête de phrase. Selon Klima la négation de phrase NOT, l'adverbe ONLY, le morphème interrogatif WH, tous trois réunis dans la classe des AFFECTIVES, attiraient vers eux AUX 1. A Cette tentative d'explication qui, si elle partait d'une intuition

somme toute correcte, n'en était pas moins *ad hoc*, je me propose d'opposer la thèse du rôle de DO que je défends ici.

Je soutiens que la fonction de DO dans (14) (15) (16) est celle que j'ai présentée dans le présent article, à savoir que DO est l'indice d'un énoncé saturé préconstruit et par conséquent *présupposé* et non *posé*.

Examinons l'exemple (14). La topicalisation des compléments circonstantiels *next morning* et *in the paper* d'une part, le jugement porté sur *next morning* par l'adverbe *only*, d'ailleurs responsable de la topicalisation, se conjuguent pour reléguer, décaler *I learnt the dreadful result* dans le présupposé, c'est-à-dire au second plan. (Le décalage dont j'ai parlé plus haut (p. 00) prend ici tout son sens). Ce décalage est responsable du passage de *I learnt* à *I did learn*. Notons aussitôt que I did learn ... n'est pas adéquat puisqu'il ne s'agit nullement *d'affirmer* l'existence de la prédication mais de la tenir pour acquise. Si *did* se déplace vers l'avant, enjambant le pronom *I* (did I learn) c'est que *only next morning* s'applique à *did* ; c'est-à-dire à la prédication et non plus (si j'ose dire) au seul prédicat comme dans *I learnt the dreadful result the next morning*. La traduction française : *ce n'est que le lendemain matin QUE j'ai appris l'affreuse conséquence* montre bien le rôle démarcatif de QUE qui est l'un des moyens dont dispose le français pour signaler le présupposé (cf. Il y a cinq ans *QUE* j'apprends l'anglais).

L'exemple (15) est, lui aussi, extrêmement intéressant. On pourrait le paraphraser de la façon suivante :

(15') He resumed his tears, *but* only after he had tasted a new bottle.

ou encore, de façon plus explicite :

(15'') He resumed his tears, *but he did so* only after he had tasted a new bottle.

On voit combien (15) est économique par rapport à (15''). La place nous fait défaut pour dire tout ce qu'il y aurait à dire à ce sujet.

Que penser de (16)? La caractère «acquis» de *they stopped* au sein de cet énoncé apparaît clairement dans (16) :

(16') They stopped, *but they did not do so* until they were hoarse. La topicalisation de *not till they were hoarse* relègue la prédication they — PAST — stop dans le présupposé, le préconstruit, d'où l'apparition de DO, auquel s'applique directement le complément circonstantiel négatif *not till they were hoarse*.

Le rôle de DO nous apparaît maintenant dans l'éventail complet de ses virtualités. Tout ce qui a été dit jusqu'ici s'applique au DO présent dans les formes négative, interrogative et emphatique. La place nous fait défaut pour exposer ces problèmes dans le détail.

IV. Conséquences théoriques de cette analyse :

La théorie de DO que je viens de présenter ici à l'état d'ébauche montre clairement que l'analyse transformationnelle n'a pas su rendre compte du rôle de DO dans la grammaire de l'anglais. Ce qui est grave, c'est qu'il ne s'agit pas en l'occurrence d'un problème mineur. DO, nous l'avons vu, est la trace en surface d'opérations qui jouent un rôle fondamental dans la structuration des énoncés anglais. On peut même avancer que la mise au jour du fonctionnement de DO dépasse le seul cadre de la grammaire anglaise, puisque les problèmes de prédication sont communs à l'ensemble des langues du monde. C'est pourquoi la carence de l'analyse transformationnelle sur ce point précis pose tout le problème de l'adéquation de la grammaire transformationnelle en tant que théorie. Dans l'état actuel de la recherche, on peut dire que seule une théorie du discours sera à même de prendre en charge le type d'opération dont l'exploration du fonctionnement de DO nous a révélé l'existence.

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Sources des exemples proposés

Agatha Christie :

BAGHD *They came to Baghdad*
BH *At Bertram's Hotel*
BT *The Mystery of the Blue Train*
ECR *Elephants can remember*
FLP *Five Little Pigs*
LED *Lord Edgware Dies*
MIA *A Murder is Announced*
MIRCR *The Mirror Cracked*
PADD *4.50 from Paddington*
PP *Parker Pyne Investigates*

Sir A. Conan Doyle :

RSHH *The Return of Sherlock Holmes*

Graham Greene :

TRAUN *Travels with my Aunt*

C. S. Forester :

PAYDEF *Payment Deferred*

Saki :

SAKI *Selected Stories of Saki*

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NOTES SUR L'EXPRESSION VERBALE DE L'ASSENTIMENT ET DE LA CONFIRMATION EN ANGLAIS

Introduction

Notre intérêt pour les actes d'assentiment et de confirmation est né de notre tentative de produire des matériaux pédagogiques pour un apprentissage de l'expression orale en anglais (langue étrangère) axé sur le développement de la compétence de communication (1). C'est avec une certaine appréhension qu'un professeur de langue s'aventure dans des contrées à peine défrichées où le sociolinguiste et le philosophe du langage évoluent avec tellement plus d'aisance. Cependant l'auteur souscrit sans réserve à la conclusion de "Directions in the Teaching of Discourse" (Widdowson 1973 : 76) :

> «Meanwhile, the applied linguist, working, as it were, from the pedagogic end, can begin to specify the nature of different communicative acts, the way they are realized, the way they combine in different varieties of language use. These specifications may well develop from attempts to design language teaching materials which focus on the teaching of discourse».

D'ailleurs notre expérience en ce domaine, bien que limitée, nous a vite montré que la réticence que nous éprouvions à nous engager trop avant dans l'analyse des actes de discours nous empêchait de penser autrement qu'en termes de structures syntaxiques et de relation isomorphique entre la

(1) Nous tenons à remercier ici Madame F. Roussel, du Centre de Recherches et d'Applications Pédagogiques en Langues, pour l'aide qu'elle a bien voulu nous apporter par ses suggestions et ses critiques.

fonction étudiée et tel ou tel type d'énoncé, comportement encouragé par un penchant de grammairien à isoler l'énoncé de son contexte, alors qu'au contraire :

> «The fundamental problem of discourse analysis is to show how one utterance follows another in a rational, rule-governed manner — in other words, how we understand coherent discourse». (Labov 1970 : 79).

Le discours que nous avons analysé est constitué par quelques heures de «conversation générale» entre interlocuteurs anglais, pour la plupart étudiants ou enseignants. La fonction référentielle du langage y est bien représentée, et l'assentiment et la confirmation interviennent souvent (2).

Pour diverses raisons, notre observation s'est limitée aux systèmes vocaux-auditifs de la communication les plus conventionnels et systématiques (nous n'avons par exemple pas tenu compte du rire, qui, pourtant, peut servir ou contribuer à exprimer l'assentiment). Parmi les systèmes non-vocaux, les gestes, et en particulier l'expression du visage, ont sans aucun doute, dans les actes qui nous intéressent, une importance considérable, et une étude plus approfondie devrait y être particulièrement attentive.

Ces notes sont organisées autour de deux thèmes principaux :
1 — définition de l'assentiment et de la confirmation ;
2 — formes linguistiques utilisées.

1. Essai de définition et règles d'emploi

Nous écartons l'assentiment dans le sens de «consentement» («I agree to your marrying him») et nous proposons de définir, provisoirement et de manière intuitive, la confirmation et l'assentiment comme l'acte verbal par lequel l'interlocuteur B marque expressément qu'il aurait pu émettre le même énoncé que l'interlocuteur A. On constate en effet que l'une des formes les plus évidentes de cet acte consiste précisément en la *répétition* plus ou moins textuelle par B d'un énoncé de A. Cette «définition» exclut les formes non-verbales de l'assentiment, l'assentiment tacite (qui serait représenté par la seule absence de dissentiment), ainsi que l'assentiment obtenu par une demande («Would you agree with that?»), que nous

(2) Nous réservons pour plus tard l'étude de leurs contraires, dissentiment et démenti, ainsi que du terme neutre, le non-engagement.

préférons mettre au rang des «réponses». Nous avons exclu les réactions aux stimuli qui ne se présentent pas, ou qui ne peuvent pas être interprétés, comme des *déclarations*, tout en sachant que la frontière entre la demande et la déclaration (et, partant, entre la réponse et l'assentiment ou la confirmation) n'est pas toujours très claire et que, par exemple, une question chargée de fortes présomptions peut avoir pratiquement la valeur d'une déclaration modalisée.

Naturellement, la formulation proposée ne permet pas de distinguer entre assentiment et confirmation. Ces deux actes se réalisent le plus souvent par les mêmes moyens linguistiques (dont la répétition), mais ils se distinguent aussi par certaines incompatibilités : l'énoncé «You're not married» n'admet pas comme réaction «I agree» ; ou plutôt si B dit «I agree», il ne peut pas s'agir d'une confirmation et «You're not married» n'a pas été perçu comme une demande de confirmation mais comme l'énoncé d'un fait servant par exemple de justification ou d'explication, avec laquelle B marque son accord.

On est tenté de définir les deux actes par rapport à la déclaration qui les suscite : si B réagit à l'expression d'une opinion, d'un jugement de valeur, sa réaction est interprétée comme un assentiment ; s'il réagit au contraire à l'énoncé d'un fait, il s'agit d'une confirmation. Le couple «opinion/fait» correspond à l'opposition «discutable/indiscutable», qui parfois affleure au niveau lexicosyntaxique («That's a debatable point», «It's a fact that ...»). Les indications textuelles peuvent être tout à fait nettes, comme par exemple// 4 That's only my personal opinion//(transcrit selon le système de Halliday 1970). Certaines expressions peuvent servir de points de repère, mais elles ne permettent pas toujours de distinguer à coup sûr l'énoncé d'un fait de l'énoncé d'une opinion («I think», «I believe», par exemple, pourraient servir à présenter un fait en ménageant la susceptibilité du partenaire), et très souvent faits et opinions s'énoncent sans aucun accompagnement de cette sorte. En l'absence d'indication textuelle sûre, il est parfois très difficile de déterminer si telle déclaration est voulue et interprétée comme l'énoncé d'un fait ou d'une opinion et donc si la réaction suscitée est une confirmation ou un assentiment.

Compte tenu de ces difficultés, nous avons décidé de fonder la distinction entre «assentiment» et «confirmation» dans une interaction à deux locuteurs sur l'enchaînement des énoncés, en posant que dans la déontologie du discours l'assentiment est une réaction facultative, alors que la confirmation est une réaction exigée par une déclaration de l'interlocuteur.

Notre première définition sera donc pour l'instant remplacée par les deux suivantes :

Confirmation : acte verbal non-optionnel par lequel B marque expressément qu'il aurait pu émettre le même énoncé que A.

Assentiment : acte verbal optionnel par lequel B marque expressément qu'il aurait pu émettre le même énoncé que A.

Nous présupposons ici que les rôles sociaux remplis par A et B sont tels que B a le *droit* d'exprimer son assentiment : il ne doit pas se trouver avec A dans une relation telle qu'il enfreindrait une règle discursive en exprimant cet assentiment (cf. la réprimande : «On ne vous demande pas votre avis»). Une analyse des fonctions de discours devrait donc reposer sur une théorie des rapports sociaux.

Tout énoncé s'interprète en fonction du contexte de situation, qui comprend les connaissances communes aux interlocuteurs et celles qu'ils ne partagent pas, et en particulier ce qu'ils savent l'un de l'autre (par exemple : est-ce que A sait si l'événement E fait ou non partie de l'expérience de B, et B sait-il si A le sait?). La distinction entre les domaines de connaissance des deux interlocuteurs, cruciale dans le mécanisme de la confirmation et de l'assentiment, a été exprimée en ces termes par Labov (1970 : 80) :

> «Given two parties in a conversation, A and B, we can distinguish as «A-events» the things that A knows about but B does not ; as «B-events» the things which B knows but A does not ; and as «AB-events» knowledge which is shared equally by A and B».

De fausses hypothèses sur leurs connaissances respectives ou des présupposés erronés de la part des interlocuteurs peuvent donner naissance à toutes sortes de mauvaises interprétations et de malentendus dans le discours (3). On peut donc poser ici une première règle :

Règle 1.

Si A fait une déclaration sur un événement de son domaine de con-

(3) Quant à l'observateur, il est loin de disposer toujours de toutes les données du contexte de situation ; dans l'incertitude, nous nous sommes abstenu de prendre en compte la réaction ambigue. L'ambiguité ne concerne d'ailleurs pas uniquement le couple assentiment/confirmation ; elle peut concerner, par exemple, le couple confirmation/exhortation, cette «exhortation» étant réalisée par divers signaux d'attention (Yes, Mm, etc.) par lesquels B marque qu'il suit et intègre le discours de A, encourageant par là même celui-ci à continuer.

naissance particulier, il est impossible à B de confirmer ou de donner son assentiment.

B réagit souvent par Yes, No (selon la polarité de la déclaration de A, qui doit, semble-t-il, être respectée) ou par une vocalisation (Mm, Mhm, Uh-huh) : ces réactions, qui dans d'autres contextes peuvent exprimer l'assentiment ou la confirmation, sont interprétées ici comme des signaux d'attention et d'intégration («Je vous suis», «J'enregistre») de même valeur que «I see» mais apparemment beaucoup plus fréquents.

Cependant, une réaction de B peut être interprétée comme un assentiment sur les *présupposés* de la déclaration de A, surtout quand les indications contextuelles montrent que ces présupposés sont communs aux interlocuteurs. Exemple : A et B partagent la même désapprobation des méthodes modernes d'enseignement qui négligent l'orthographe.

A : If I'm reading something and it's full of spelling mistakes I want to mark it wrong

B : Yes to correct it

Si B ne partageait pas les présupposés de la déclaration, sa réaction serait interprétée comme un signal d'intégration («I see what you mean»). Nous proposons donc une deuxième règle :

Règle 2.

Si les présupposés d'une déclaration que fait A sur un événement de son domaine particulier sont partagés par B, celui-ci peut exprimer un assentiment qui est alors interprété comme portant sur les présupposés (ce qui découle du fait général que B peut faire porter son assentiment sur ce qui est présupposé par la déclaration de A).

Il est peut-être à noter que la progression du discours entraîne normalement l'accroissement du nombre des «événements AB» et que l'on peut par conséquent rencontrer de plus en plus de déclarations qui ont certaines caractéristiques formelles d'énoncés portant sur des «événements A» ou des «événements B» (emploi des pronoms de 1re et 2e personnes, des verbes «privés», etc.) mais qui portent en fait, contextuellement, sur des événements AB pouvant susciter la confirmation ou l'assentiment.

Nous avons défini l'assentiment comme une réaction optionnelle. Cependant, il a été montré expérimentalement par Verplanck (1955) que si B s'abstient totalement de réagir aux déclarations d'opinions de A, ce dernier, au bout d'un certain temps, cesse de parler, et qu'au contraire si B renforce des déclarations en exprimant son assentiment, la fréquence relative de ces déclarations augmente dans le discours de A. Par ailleurs,

une expérience de Hildum et Brown (1956), rapportée par Argyle (1973 : 177) semble indiquer qu'un interviewer peut influencer par ses réactions les opinions exprimées par l'interviewé. Ces observations suggèrent qu'il existe des règles qui pourraient être formulées ainsi (4) :

Règle 3.

Si l'interlocuteur A fait des déclarations sur des événements AB, l'interlocuteur B ne peut pas rester indéfiniment sans donner son sentiment.

Règle 4.

Si B donne son assentiment, il favorise la continuation du discours, et s'il le refuse, il favorise son extinction.

Cette coloration phatique que peut prendre l'assentiment présente peut-être de l'intérêt pour l'acquisition d'une compétence de communication en langue étrangère, où la fonction phatique est vraisemblablement l'une des plus difficile à maîtriser.

En ce qui concerne la confirmation, nous rappelons la règle de Labov (1970 : 80) :

> «If A makes a statement about a B-event, it is heard as a request for confirmation».

B est *tenu* de confirmer (ou, bien sûr, de démentir éventuellement). Mais l'interprétation du mot «statement» nous paraît poser un problème : le ton de l'énoncé peut-il être indifféremment ascendant ou descendant? On notera que Labov, dans ses illustrations, n'indique pas l'intonation (par exemple : «You live on 115th St.»). Ainsi, les deux énoncés suivants sont-ils équivalents (5) :

//1 You're going to carry *on* with your singing//
//2 You're going to carry *on* with your singing//

Sur cette opposition de ton, Quirk (1972) ne semble pas donner d'indication claire, considérant tantôt que le ton ascendant fait d'un énoncé à syntaxe déclarative une question (§ 2.19), tantôt que ce ton est utilisé «not so much in order to make the statement a question as to suggest politely

(4) Ces règles seraient de type «régulatif» et non «constitutif», dans le sens où Searle (1972 : 138-39) définit ces mots.

(5) Le premier est de ton descendant, le second de ton ascendant.

that a (confirmatory) comment would be welcome» (§ II.13). Ces deux interprétations sont vraisemblablement moins contradictoires qu'il ne paraît : la différence sémantique entre ces deux types d'énoncés ne réside-t-elle pas dans le degré de certitude du locuteur? Le ton descendant impliquerait la quasi-certitude, le ton ascendant un degré moindre de certitude qui pourrait, à la limite, et en contexte, faire de l'énoncé une pure demande d'information (de registre familier).

Mais la confirmation ne se limite pas à la situation envisagée par la règle de Labov. Le locuteur B est tenu de confirmer (ou, éventuellement, de démentir) toute déclaration de A, c'est-à-dire tout énoncé affirmatif ou négatif de ton descendant, accompagnée d'un «tag» descendant de polarité inverse et suivie par le silence de A (6). La seule présence du «tag» n'est pas suffisante, et la cessation de phonation doit être introduite comme condition nécessaire, car une déclaration accompagnée d'un «tag» de ton descendant n'est pas forcément suivie par le silence du locuteur et dans ce cas elle n'est pas interprétée comme une demande de confirmation. Nous formulons donc la règle suivante :

Règle 5.

Si A fait une déclaration accompagnée d'une reprise avec inversion («tag») de ton descendant et cesse de parler (c'est-à-dire «passe la parole» à B), cette déclaration est interprétée comme une demande de confirmation (7).

Appellent également confirmation les déclarations de forme interro-négative à ton descendant. «These invite the listener's agreement to something on which the speaker has strong feelings» écrit Quirk (1972 : § 7.70). Si le lecteur se reporte à la citation de la note 6, il verra que cet auteur utilise les termes «agreement» et «confirmation» sans distinction.

Règle 6.

Si A fait une déclaration de forme interro-négative, elle est interprétée comme une demande de confirmation.

(6) Cf. Quirk (1972 : § 7.59) : «The tag with the falling tone ... invites confirmation of the statement ...». Encore faut-il que cette déclaration ne soit pas elle-même une confirmation ou un assentiment, comme c'est le cas dans l'échange suivant :
A : My impression is that they park everywhere
B : Oh they do they do don't they

(7) Des signaux non-verbaux, comme le regard, entrent vraisemblablement en jeu aussi.

Nous pouvons proposer maintenant la dernière version de notre définition des actes d'assentiment et de confirmation, en la calquant sur le modèle searlien. La difficulté réside dans la formulation de la «règle essentielle», constitutive de l'acte, par laquelle le locuteur marque son intention (cf. par exemple Searle 1972 : 150-51, 153). On voit dans le tableau ci-après que c'est au niveau de cette règle que les deux actes se différencient.

	ASSENTIMENT	CONFIRMATION
Règle préparatoire	l'événement E et/ou ses présupposés font partie du domaine de B	idem
Règle de sincérité	B croit ce qu'il dit	idem
Règle essentielle	Acte facultatif par lequel B s'engage à partager la responsabilité de la déclaration de A (et de ses éventuelles implications)	Acte obligatoire par lequel B asserte la vérité de la déclaration de A

II. FORMES LINGUISTIQUES UTILISÉES

L'assentiment et la confirmation montrent une nouvelle fois qu'il n'existe pas de rapport terme à terme entre fonctions discursives et formes linguistiques. Ces deux fonctions présentent de multiples réalisations verbales et nous pensons que l'un des objectifs principaux de l'application pédagogique doit être la découverte et la pratique de cette diversité. Ici nous ne pourrons donner qu'un bref aperçu de nos relevés et suggérer des directions de recherche.

Toutes les formes rencontrées dans le corpus, à une exception près, peuvent exprimer indifféremment l'assentiment et la confirmation. L'exception est constituée par «I agree» (très rarement utilisé par nos locuteurs), qui peut représenter les deux fonctions, telles que nous les avons définies, mais qui ne peut pas servir à poser un fait objectif indiscutable. On comparera par exemple :

A : Yes but you're bound to be critical aren't you
B : I agree yes yes

A : You're not married
B : *No I agree

Nous avons relevé sept réalisations différentes : Yes/No, Substitution, Vocalisation, Locutions, Répétition, Paraphrase, Expansion. Cela pose le

problème du statut de ces formes qui toutes peuvent réaliser la même signification. Au premier degré de finesse de la description (au sens que Halliday donne à «delicacy» dans la théorie polysystémique) on pourra les considérer comme des variantes libres, tout en sachant que cette variété de formes exprimant une même signification «nearly always signifies that there is a more subtle choice in meaning ...» (Halliday 1973 : 57), choix qu'une analyse plus fine devra expliquer. Ainsi on se demandera s'il existe une forme non-marquée de l'assentiment et de la confirmation, forme qui est utilisée dans tous les cas où, selon le principe de Halliday, il n'y a pas une «bonne raison» d'en choisir une autre.

(1) *Yes (Yeah)/ No*

C'est la forme de très loin la plus fréquente dans le corpus. Elle ne paraît pas correspondre à un choix plus «subtil» que celui de l'assentiment ou de la confirmation neutre et nous voyons donc en elle la meilleure candidate au titre de forme non-marquée. Mais elle peut être accompagnée d'interjections («Oh,» «Ah») et/ou être multipliée («Oh yes yes», «Yes yes yes») : il s'agit alors de formes marquées témoignant que l'assentiment ou la confirmation sont pleins et entiers («wholehearted»).

(2) *Substitution (ellipse incluse)*

Exemple :
A : It's very expensive isn't it
B : It is

Il nous semble que la substitution est non-marquée et équivaut à Yes/No, qu'elle accompagne souvent.

(3) *Vocalisation (Mm, Mhm, Uh-huh)*

Cette vocalisation appartient au registre familier, où elle est non-marquée. Elle est utilisée le plus souvent seule, alors que les autres formes ont tendance à se combiner entre elles.

(4) *Locutions*

Des expressions plus ou moins figées servent a marquer l'assentiment ou la confirmation : «that's right», «that's it», «that's true», «this is the problem (the point)», «so + sujet + auxiliaire», «I know» (qui met en lumière la règle préparatoire), etc. Nous incluons ici certaines «phrases mineures», généralement réduites à un adverbe ou un adjectif : «True», «Exactly», «Of course», «Right» etc. Ces locutions sont assez nom-

breuses et mériteraient une étude approfondie. À première vue, il semble que certaines au moins sont non-marquées («True» et «Right» par exemple). Naturellement, des réalisations prosodiques (le ton 5 particulièrement ; cf. Halliday 1970), rythmiques (martèlement des syllabes) ou paralinguistiques (qualité de voix) particulières peuvent correspondre à une modulation de la fonction (8).

(5) *Répétition*

B répète l'énoncé de A, entièrement ou partiellement, en ne retenant que les éléments essentiels. Redire ce qui a déjà été dit semble être une infraction à une loi du discours que Ducrot nomme «condition de progrès», selon laquelle «chaque énoncé est censé apporter une information nouvelle, sinon il y a rabâchage» (1972 : 87). Donc si B n'est pas un locuteur pathologique, sa répétition est considérée comme signifiante et interprétée, selon sa réalisation prosodique, les indications contextuelles et éventuellement les signaux non-verbaux, comme assentiment/confirmation, mise en question, pause méditative-réflexive ou réaction émotive (surprise, incrédulité, colère). L'emploi de la répétition est cependant soumis à des contraintes d'ordre psycholinguistique (plus l'énoncé de A est long et complexe moins il est facile à répéter) et sociolinguistique (plus l'énoncé répété est long plus il ralentit le rythme des échanges, ce qui peut être gênant). Quant à la motivation sociolinguistique du choix de la répétition comme forme d'assentiment/confirmation, nous faisons l'hypothèse qu'elle est d'ordre phatique : cette forme a une valeur d'intensification qui souligne l'accord des deux interlocuteurs et peut marquer une certaine chaleur, une certaine sympathie qui place les participants sur un plan de plus grande intimité. Elle serait ainsi une forme marquée. La

(8) Nous empruntons à Madame F. Roussel sa définition de la modulation discursive : «Any discursive function is seldom expressed in an absolutely neutral way. In most cases, various colourings — expressive, affective, social colourings — are superimposed on the utterance by which it is conveyed. In so far as these colourings are not random shades but can be regarded as graded nuances, within given ranges, selected in order to fit the atmosphere one wishes to create, the term «modulation» seems appropriate to refer to the passage from one nuance to the other, and in particular, from a neutral to a (more or less) marked realisation of the function concerned». (extrait d'une communication présentée au séminaire sur «The Communicative Teaching of English and the Foreign Language Learner» organisé par le Centre de Recherches et d'Applications Pédagogiques en Langues (Nancy) du 26 au 28 juin 1974 avec l'aide de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, du Social Science Research Council et du British Council.

répétition peut d'ailleurs se charger d'une intensité supplémentaire (modulation) si elle s'accompagne d'un auxiliaire tonique :

A : I think that also it slows the traffic down
B : //I It *does* slow traffic down//

Une autre manière d'intensifier consiste à utiliser le procédé de multiplication (qui, nous semble-t-il, a toujours cet effet) :

A : It's very odd that is
B : Very odd very odd

(6) *Paraphrase*

Un énoncé de A est reformulé par B au moyen d'autres termes, cette reformulation pouvant être syntaxique et/ou lexicale :

A : If I buy meat in England I know that I'm going to get a certain amount that is inedible
B : That you can't eat yes

Le corpus offre beaucoup plus d'exemples de répétition que de paraphrase. Nous n'avons pas trouvé de motivation originale qui distinguerait la paraphrase de la répétition et nous considérons provisoirement la première comme une variante de la seconde. Il y a peut-être souvent une motivation d'ordre purement linguistique, B exploitant en somme les ressources du code («inedible» / «that you can't eat», «wear the trousers»/«rule the roost», etc.) Mais la paraphrase peut être plus complexe et s'étendre sur un assez long passage de discours (dans cet exemple de confirmation le thème de discussion est l'appréciation de la musique) :

A : But you have more insight than the majority of the population into the problems and how good people are
B : I'm always looking into how they overcome this certain technical difficulty or the breathing difficulties of this certain passage

La synonymie, qui est le fondement de la paraphrase, apparaît ici dans «insight/look into», «problems/difficulty» et donne au texte une forte cohésion lexicale.

(7) *Expansion*

B ne se contente pas de répéter ou de reformuler l'énoncé de A, il en développe le thème. Dans l'exemple suivant l'assentiment est exprimé par une répétition suivie d'une expansion (il s'agit de Guernsey) :

A : It's too small and too
B : (interrompt) It's too small everybody knows you you know everybody.

Tout énoncé peut servir à exprimer l'assentiment ou la confirmation s'il développe le thème du discours de A. L'expansion est parfois fragmentaire (la phrase reste inachevée), mais elle est interprétée comme assentiment/confirmation dans la mesure où elle représente une ébauche de développement du thème. Il faut prendre le mot « thème » dans un sens très restreint, sinon des conversations presque entières pourraient être considérées uniquement comme des successions d'assentiments. À l'intérieur d'un thème général de conversation (ici, Guernsey), qui peut durer plus ou moins longtemps avant de céder éventuellement la place à un autre, on distingue des regroupements successifs, et c'est à un niveau assez bas de la hiérarchie que l'expansion fonctionne sans ambiguïté comme mode d'expression de l'assentiment (9). Parfois nous n'avons pas su dire si B, dans tel de ses énoncés, exprimait simplement son assentiment ou apportait sa contribution originale à l'édification du discours. Il nous semble que l'expansion n'est pas davantage que la répétition ou la paraphrase une forme neutre. Elle exige d'ailleurs, de par sa nature, un effort particulier de la part du locuteur (bien plus grand par exemple que celui requis par un simple « Yes » ou une vocalisation), effort qui paraît justifié par un haut niveau d'engagement (au sens de l'anglais « involvement ») du locuteur dans sa réaction : il est personnellement concerné, il connaît particulièrement bien le sujet, son affectivité entre en jeu, etc.

Ces différentes formes se combinent souvent entre elles, et l'étude des combinaisons promet d'être intéressante, aussi bien du point de vue de la description que de l'application.

Conclusion

Cette brève exploration nous a permis de mettre en lumière plusieurs points importants. Une analyse suivie, non-fragmentaire, du discours est indispensable si l'on veut étudier une fonction donnée et la mettre en

(9) L'expansion et la paraphrase ne se trouvent pas nécessairement à la suite immédiate de la déclaration de A, qui peut avoir à attendre assez longtemps avant qu'apparaisse l'expression de l'assentiment de B (si par exemple celui-ci choisit de présenter d'abord ses réserves). Cette non-juxtaposition possible est très importante dans l'analyse du discours et nous remercions Dr Candlin de l'avoir rappelée au cours de la discussion qui a suivi le présent exposé.

œuvre dans le cadre d'une application pédagogique. Cette analyse montre combien il serait faux d'imaginer qu'une fonction est représentée par une forme linguistique particulière et aussi qu'une forme linguistique donnée ne peut représenter qu'une seule fonction. Nous avons vu par exemple que tout passage de discours pouvait (si certaines conditions étaient remplies) être interprété comme assentiment/confirmation. Il est frappant de constater aussi à quel point l'interprétation d'un énoncé dépend de facteurs situationnels non-linguistiques : l'étude du discours est bien l'étude d'un certain texte dans une certaine situation. Et quand on essaie d'analyser la signification des différents modes d'expression d'une fonction, on prend conscience du rôle essentiel du comportement verbal dans le comportement social.

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SOME METALINGUISTIC PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATIVE LANGUAGE LEARNING

1. One of the more intriguing among the many dogmas of language teaching is that which states that it is the task of the language learner to 'learn the language', not to 'learn about the language'. No doubt this dogma was more honoured in the breach by enthusiastic and imaginative teachers who rapidly realised the absurdity of attempting to persuade the learner to embark on a analysing and categorising task of considerable complexity while denying him the right, apparently, to discuss the data so as to make sense of problems in an ordered fashion for himself, but it did stand as a warning against calling on a metalanguage, or better metalinguistic knowledge, by the language learner and the language teacher, of the data presented in the classroom.

In this paper I want to argue in favour of possessing such metalinguistic knowledge (1), and specifically through the example of a particular group of specialist learners (2) to show how attempts in much current language teaching material to lead the learner to an awareness of discourse on the basis of variety analysis (3) are not appropriate as indicators to the learner of the interactive nature of discourse, for which different metalinguistic knowledge (and hence a different metalanguage in course books and teachers' manuals) based on a dynamic view of linguistic variation (4) is now required.

(1) Defining 'metalinguistic knowledge' as knowledge by the learner of the nature of language and the nature of 'knowing a language', and additionally, of sets of terms by which the components of such knowledge can be characterised.

(2) The example data is drawn from : Candlin, Bruton and Leather 1974.

(3) 'Variety analysis' as used here refers especially to the systems proposed inter alia by Gregory 1967 and Crystal and Davy 1969.

(4) Cf Bailey and Shuy 1973 ; Labov 1969, 1972, 1973 ; Sankoff 1973, Bickerton 1971.

2. Recently there has been considerable discussion on the topic of 'communicative competence' in linguistics and language teaching, indicating from the point of view of sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics and latterly from generative semantics, a concern for contextual meaning and an extension of linguistic knowledge into the broader areas of language in use and language in texts.

By 'communicative' in the title of this paper I intend the following : we make sense of language stimuli through our generalized knowledge of language which we acquire both as individuals and as members of society. We acquire this knowledge dynamically : as, for example, we learn verbally how to make ourselves understood, quieten misunderstandings, carry out decisions and win support for our actions, we also learn thereby to understand the social rules which in turn come to condition our awareness of the world.

Fundamentally, of course, we possess language not because we need, want or use it but simply by virtue of our status as human beings with certain mental faculties such that it is via language that we portray symbolically our treatment of our sensory input. Nonetheless, for communication it is the ways in which we put this fundamental ability to the expression of certain 'meanings' which matters and which governs the selection of the components of communicative language learning.

These meanings range from the essential *notional* (5) categories of, for example, Time, Place, Number, Manner and Degree, through the *logical/propositional* meaning of assertions and denials of truth and falsity, to the *sociolinguistic* meanings implied by speaker-hearers' mutual understanding of beliefs, states-of-mind and social status/roles, on to the *contextual* meaning carried by the grammatical cohesion and rhetorical coherence of oral, and written texts.

Consequently, communicative learning cannot be analyzed in terms of linguistic form alone, but necessarily with reference to speaker-hearers' mutual assessments within their own social capacities. In all the ritualised acts of speaking devised for the management of human affairs by society — seeking and giving information, complaining and entreating — we have to acknowledge the restrictions on the understanding and performing of these acts of speaking which are imposed by the conventions of our own social worlds.

(5) i.e. the basic semantic categories of a grammar.

It is in the light of this that I am especially concerned with the ways in which we might make clear to language learners the nature of communication as an active process ; the ways in which the exchanges between interlocutors are rhetorically patterned and how an understanding of these exchanges, and, in particular, their internal sequences, depends on understanding the cultural, interpersonal and dynamic components (6) of the speech situation (7). I would not be rash and declare that the assessment of these components in terms of their real effect in particular cases on realisation-choice has been solved ; we are only beginning to record and botanise discourse, let alone generate and predict. We are clearly a long way from successfully incorporating into these components necessary others such as the sociopsychological features of an individual's *personality* and *intention*, or the more transient features of *emotional state* and assumed *role*. Avenues are, however, opening in a variety of fields connected with linguistics, and, as we are reminded, applied linguistics need not always wait on the results of theoretical discussion to make its own contribution to understanding linguistic interaction.

3. One of the obstacles to the solution of the metalinguistic task of making learners aware of the communicative value of the language they are learning, and in the context of this paper 'taking turns' in oral discourse, is the overwhelming concentration of course-books on variation in language seen in static, correlative terms. Despite the dynamism of oral-aural methodology, language variation is seen as a product rather than an activity (8). Accepting the methodological problems associated with applying such analytical schemes as Gregory (1967) and Crystal and

(6) *cultural* : indicating the presuppositions about social appropriateness mutually held by interlocutors.
interpersonal : representing facts about the interlocutors and their beliefs.
dynamic : reflecting the ways in which a developing discourse mirrors reactions between interlocutors and their setting.

(7) 'Situation' is succinctly defined by Goffman : "A social situation arises whenever two or more individuals find themselves in one another's immediate presence, and it lasts till the next-to-last person leaves". It is meant here in this very broad 'social' sense, rather than the more narrowly defined 'situation' of language teaching course-books where the reference is typically to a mixture of a physical *setting* and a particular lexical field.

(8) This is in part due, as Wilkins (1972) points out, to the fact that the majority of such course-books are distinguished by the *reported* language of the closet conditions in which they are produced — where the language data derive from introspection by the author of what people report by means of language : rather than reflecting the actuality of what people *do* through language.

Davy (1969) to texts, and ignoring, for the purpose of this paper, the interesting conclusion of Kirkwood (1973) that even in 'variety analysis' terms some text-books are excessively monolectal, a nagging transfer problem remains. Just as with hindsight there was no great reason to suppose that courses intent on inculcating formal rules of grammar (by whatever methodology) would assist the fluent verbal ability of the learner, neither ought we to suppose that registerial analysis in correlative terms will improve the communicative strategies of the learner engaged in steering his way through a discourse to achieve an original or discovered goal. In a sense there is a return here to the distinction between sentences and utterances in that the view of language as communication taken in the second section of this paper, based on a rhetoric of speech functions, is incommensurate with the structuralist features of variety analysis.

4. Recent work on the analysis of spoken discourse, however, (Sinclair, Coulthard et al. 1972, 1975 continuing) suggests a framework for the analysis of speakers' verbal strategies of considerable potential value for language learning. In essence their model provides a taxonomy of hierarchically ordered ranks (9) within which the discoursal significance of individual utterances can be measured, and their prospective and retrospective value assessed. Here speakers' utterances are judged and interpreted interdependently, and through the analysis judgements are commonsensically made of the strategies and roles of competing interlocutors. On the basis of this analysis, Johns (1973 continuing) has outlined teaching units for spoken discourse which are of considerable interest to the metalinguistic concerns of this paper. Learners are encouraged to assess the value of utterances in terms of what they achieve in the discourse — whether they effectively make a strategy (10) succeed, or fail. Students in such a methodology are encouraged to gloss, to comment on the interpretation of utterances, so that they move progressively towards that 'common-sense' on which native-speakers draw, and come to be aware of the necessary preconditions for the understanding of utterance-values, and also in the own performance, of what utterances entail. An example follows (11):

(9) E.g. TRANSACTION, SEQUENCE, EXCHANGE, MOVE, ACT.

(10) The term 'strategy' here is best understood in ethnomethodological terms — as 'interruptions', 'floor-seekings', 'getting-out routines' etc. cf. inter alia Garfinkel (1967), Goffman (1959, 1971), Shegloff (1969).

(11) Cf. T. F. Johns mimeographed, unpublished, University of Birmingham 1973. Whereas in earlier approaches to applying the notion of speech function to language

I	II Explanation	III Example/Realisation
ENTRY	The speaker announces that he wishes to enter the discussion	I'd like to take up a point Jim made, if I may
CHECK	The speaker returns the discussion to a previous point and checks that his understanding is correct	I think he said that a women's place is in the home
CHALLENGE	The speaker shows the general *nature* of his disagreement	Isn't that taking a rather narrow view?
COUNTER	The speaker puts forward his own point of view	In my country, for example ...

Metalinguistically, the student has here to master an analytical system with its terminology (for example, ENTRY, CHECK, CHALLENGE, COUNTER) and to be able to apply a continuous process of analysis through the realisations at III, understood at II, and to continue the discourse through I. Such an applied linguistic example indicates part of the metalinguistic demand on discourse-learners.

In terms of the components of language seen as communication sketched at the beginning of this paper, however, a number of gaps need to be filled. ENTRY, CHECK are not of themselves setting-specific, nor do they nominate particular interlocutors. They are, moreover, not sufficiently lucid in terms of, let us say, their perlocutionary force. They do not indicate precisely enough the *communicative network* of the participants, the nature of the *participants* in the act, nor the *intention* of the act.

To be transparent to the learner the analytical system has to employ a metalanguage which successfully makes plain these sociolinguistic parameters. What follows here is a limited example from current research into language teaching materials development based on sociolinguistic analysis of real data ([12]). The example is limited to an enumeration of the speech

teaching (inter alia Wilkins (1972) ; Candlin (1974) ; Candlin, Kirkwood, Moore (1974, 1975) a quantity of potential syntactic realisations had been assigned to particular functions, the advantage of the Johns' material is to set the functions in a discoursal sequence. This requires students not only to be aware of the underlying communicative value of heterogenous grammatical forms, but further requires then to be able to discuss the placing of the functions within the developing structure of the discourse, and indicates to them how to place their own functions.

(12) Cf. Candlin, Bruton, Leather (1974).

functions available in the context of doctor-patient consultation and indicates, in the way I have suggested as now necessary, part of the metalinguistic awareness required by communicative language learners.

5. Speech functions

Note that what follows here is a provisional set of speech functions in the consultation context. The set will need to be tested against broader domains of Casualty duty (for example doctors in conversation with telephonists, anaesthetists, and paraclinical staff) and it results from what were necessarily at this stage immediate and pre-scientific judgements.

A GREET	D ([13]): 'Hullo'; D: 'Good morning'; D: 'Mrs. Jones?' etc.
B ELICIT	(*to get broad description of accident with some circumstantial detail*) ([14]) D: 'Can you tell me what happened?' ... etc.
C INTERROGATE	(*to probe circumstances of trauma relevant to diagnosis ...*): D: 'Do you remember if your whole weight was on the foot?' D: 'Did you bend right back when you fell?' ... etc.
D QUESTION	(*to get information during examination*): D: 'Does this hurt?'; D: 'Can you bend it?' etc.
E MAKESURE	(*to make sure that what the Doctor understands is what the Patient meant*): D: 'Does it hurt here?' P: 'No, not really'. D: 'It doesn't hurt?' P: 'No'.
F EXTEND:	(*to test a deduction made from the Patient's information*): D: 'Can you walk alright'? P: 'Yes'. D: 'So it doesn't hurt to put your weight on it'? P: 'No'.

(13) D = *Doctor*, *P* = Patient.

(14) The bracketed items are given as interpretations of the communicative values of the speech function in question, and are crucial to making the function-labels transparent.

G ACTION-INFORM (*to let the patient know what is being done/ going to be done*):
D: 'I'm going to put in a couple of stitches'.
D: 'I think we'd better have an X-ray, to make sure ...' etc.

H DIAG-INFORM: (*to let the patient know the diagnosis*):
D: 'You haven't broken anything' ... etc.

I PROG-INFORM: (*to let the patient know how the condition is likely to progress*):
D: 'It should heal up quite quickly', etc.

J TREAT-DIRECT: (*to tell the patient what to do help the cure*):
D: 'Take plenty of rest'. etc.

K DIRECT: (*to tell the patient what to do so that medical attention can effectively be given*):
D: 'Can you just lie down a moment'.
D: 'Take this with you to X-ray.
D: 'Come back in five days'. etc.

L APOLOGY: (*to apologize for hurting patient or otherwise inconveniencing*):
D: 'Sorry! Did that hurt'? etc.

M TALK: (*to give information not strictly relevant to the consultation in hand*):
D: 'I've seen rather a lot of these lately'.
D: 'Little girls tend to do that sort of thing'.

N MED-ASK (*to get information relevant to clinical aspects of consultation*):
D: 'Are you allergic to penicillin'?
D: 'Have you been vaccinated against tetanus'? etc.

O ADMIN-ASK (*to get information not relevant to clinical aspects of consultation*):
D: 'Do you use this hand in your work'?
D: 'Did you come here on foot'? etc.

P REASSURE: (*to reassure patient*):
D: 'Nothing serious here'.
D: 'Don't worry, it's all right', etc.

Q ACCEPT: (*to acknowledge receipt of communication*):
D: '... Yes ...4
P: 'I sort of twisted it round ... you know ... like ...'
D: 'Twisted it. 'I see'.

R LEAVETAKE: (*to end the consultation*):
D: 'Right, thank you Mrs. Jones'.
D: 'OK? Thank you'.
D: 'Good. See you after the X-ray then ...'

S GO-ON : (*to encourage patient to continue the story*) :
P : 'Well, I was playing football...'
D : 'Mmm ...'
P : 'And ...

T ANSWER : (*to reply to query by patient/nurse*) :
P : 'Does that mean it's broken'?
D : 'Yes, I'm afraid it's broken just there'.
N : 'Shall I do an elastic bandage Doctor'?
D : 'Yes I think that's all it needs'.

U REPEAT : (*to get the patient/nurse/addressee to repeat what he/she said*) :
D : 'What'?
D : 'Sorry'? etc.

V RESTATE : (*repeating what was said because the patient didn't catch it*) :
D : 'Can you swallow all right'?
P : 'Can I ...?'
D : '... Swallow all right'.

W FEED-ME-BACK : (*to check that the patient/nurse/addressee has understood/is listening*) :
D : 'Do you follow me'?
D : 'OK'?
D : 'Is that all right'? etc.

Two points should be made following from the above enumeration of speech functions. Firstly, as has been noted elsewhere, it would be rash to think in terms of a one-to-one correspondence between utterance and speech function. In terms of this taxonomy, an utterance could fulfill both a TALK function and a REASSURE function (as when the doctor asks the boy patient which football team he supports). Similarly ACTION-INFORM often serves both to tell the patient what is going to be done to him/her and to inspire confidence. (Particularly through intonation).

Secondly, there are types of utterance which have as it were bifurcating illocutionary forces. Thus the doctor may utter *We'll just put a couple of stitches in*, simultaneously realising as ACTION-INFORM to the patient and a DIRECT to the nurse (who takes the utterance as an instruction to bring a suture-set).

6. Such, then, is a characterization of part of the metalinguistic knowledge required by a particular set of specialist learners involved in the

monitoring and production of oral discourse ([15]). Central to this knowledge is an awareness of the structure of discourse in terms of the patterning of speech functions, and it is this aspect, crucial to the planning of discourse by the learner, where extension from sociolinguistic analysis of 'variation' can contribute both to applied and theoretical linguistic discussion.

A current issue in sociolinguistic analysis is to discover ways of incorporating regularly patterning co-occurrent features into steady-state grammars of the classic transformational type. Early attempts (Klima 1964) to relegate variation to low-level cosmetic rules hardly did justice to the 'depth' of variation implied in studies such as Labov (1966), Bickerton (1972). Labov's concept of the variable rule had a major effect in introducing probability measures into linguistic analysis, implying, as it did, that idiolectal grammars could indicate the probabilities of particular rules becoming operational or not, in a variety of environments. The early proposals were restricted to phonological data, but later research by Labov and others indicated no *a priori* reasons why other levels of language should not be similarly susceptible. Current work by Bickerton (1973), Sankoff (1973) inter alia has shown probabilities of rule-operation in certain environments involving, for example, loss or retention of morphological features, and work by Carden (1973) examines the probabilities among different readings of ambiguous utterances. In essence these 'probability rules' are concerned with co-variation. The presence of certain phonological or syntactic features ensures, for particular social speakers, the operation of the rule. This overbrief indication of current sociolinguistic interest into the dynamics of co-variation has, I believe, considerable insights for applied linguistic analysis and in particular to the teaching of discourse performance.

Taking the list of speech functions in section 5 above, and seeing them within the framework of the phases of the casualty consultation, what begins to emerge from statistical analysis ([16]) of function co-selection and sequence is that chaining of rhetorical functions is not random but quantifiable to the point that probabilities for co-occurrence and entailment can

(15) It is, of course, only part of the metalinguistic information required : to this has to be added details of communication networks, participants, channels and specific communication tasks.

(16) See Candlin, Bruton and Leather (1974), *Work in Progress : Report III*. Doctor Speech Functions in Casualty Consultations : Some Quantified Characteristics of Discourse in a Regulated Setting.

be stated, and indications of serial ordering given. Despite these encouraging results, this is not, of course, to say that particular realisations can be predicted probabilistically, even given particular situations such as Doctor-Patient interactions in a consultation cubicle. What can be done is to limit the range of occurring speech functions — and to indicate function patterns. Information of this kind would seem both to extend again the metalinguistic knowledge required by the foreign learner in his pursuit of 'common sense', and seems also to point a way to making more specific the learning tasks involved in oral communication, in the way it suggests that given particular settings and participant-relationships function choice is not random but rule-governed and in part predictable.

For communicative language learning, therefore, particular with oral discourse performance in mind, at least two important areas of metalinguistic knowledge cannot be excluded. Firstly, if we are intending, for example, to establish discourse rules as a necessary part of a learner's equipment to understand utterances, we shall have to bring him to participate in AB events, in Labov's terms [17]. In the case of the example from the analysis of doctor-behaviour this minimally includes the features of setting, communication network and participant-relationships as well as the speech functions outlined in section 5 of this paper. Equally, if learners are to plan their participation in discourses, they must share that sense of the probably-occurring which in oral discourse terms corresponds to the sensing of the appearance of rhetorical acts which one can train for in reading comprehension. Just as in written text there are patterns of argument and rhetorical schemes which are regularly followed, and typically signalled, so in oral discourse, speech functions co-occur and entail each other in predictable ways.

From this example of present research into doctor-patient consultation in a Casualty setting, to return to the points on 'variety analysis' and register made in section 3 above, it would seem wholly possible to fulfil Widdowson's suggestion (1971) that a register (for example the consultation-register suggested here) can now be defined in terms of a predictable patterning of speech functions. This extends the knowledge of the nature of language a learner now requires, and provides him with a key to the unlocking of discourse.

(17) Cf. Labov (1970).

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INTERPRETIVE PROCEDURES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF POETRY

It has long been fashionable to regard poetry as irrelevant to the learning of foreign languages. If it is sometimes reluctantly allowed admittance, it is usually after the main business on the language learning agenda has been completed as a kind of light entertainment which practical people need not take seriously but which may serve to stimulate interest. In this paper I want to suggest that poetry can be incorporated as an integrative element into a language course and that, properly presented, it can serve as an invaluable aid in the development of communicative competence. I shall argue that although poetry is an abnormal use of language, its interpretation involves the same essentially normal procedures as are required for the understanding of any discourse and that it is precisely because of its abnormality that poetry can be used to direct the learner's attention to these interpretive procedures. The expression 'interpretive procedures' comes from Cicourel (Cicourel 1973) and I shall in the course of my argument draw on (my understanding of) certain ethnomethodological notions regarding the interpretation of discourse. This is because I believe that these notions provide the theoretical perspective which indicates the way poetry can be reinstated as a practical element in a language learning programme.

One can sympathize with the desire of the proponents of structural grading to exclude poetry from their syllabuses. A rationalisation of this desire might take the following form. We may say (simplifying somewhat) that there are two main ways in which poetry has traditionally been represented in teaching, and neither or them appears to have much bearing on the practical business of learning a foreign language: in fact they

would appear to be contrary to sound language teaching principles. The first represents poems as linguistic puzzles which need to be solved by detailed explanation and the second represents them as aesthetic objects whose essential message can be intuitively perceived by exposure and exhortation. The first way represents poems as complicated texts with little or no reference to their character as discourse (see Widdowson 1973a, b for the text/discourse distinction) and the second way represents poems as a kind of superior discourse conveying special messages without much reference to the way textual features are used in the conveyance. Neither of these representations commends itself to teachers whose concern is to present language in a carefully controlled manner through a structural syllabus so that each element introduced should be thoroughly understood. The first introduces complexities and requires explanations, whereas it is precisely explanation and complexity which the structural syllabus, as a matter of principle, seeks by careful grading to avoid. The second representation draws the learner's attention away from an exact understanding of linguistic elements whereas it is precisely this close attention to detail which characterizes the design of a structural syllabus. In short, poetry can be seen as a potential source of disruption in the step-by-step learning process : something which might be introduced with circumspection to add variety and relieve boredom but not to be regarded as an intrinsic element in the course itself. A kind of side-show.

It must be noted, however, that this rationalisation does not provide a case against the inclusion of poetry in a language learning course in principle. It provides a case against including these particular representations of poetry in a language course based on structural principles. But there are other ways of representing poetry and other ways of approaching the teaching of language.

Over the past few years a number of people have recommended a shift of emphasis from a concentration on the teaching of the language system to a concentration on the teaching of the actual social uses to which it is put. It has been suggested that the principles underlying the structural approach should be revised to accomodate the teaching of communicative functions and in some quarters there have been somewhat more extreme councels which recommend the rejection of the structural approach altogether. As yet, little in the way of actual teaching materials has been produced which embodies these suggestions and exposes them to tests of pedagogic viability and it is far too early to say to what extent this shift of emphasis can reasonably be adopted as an approach of general relevance

to all teaching situations. But whatever difference of opinion there might be regarding the most effective approach to the design of language teaching courses, everyone would agree that their ultimate purpose must be to develop an ability to handly language as an instrument of communication. Although there may be a delimiting of aims which restricts the skills to be acquired and the areas of social activity in which communication takes place, it will be generally agreed that there must be no restriction which denies the learner access to an ability to use the language he is learning as a means of communication.

Ultimately, then, the aim of language teaching must be to develop a communicative competence in the language being learned, although there is room for disagreement as to how this aim might be achieved in different circumstances. Now, having said that, it seems to me that the principal difficulty associated with the structural approach as usually practised has always been the problem of how to present linguistic elements in extra-linguistic situations or linguistic contexts in such a way as to make the learners aware of the communicative potential of these elements. If at a certain point in the syllabus for example one has to introduce a certain linguistic element (a 'sentence pattern' or 'vocabulary item') one might, following time-honoured practice, contrive a classroom situation or a written passage representing a context in which this element can be made to occur with a fair degree of frequency. This kind of contrivance can be an effective means of indicating what meaning a grammatical feature or a lexical items has as an element of the language system, what I have called elsewhere its signification (Widdowson 1972). But it has two rather serious limitations.

In the first place, since one's purpose is to introduce and establish the form and the signification of the element in focus, one is concerned with the possibility and not the probability of occurrence. That is to say, one is concerned with exemplifying the structure concerned as fully as possible and so one's aim is to produce pedagogically appropriate text. But if the density of exemplification is achieved at the expense of the probability of such density occurring in any normal and non-contrived use of the language, then one produces language which has little value as discourse. Hence one cannot be demonstrating the communicative function of the structure : one is manifesting its form and signification in a text but one is not showing how it realizes communicative value in a discourse. To do this, one would have to think of a situation or a context in which the recurrence of the linguistic structure in question constituted normal use. Though this is possible, it is difficult ; and in practice is rarely achieved.

The first limitation has to do with the teacher's difficulty in reconciling the need for repetition with a natural communicative use of language. The second limitation has to do with the learner's difficulty in abstracting from particular situations and contexts more general conditions of appropriateness. The point is that the communicative value of a particular linguistic element is not a function of its relationship with the context or situation as a whole but of its relationship with a set of essential conditions for which the context or situation simply provides the concrete realization. When Firth talked about 'context of situation' he made reference to 'The relevant features of participants' and 'The relevant objects' (Firth 1957 : 182). The notion of relevance is crucial. For, confronted with a piece of language in a context or context of situation, how does the learner recognize which features and objects are relevant to the communicative import of the language and which are not? Those which are relevant represent the conditions whereby the piece of language counts as a particular act of communication. If one simply brings together linguistic elements with contexts or situations the learner is left to work out the relevant conditions for himself. Obviously he cannot be said to have acquired communicative competence if he only learns a fixed connection between a particular linguistic form and a particular context or situation. For someone to correctly interpret discourse he needs to be able to recognize relevant conditions in situations he has never encountered before and the manner in which these give value to structures he may never have specifically associated with these situations in the past. Linguistic ability must be essentially creative. The acquisition of communicative competence involves the learning of interpretive procedures whereby particular situational or contextual factors are recognised as realisations of conditions which determine the communicative function of linguistic elements.

What a language course must ultimately develop in the learner, then, is a technique for deriving the communicative value of linguistic elements as they occur in discourse. The learning of the form and the signification of these linguistic elements, which the structural syllabus promotes, represents a set of facts, a body of knowledge upon which this technique operates to create communication. And communication is created both by receiver and producer. It is common to speak of receptive and productive skills (and even active and passive skills) but these terms refer only to the physiological activity involved. From the cognitive point of view both the initiation and the interpretation of discourse involve creative activity.

Learning to comprehend efficiently involves the activation of interpretive techniques or procedures and the same procedures are brought into play in reverse when discourse is composed.

This view of what is involved in realising the communicative potential of language derives essentially from ideas propounded by the ethnomethodologists. I will not be so imprudent as to lay claim to a complete understanding of what they have to say. Indeed since it is one of their principal contentions that complete understanding is not attainable they presumably would not want anyone to strive for it. I believe in fact that the very views which they express require that they be expressed obscurely and that the best way of approaching much of their work is to treat it as if it were a kind of literary writing, a creative rather than an expository form of discourse. Be that as it may, what does emerge fairly clearly from the obscurity is the concept of discourse not as the manifestation of pre-ordained meanings but as a dynamic process which involves what Garfinkel calls 'practical reasoning' (Garfinkel 1967). Discourse is created as a 'contingent ongoing accomplishment' whereby the participants in an interchange attribute particular value to linguistic elements as they are conditioned by the context and the situation in which they occur. The basic insight that the ethnomethodologists express it that the meanings conveyed in the use of language are not subject to precise specification beforehand in grammars and dictionaries but have to be discovered in the development of the discourse itself. The linguist has led us to think of meanings as fixed in a static well-defined system and subject to variation in 'actual performance' which in some sense is a distortion, whereas the ethno-methodologists suggest that instead of thinking of variation in meaning we might more profitably think of meaning in variation. In this view, variation cannot be idealised out from linguistic data : it is at the very centre of the communicative process. If this is so, then of course a generative grammar which describes linguistic competence in the Chomskyan sense cannot by definition deal with discourse at all.

One form of discourse which has been a source of some embarrassment to generative grammarians for some time is poetry. In poetry we very often find what Katz calls 'semi-sentences' and 'nonsense strings' (Katz 1964). Now if a grammar represents a speaker's knowledge of his language, how does it come about that he knows how to interpret strings which are not well-formed and so cannot be generated by the grammar? This is how Katz puts the problem :

> "Though the knowledge a speaker requires to understand well-formed sentences and the knowledge he requires to understand semi-sentences is one and the same, and though a generative grammar can represent all the grammatical knowledge a speaker has and can account for how he is able to understand sentences, yet such a grammar cannot account for how a speaker is able to understand semi-sentences".

This is the somewhat self-contradictory conclusion that he arrives at :

> "The task a speaker performs when he understands a semi-sentence involves, in addition to his use of grammatical knowledge, the use of knowledge of another kind" (Katz 1964 : 402).

But what is this knowledge of another kind? And how precisely is this knowledge and grammatical knowledge 'used'? Again Katz says that the speaker "utilises his knowledge of the structure of the language to find a meaning for something that is not well-formed" (Katz 1964 : 414). But of course the speaker must utilise his knowledge of the structure of his language to find meanings in well-formed instances of language use as well. The speaker does not simply require a knowledge of his grammar to interpret discourse : he requires a knowledge of how his grammar is used. And although his grammar can be made manifest as usage by citing isolated sentences contrived by the linguist for the purpose of exemplification, it is not actually realised in use through isolated sentences. Sentences simply serve to manifest grammatical rules but they do not show how these rules are used in the dynamic process of discourse development. A grammar cannot tell us how semi-sentences are understood because if they occur in actual use they are not semi-sentences but elements of a discourse and a grammar cannot tell us how discourse is understood. It cannot tell us because it does not provide information as to how our grammatical knowledge is actually put to use in communicative behaviour (For further discussion on this and related points see Widdowson 1973b).

A number of linguists have pondered on the problem of how to account for what Katz would call semi-sentences and nonsense-strings occurring in poetic discourse and several suggestions have been made as to how grammatical statements might be framed to make explicit the meaning of deviant strings of this kind and their relationship with well-formed sentences (see Levin 1962, Thorne 1965, Fowler 1969). Interesting though much of this discussion is, it is important to see that it is concerned with a problem of the linguist's own invention. Sentences only exist as the

linguist's exemplification of rules within a grammar; and they must by definition be well-formed. Semi-sentences cannot occur in a grammar because they are semi, and they cannot occur anywhere else because they are sentences. They are, in effect, figments of the linguist's imagination.

If we cannot account for the interpretation of discourse, deviant or otherwise, by invoking grammatical knowledge, how then can we account for it? We can account for it, I suggest, by invoking this concept of interpretive procedures. What the ethnomethodologists do when they attempt to explain the nature of these procedures is to focus attention on precisely what is involved in what Katz refers to as the 'use of grammatical knowledge'. There is no 'knowledge of another kind' apart from this and it is these procedures I suggest which are put into operation when we realise the communicative value of linguistic elements in discourse, whether this is poetic or not. In other words, I am suggesting that we interpret poetry in the same way as we interpret other kinds of discourse and that if we did not do so, there would be no way of explaining how poetry is interpreted at all. The difference between the interpretation of poetic and other kinds of discourse is not that we use different procedures but that in the case of poetic discourse we are more conscious of them. Interpretation is more problematic and so we are inevitably more aware of the process involved. It is this which gives poetry its potential importance in language teaching.

Before going on to develop this last point, let me try to draw together what I have said so far. The kind of structurally graded course which presents grammatical and lexical material so that it appears in a precise step by step sequence clearly cannot incorporate poetry as it is commonly represented, that is to say as something linguistically complex which requires explanation or something vague and aesthetic whose meaning can only be intuitively apprehended. However, a course of this kind, or of any other kind, cannot be said to teach language satisfactorily unless it can also provide learners with the ability to use their linguistic knowledge to create or recreate discourse. The aim of all teaching must be to develop communicative strategies, or cognitive procedures, whereby the language user is able to recognise in a situation or a context just those conditions which operate to provide linguistic elements with their specific value, whether these elements are single lexical items or sentences or combinations of sentences. It is not enough simply to bring bits of language into association with contexts and situations and leave the learner to work out for himself which contextual or situational features are relevant for the correct interpretation of the language as an instance of communication. A

structurally based course, then, must somewhere make provision for the teaching of interpretive procedures, since not otherwise will learners be prepared for their encounter with actual discourse. The structural syllabus is based on the grammarian's orientation to language study and this does not provide a model of description that can deal adequately with discourse. The ethnomethodological orientation, for all the obscurity of its exposition, does provide such a model since it stresses the ongoing creative activity involved in deriving communicative value from linguistic elements as they occur in contexts of use. I suggested that the cognitive procedures that must be brought into operation in the interpretation of discourse containing elements which cannot be put into correspondence with well-formed sentences are the same as those we must employ to make sense of any discourse. The process whereby we interpret poetry is essentially the same process whereby we interpret any other kind of language use, the difference being that in poetic interpretation the process is inevitably more apparent.

Now if it is the case that an understanding of poetry, not as a piece of complex text or as a mysterious message but as a form of discourse, makes us conscious of the procedures we employ in the understanding of any discourse, and if it is the purpose of language courses to develop an awareness of such procedures, then it would seem logical to suppose that poetry can be introduced into such courses to help to develop such an awareness. It should be added that one must, at the same time, take care that the particular poems introduced are graded in terms of textual complexity and abstruseness of message.

Let us consider an example. Let us suppose that the following poem is judged to be appropriate from these points of view at a particular stage in a language course:

September

We sit late, watching the dark slowly unfold:
No clock counts this.
When kisses are repeated and the arms hold
There is no telling where time is.

It is midsummer: the leaves hang big and still:
Behind the eye a star,
Under the silk of the wrist a sea, tell
Time is nowhere.

We stand ; leaves have not timed the summer.
No clock now needs
Tell we have only what we remember :
Minutes uproaring with our heads

Like an unfortunate King's and his Queen's
When the senseless mob rules ;
And quietly the trees casting their crowns
Into the pools.

Ted Hughes

We will assume that the learner knows the signification of the grammatical structures and of the lexical items which appear in this poem, or has access to a dictionary. The question is : knowing these things, what procedures must be brought to bear to make sense of expressions like *watching the dark slowly unfold* (line 1), *under the silk of the wrist* (line 7) and so on. Even if we assume that the learner has encountered the use of *dark* as a noun, he needs to link its occurrence here with the expression *We sit late* for him to recognise that here it is the darkness of night that is being referred to. And this darkness unfolds. This verb, we will assume, has previously been given a signification that associates it with object noun phrases which make reference to tangible substances of a pliant nature : sheets of linen or paper for example. But here it is associated with something insubstantial. Clearly for the reader to make sense of this expression, then, he must recognise that the significations of *dark* and *unfold* are not carried unmodified into the context : he must realise a kind of mutual conditioning whereby each lexical item draws relevant semantic features from the other to create a unique concept. The dark is both insubstantial and substantial and its unfolding is both perceived (like the unfolding of a blanket) and imagined (like the unfolding of a story).

Consider now the expression *under the silk of the wrist*. Here the value of *silk* derives from the way it is conditioned by the phrase in which it occurs. The reader is required to select certain semantic features (smoothness and softness, for example) and to disregard others as irrelevant in this instance of use. In other words, he has to employ interpretive procedures to work out in what respect *silk* and *wrist* can be conceptually related as the context requires them to be, bearing in mind that the signification of these items will provide no explicit semantic link.

In the cases we have considered so far, the interpretive procedures are prompted by the syntactic relations which hold between the lexical items concerned. These relations, like bearings drawn on a map, indicate where

semantic associations are to be found. It often happens, however, (particularly in poetry) that associations are not overtly indicated in this way and the reader then has to discover meanings without the help of an explicit syntactic map. Thus, the syntactic relations between *dark* and *unfold* direct the reader's attention to where his interpretive procedures are to be applied, but there are no such directions to guide the reader to a recognition of the link between this collocation and that of *star-tell* in lines 6-7. An interpretation of this poem requires the reader to free himself from a reliance on syntactic clues and to recognize how a number of collocations (*tell-time, tell-story, clock-time, time-late, time-minutes* and so on) function in effect like the semantic features of a complex concept which represents the central theme of the poem as a whole.

Mention might also be made of the problem posed by lines 12-14. Here the reader has to realise a verbal value for the noun *uproar*, relate this verb not only with the noun phrase *minutes*, with which it is syntactically linked, but also with the noun phrase *the senseless mob*, with which it is not, thereby establishing a meaning relation between the two noun phrases not indicated by syntactic structure and not sanctioned by their semantic significations. Apart from this, he has to work out the value of *heads* by recognising how its meaning here is a function of its association with *uproar*, *unfortunate* and *senseless mob*. And so on.

It is not my purpose to conduct a full scale stylistic analysis of this poem (interesting though this would be) but simply to point out the kind of procedure involved in arriving at an interpretation of it as discourse. The obvious lack of correspondence between what words mean as lexical elements of the language code, their signification, and what they are required to mean in the context, their value, obliges the reader to engage in what Garfinkel calls 'practical reasoning'. Furthermore, the problematic nature of the task draws the reader's attention to the procedures he must employ. Let me say again that it seems to me that these procedures can essentially be no different from those we employ in the understanding of any use of language, though in poetry more demands tend to be made of them (hence its importance). To take just one example, the kind of reasoning involved in deriving appropriate value in the case of the lexical items we have just considered would appear to be no different in kind from that required in recognising the value of the item *commercial* in the following instance of use* :

* I am indebted to H. J. Nyyssonen for this example.

> Pure metals are likely to resist corrosion better than metals containing impurities. Thus pure aluminium resists attack better than a commercial variety.

I believe that if teachers can represent poetry as discourse, along the lines suggested above, they will be able to make learners aware of how they use their linguistic knowledge in the interpretation of poetry, and that this will help to develop in them precisely those cognitive procedures which they need in order to deal with discourse of any kind. Once it is accepted that the ultimate aim of a language teaching course is to develop the ability to create and recreate discourse from the resources of linguistic knowledge and once it is accepted that poetry can be represented as a kind of discourse in which these processes are particularly open to observation, then I think one can begin to see a way of reinstating poetry as an integrative element in language teaching.

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INTERPRETIVE PROCEDURES: SEEING, READING, AND UNDERSTANDING DISCOURSE

Henry Widdowson has suggested in his paper: *Interpretive Procedures and the Importance of Poetry*, that it is the ultimate aim of a language teaching course to develop the ability of the learner to create and understand discourse in the target language, and that poetry, though an abnormal use of language (presumably in some statistical or probabilistic sense), is nevertheless discourse no different in kind from other types of discourse and consequently demands of the reader essentially the same interpretive skills, strategies or procedures as those required by other types of discourse. By exposing the learner to admittedly carefully graded examples of poetry we can help him to develop effective interpretive procedures or strategies, which will serve him well in the less exacting task of interpreting non-poetic discourse. The problem of understanding poetry is not different in kind from understanding any discourse but only in the degree of linguistic skill, knowledge or interpretive skill it demands of the reader-learner. It is because of these demands on the reader that poetry has been banned from the language classroom. Widdowson suggests that it is precisely because of these demands that it should be re-introduced, albeit with discretion.

It is my intention in this paper to investigate the possible nature of the interpretive procedures that are involved in understanding discourse and eventually to evaluate Widdowson's proposals in the light of my conclusions.

I want to start off by suggesting that understanding discourse is only a special case of the more general activity of interpreting or making sense of our environment. Another special case of this is the activity of making

sense of our physical environment — or perception, but more particularly visual perception, since we may, and often must, react to sensory information from taste and touch without going through the process of interpreting the meaning of the information. Our comfort, safety, and even our lives may depend on doing so. This is not true of visual perception. Optical images on the eyes are only patterns of light and, except in cases of high intensity, we do not react directly but only when interpretation has taken place. The difference between the interpretation of discourse and of the visual environment is, of course, that in the second case we have to do with naturally occurring physical objects, materials and man-made artifacts, having no inherent signification or value, whereas in the case of discourse some part of the data we have to interpret is symbolic ; that is, it has conventional inherent signification, which it is the task of linguistics to investigate. The point of view I shall try to argue is that, in fact, we do not treat linguistic objects wholly as symbols with conventional meanings but partly as we do other objects in our natural environment, hence the valid distinction made by Widdowson between signification and value.

It is now generally accepted by cognitive psychologists working in the field of perception that it is an *active*, and not as was held by eighteenth century empiricist philosophers, a *passive* process. It is something we *do*, not some thing that *happens* to us (it is an interesting fact, however, that our language classifies it as a passive process : *see, hear, understand* are syntactically stative). Visual perception is a cognitive activity, a process of *induction* which operates by data selection, processing, hypothesis formation, prediction and testing. In other words it is a type of problem-solving activity, involving logical thinking, of making 'unconscious inferences' as Helmholz called them, from the raw sense-data. Our ability to interpret the meaning of the sense-data depends upon our having some sort of stored knowledge or information learned from our previous experience, a stock of 'patterns' or 'object-hypotheses', against which we test the configuration of incoming sensory data for a 'fit'. Our ability to make quick and effective interpretations of our visual environment then depends upon two things : the *quantity* of the sensory data and the *adequacy* of our object-hypotheses. If the incoming data is restricted in quantity or quality (bad light, distance, etc.) our interpretations are likely to be less than adequate for effective action ; or, if our stored object-hypotheses are inadequate we are equally likely to make inadequate interpretations. The sense data available to us on any particular occasion is never likely (for

various reasons) to provide a perfect 'fit' with our stored image. All interpretations are fundamentally provisional — they are 'hypotheses' about how things are. It is the rule rather than the exception that we interpret what we see upon the slenderest clues and act consequently not so much upon what is directly sensed but upon what is believed. "We see what we believe rather than believe what we see" (Gregory 1970). In this sense visual perception is a *predictive* activity, and because predictive, action based upon it is risk-taking. We are constantly forced to make decisions for action upon our beliefs about the nature of our environment. Most of the time this is not a serious matter, since in any particular situation it is necessary only to make adequate interpretations of a limited number of *crucial* features. Summary interpretation of most of the features of our environment at any moment is a matter of little consequence. However, situations are not *static* they are in constant flux ; they unfold. By our reaction to the environment, that is by our behaviour, in the carrying out of our intentions, new factors in the environment become relevant or crucial for action. These require reprocessing, require new or up-dated interpretations. In other words, the meaning of features in the environment is contingent and dynamic, not inherent and static. This I understand Widdowson to mean when he says "we need to think not so much of variation in meaning, as meaning in variation".

Visual perception is not, then, just a matter of identifying a set of objects in our environment and assigning a once-and-for-all meaning to them, but a continuous dynamic process of re-assessment of our interpretations, or, as Garfinkel puts it, "a continuous on-going accomplishment". We must at every moment have sufficient understanding of our environment for us to act confidently.

I said that the process of perception involved matching the configuration of incoming sensory data with stored object-hypotheses. This means that to cope effectively with our environment we must have an *adequate* stock of *adequate* object-hypotheses available. As Gregory says "Perception is a matter of seeing the present with stored objects from the past". What do we mean by an adequate stock and adequate object-hypotheses? To answer the first part of the question is easier than to answer the second. An adequate stock is one which provides a sufficiently rich classification or account of the normal features of our environment to understand all the situations we are likely to meet with in our everyday lives. Transfer us to a new environment and we shall quickly find that our stored stock is inadequate for us to act effectively. We shall have up-to-date our stock, that is, we shall have to start learning.

The answer to the second question : an adequate object-hypothesis is one which contains sufficient information for the effective interpretation of the features of our environment even when the sensory data is severely restricted, or in an unusual configuration. An adequate object-hypothesis is one which not only fits the data but enables us to make *useful predictions*. For example, we must be able to establish a working hypothesis about an object not just when seen from the most usual orientation, but also in other 'transformations'. Most of our object-hypotheses are derived from experiences of the world as perceived from a limited number of orientations. Our object-hypotheses are made up of information which in our past experience has proved 'criterial' in interpretation. (Note the parallel with the semantic notions of criterial and non-criterial features).

The adequacy of our stock of object-hypotheses both in richness and quality is a measure of what we can call our "visual competence". The parallel with the notion of "linguistic competence" is obvious. The more visually competent we are, the better able we are to cope with novel visual experiences, just as our linguistic competence enables us to interpret discourse we have never experienced before. Visual competence is projective, or creative, just as is linguistic competence. And just as transfer to an unfamiliar environment taxes our visual competence, so does transfer to an unfamiliar linguistic environment tax our linguistic competence. But, we may ask, at what point does communication come into our visual experience? Is there anything in visual perception which corresponds to the de Saussurean notion of "langue"? The answer is surely to be found in pictorial representation. For communication to take place there must be a shared system of categories and relations, i.e. a shared stock of object-hypotheses. Certainly each person (and thus each artist) has his own personal visual competence, just as he has his own personal linguistic competence or idiolect. It is likely, however, that when someone attempts to "represent" the world, he makes use of his own object-hypotheses. They represent what are for him typical views and sizes. It appears that it is easy for people to draw "typical" views of common objects but difficult to draw atypical ones. This is probably because we acquire our representational object-hypotheses not from observation of nature but from the visual representations of others. As Gombrich (1960) says : "Art is born of Art, not of Nature". It takes an art student a long time to learn to draw, for example, a life-like human figure. He has to elaborate his personal object-hypothesis by careful observation. Artists' pictures — particularly 'naive' or untrained artists — represent the world not so much as they see it at

any particular moment but as a composition of stored conventional object-hypotheses. In any culture the conventions of pictorial representation represent the 'shared knowledge' which makes visual communication possible. This shared body of object-hypotheses is a community's 'visual langue'. The pictorial communication cannot, however, be said to have a fully developed 'grammar' as language has, since the forms it uses have both symbolic and purely representational functions at the same time. It lies, therefore, in an intermediate position as far as interpretation is concerned between the real world and linguistic discourse and consequently presents the interpretive problems of both. Once again I quote Gombrich (1972): "Images apparently occupy a curious position somewhere between the statements of language, which are intended to convey a meaning and the things of nature, to which we can only give meaning". This is why I suggest that pictorial discourse resembles poetry rather than prose. As Gregory (1970) says: "Neither pictures nor language work well for unique cases, for there must be shared perceptual hypotheses for communication to occur. If indeed pictures are a kind of language, painting is more poetry than prose". And I would add, photographs are more prose than poetry.

A hypothesis when acted upon becomes a prediction; that is, when we act upon some belief we have about the nature of our environment we are, in effect, *testing* that belief, just as a scientif experiment tests a hypothesis.

In the business of interpreting our visual environment, the interpretation of the rest of the environment. What we think we see is a function both of what we expect to see and the actual interpretation of the sense data. In most familiar situations we identify objects on the basis of only a minimal *sampling* of the sense data, the 'slenderest clues'. Indeed, function both of what we expect to see and the actual interpretation of the sense data. In most familiar situations we identify objects on the basis of only a minimal *sampling* of the sense data, the 'smenderest clues'. Indeed, the sense data attended to are actually *selected* by our predictions about the nature of the object. We pay attention largely to such data as will *support* our hypotheses. We tend to see what we expect to see. It is only when there is a serious conflict between our predictions and our hypothesis based upon the sense data that we must re-appraise our predictions. This means processing more data, i.e. looking again at the object. We seem, however, to prefer to rely more on our predictions than on the evidence of our senses. We abandon our initial predictive hypotheses very unwillingly.

We must remember that by adopting a hypothesis about the nature of an object, we assign to it properties from stored knowledge (i.e. our object-hypothesis) which may go beyond the sensory evidence, that is, we make use of our visual competence and our knowledge of the world. This process has been deliberately exploited by such schools of art as the Impressionists. It is referred to by Gombrich (1960) as the "etc. principle". The same, I suggest, is our way of interpreting discourse, as an 'ongoing, contingent accomplishment'.

We can observe this process rather clearly in the case of a person learning to read, most clearly perhaps in the case of an adult illiterate learner, who, unlike the child, already possesses good communicative competence in spoken language. The interpretive processes are most clearly seen in such cases because the source of breakdown or failure can be more easily identified and, as has often been pointed out, we can gain a better insight into a process by a study of the cases where it falls. As a competent native-speaker, the adult learner's predictive skills are highly developed. He can cope normally with spoken discourse. What he lacks is the ability efficiently to process and interpret the visual sensory data of written language, i.e. letter shapes and combinations. His strategy, however, in other respects is that of the competent adult reader. He predicts, on the basis of the text so far interpreted, the probably identity of the next word or phrase. This identification is based upon his native communicative competence, together with a *sampling* of the sense data from the next word-object. He will predict the semantic and syntactic properties of the object, but because of his inefficient processing of the sense data he will accept a confirmation of his prediction on too little evidence. The skilled reader, on the other hand, knows, on the basis of his predictions about the probable identity of the word-object, what visual data to pay attention to and what to ignore. He is thus able on minimal evidence to maintain or abandon his hypothesis. The adult-learner-reader is no less competent in predicting but he is incompetent in selecting and processing the sense data, i.e. in *testing* his predictions. He does not poossess an adequate store of object-hypotheses for the letters and words in question. How does he proceed? He will usually cling to his semantic and syntactic predictions and start offering synonyms, or synonymous phrases, which often have minimal graphological similarities to the actual words in question. When his hypotheses are disconfirmed by the teacher he will go on making wilder and wilder 'guesses' rather than abandon his predictions, and process more data. In other words, he prefers to 'overtrust' the competence

he has than to rely on his minimal 'visual competence' and plunge into the problem of reprocessing the sensory data. The unwillingness of adult learners to abandon their hypotheses and process more sensory data in order to set up a new hypothesis is sometimes quite remarkable but is, in fact, only a special case of a widespread phenomenon that has been observed, for example, in experiments on logical thinking (Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972).

The skilled reader has available a stock of object-hypotheses for letter and word shapes and even common combinations of words. He is able, therefore, rapidly, and on the basis of a minimum of sensory data, to disconfirm, or otherwise, his predictions about the identity of the objects in question. But even competent readers must quite often return to the actual data a second time because the hypothesis they have made by prediction from context has proved inadequate. This is, of course, equally true of the interpretation of spoken discourse.

Interpretation is a heuristic activity. We sample only enough of the sensory data to disconfirm, or otherwise, our predictions about the meaning of our environment or discourse. If our predictions are proved inadequate then we must go back to the data, i.e. re-read or ask a question.

You will have noticed that I have never used in my discussion so far the expression 'correct interpretation' or 'correct identification'. I have only spoken about an 'adequate interpretation' or a 'useful hypothesis about meaning'. In other words, I have been suggesting that both in visual perception and in the interpretation of pictures or discourse there is no such thing as a 'correct interpretation'. This is presumably the point made by the ethnomethodologists when they say that "complete understanding is not attainable". All interpretations are hypotheses about 'how things are' and, as in science, hypotheses can only be disproved or not disproved, but never proved. An adequate interpretation of discourse or of our visual environment is one which is *practically* useful or successful, in that it permits effective action, but it is only the need for action which either forces us to abandon, or permits us to maintain, our hypotheses. Our interpretation of the visual world, as of discourse, may be inadequate or adequate for our immediate needs but it can never be *right*.

But, you may say, linguistic symbols, unlike objects in the world around us have conventional meanings or significations inherent in them there to be discovered, and therefore we can *know* when we have made a correct interpretation. The answer to this has already been given. Semantics deals with linguistic entities as object-hypotheses, not as elements in the ever-

changing kaleidoscope of real life. I have already suggested that real life discourse is like pictorial communication, in which the forms we see have partly conventional meaning and partly natural representation. This is why in pictorial communication and in written discourse, but not in nature or spoken discourse, we accept that paradox, contradiction, and ambiguity cannot be resolved by action, they are partly inherent in the picture or in the text. In the physical world and in spoken discourse they are purely the product of our interpretive processes and can always eventually be resolved by action or learning. If all painting is like poetry so, to some extent, is all written discourse.

An adequate interpretation of discourse or of our physical environment is one which permits effective action. Inadequate interpretation therefore may lead to redundant or ineffective action or even disaster. What then are efficient interpretive processes and how can they be taught? An efficient interpretive strategy is one which does not irrevocably commit the perceiver to a firm interpretation. We have seen how efficient interpretation in reading involves a willingness to abandon an unsuccessful prediction on the basis of sensory data. To cope with the real world, of course, we have to make predictions all the time, or else all action would be paralysed, but to persist in maintaining a predictive hypothesis in the face of contradictory evidence is inefficient. Efficient interpretive behaviour, therefore, is behaviour which holds hypotheses *lightly* and is even prepared to entertain for as long as possible potentially conflicting hypotheses about meaning, that is, to accept ambiguity, contradiction and paradox, i.e. keep our interpretive options open. The same point is made by Gombrich (1960) when he illustrates this problem from the example of aerial reconnaissance or x-ray photographs and says that interpreters have to learn in the hard school how often 'believing is seeing' and "how important, therefore, it is to keep their hypotheses flexible".

Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) have this to say about efficient reasoning strategies, which, since I suggest that interpretation is a form of reasoning, may serve as a proposal for the development of efficient interpretive strategies :

> "At least two factors may be important: (a) the ability to think up hypotheses, and (b) the ability to relinquish hypotheses. These factors are likely to interact. The ability to conceive a hypothesis which seems to 'work', in the sense that it fits the data, may make the individual reluctant to abandon it. On the contrary he may simply try to strengthen it by adducing more confirming evidence for it. The experiments were designed to investigate the

propensity of individuals to offer premature solutions based on such evidence. In this way they are related to tolerance for uncertainty".

Teaching efficient interpretive strategies then means teaching the student not to commit himself to his predictions, not to act on his first hypotheses about meaning. (His first hypotheses will, of course, be based upon conventional signification). Now, as we have seen, pictorial communication and poetry *typically* contain ambiguities, contradictions and paradoxes and, in the interpretation of art and poetry, unlike the interpretation of spoken discourse or the physical environment, we cannot resolve these by action. We have to make what Bartlett (1932) called an 'effort after meaning'. We have to make the best interpretation we can. We have to accept living with uncertainty.

Successful teaching of interpretation is that which trains the learner both to make this 'effort after meaning' and to live with uncertainty; perhaps the study of poetry can help.

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ERROR ANALYSIS AND PEDAGOGICAL ORDERING

THE DETERMINATION OF PEDAGOGICALLY MOTIVATED SEQUENCES

Recent research in first language (L_1) acquisition on the part of young children has had considerable impact on the theories of second language (L_2) learning. It has been proposed by adherents of the innate model of L_1 acquisition that the inner principles that guide young children to reinterpret in terms of a simpler system well-formed adult speech too complex for their limited cognitive capabilities might also be available to them when, as adolescents and adults, they are learning an L_2. As is the case with the young child learning his L_1, the L_2 adolescent and adult learner does not passively memorize. On the contrary he actively filters and reorganizes the L_2 material to which he is exposed ; in the L_2 learning process a central function must be assigned to mediating processes that exist independently of the input data (Corder 1967, Richards 1971) (1).

From that view of second language acquisition, it follows that the central task any discipline concerned with an elucidation of the process of second language learning is "to discover the relationships between the

(1) The relative contribution of innate, language-specific mental structures (Language Acquisition Device) and processing strategies — some of which determine other types of cognition and perception — to language acquisition is currently a subject of considerable discussion among developmental psycholinguistics. We are more inclined toward the "process" view put forward by Slobin (1971), for instance, but the issue is not crucial to the arguments presented here. In the elaboration of a theory of second language acquisition it needs to be considered whether there might not exist, in addition to recognized differences in socio-psychological factors, differences in cognitive structures and processing strategies between first- and second-language learners, particularly between children learning the L_1 and adolescents and adults learning an L_2.

nature of the data presented and the state of the learner's grammar". Just as it is impossible to formulate an observationally correct and descriptively adequate grammar of any L_1 without a large body of sample texts and access to native speakers' intuitions, so it is impossible to understand the process of second language learning without a large body of learner responses and access to his intuitions about the intermediate grammar of L_2 — the interlanguage — he has evolved. There has been as yet little research conducted in devising procedures for eliciting second language learner intuitions (2), so that I will limit my remarks to the observation and analysis of errors.

Once teaching aims have been delineated the fundamental step in the preparation of efficient teaching materials is the selection and ordering of the features that need to be acquired by the learner as he progresses toward linguistic and communicative competence. For the student to attain native speaker linguistic competence — the ability to recognize and produce semantically appropriate and grammatically well-formed sentences — he must acquire cognitive as well as productive control of a set of phonological, syntactic, and lexical features of the L_2.

Heretofore applied linguists have not contributed significantly to the selection of linguistic features and their ordering in well-motivated sequences, and they have shown relatively little interest in the observation and analysis of learner errors (Valdman 1973). This is because of the overriding interest contrastive analysis has held for applied linguistics. It was held that the point-by-point comparison of the structure of the L_1 and L_2 would identify areas of interference and, in turn, would lead to the prediction — and, eventually, the avoidance — of likely learner errors. In addition, from the standpoint of interference theory, errors inhibit the acquisition of native speaker competence in the L_2 and were to be avoided or, that failing, to be eradicated.

As is well known, the results of contrastive analysis *qua* predictive technique have been disappointing. On the one hand, no linguistic model is sufficient to permit global interlinguistic comparisons at the morphosyntactic level and, on the other, even at the phonological level, only knowledge of the second language learning process — that is,

(2) For an attempt to infer approximative systems from direct elicitation from language learners after the fashion of linguistic fieldwork with informants, see Eric Kellerman (1973)

psychological rather than linguistic information — could provide the basis for well motivated learning sequences. Consider the contrastive analysis of the French and English vowel systems. It can be readily shown that they differ with regard to distinctive features, such as the presence in French but the absence in English of a set of front rounded vowels ([y ø œ]) or relatively stable versus glided vowels. But, say, in the teaching of French to English speakers how should one proceed? Should one begin with near-equivalent vowels and concentrate on differences in mode of articulation or, on the contrary, start by training the learner to discriminate and differentiate novel combinations of distinctive features?

The most notable contribution to the problem of the ordering of linguistic features was made by Skinnerian programmed instruction adherents. It will be recalled that according to Skinnerian principles the subject matter to be taught is to be arranged in a progressive and gradual series of minimal steps such that the learner could not progress from one step to another without having mastery of the preceding step. Orthodox Skinnerian second language programmers such as Morton (1960) devised the useful notion of the *acoustic signifier*. The acquisition of the phonological system of L_2 — which was to precede any exposure to sentence or word structure and to meaning — took place in three phrases. First, the learner was trained to discriminate between all L_2 phonemic distinctions and between corresponding L_1 and L_2 features, then to produce the inventory of L_2 phonemes with near-native accuracy, and finally to associate certain phonemic distinctions and markers of important grammatical categories such as plural of nouns, tense, mode or aspectual distinctions in verbs, etc. In fact, the notion of the acoustic signifier rests on an informational (or listener) model of language structure and is particularly useful in listening comprehension training. Whereas the ordering of grammatical features in materials inspired by contrastive analysis (and structural applied linguistics generally) did not differ substantially from that found in traditional grammar oriented materials, those designed by programmers exhibited striking departures. For example, in conventional beginning French textbooks determiners are introduced in complete paradigms first the definite determiner, then the indefinite, the possessive, etc. Materials that show the influence of structurally-oriented applied linguistics differ only from the traditional grammar oriented textbooks in that they indicate spoken in addition to written forms. Materials influenced by programmed instruction depart from the presentation of complete paradigms and group determiners instead according to the acoustic

signifiers they contain. Thus, first [a] is introduced as feminine gender marker in the definite determiner variant *la* and the possessive determiner variants *ma, ta, sa* :

(1) la fille, ma sœur, ta mère, sa tante

then [a] is opposed to the masculine markers [õ] and [ø] :

(2) ma fille/mon fils, ta fille/ton fils, la fille/le fils, etc.

The next step would be the opposition between the plural marker [e] and the singular markers [aj] and [õ] :

(3) mes filles/ma fille ; tes fils/ton fils

At a later stage, the plural marker [z] would be contrasted to its absence before third person present indicative forms of one-stem verbs beginning with a vowel :

(4) ils aiment/il aime ; elles ouvrent/elle ouvre

The plural markers [e] and [z] would be combined and opposed to singular forms not differentiated for gender before nouns beginning with a vowel :

(5) les amis/l'ami ; mes étudiants/mon étudiant

It is only after the student has progressed through these five progressive steps that he would be given the complete paradigms of the definite and possessive determiners.

Undoubtedly, the notion of the acoustic signifier permits a more gradual introduction of phonological features and is more natural than an extensive pre-reading phase devoted to the practice of articulatory features with nonsense or near-nonsense material. But it would be difficult to claim that this type of ordering of L_2 features reflects necessarily processes employed by the learner and has deep psychological motivation, although, to be sure, the programmers' teaching sequences were evolved by testing with small representative samples of learners.

In devising optimal *learning* (as opposed to *teaching*) sequences, a fundamental distinction must be made between student *input* and student *intake* (Corder 1973). For, as any experienced classroom teacher will readily attest, students do not always learn all that is presented. And this is not only because they are either indolent, unintelligent or non-motivated or because the material and the manner in which it is presented are defective, but simply because the student's learning processes are not in the proper receptive state :

> "... the learner has to know certain things before he can learn something new. If we then attempt to teach him something before he is ready for it, the result will be confusion, false hypothesis and what we could call redundantly 'errors'" (Corder 1973).

Periodic observation and analysis of errors as individual learners progress in their L_2 learning task of comparison of similar groups of learners at different stages in the L_2 learning process promises to be a useful procedure in guiding both the selection and the ordering of L_2 linguistic features so that they do not interfere with the various stages of the learner's replica of the L_2 grammar as it evolves toward closer approximation to that of the adult L_2 native speaker. In the remaining part of this article I will illustrate how data from the analysis and observation of errors have been used to devise a more facilitative selection and ordering of French interrogative structures within the frame of reference of college-level instruction in beginning French. It should be pointed out that the pedagogical use of data from the observation and analysis of learner errors is not novel, for any skillful second language teacher will use it as input to the planning of explanation and drill — an excellent example of such a use is provided in the field of the teaching of English as a second language by Marina K. Burt and Carol Kisparsky's *The Gooficon : A Repair Manual for English*. But to our knowledge, no extensive proposal has been put forward for the use of data from the observation and analysis of errors in the preparation of materials and the long-range planning and organization of second language instruction.

Variation in French interrogative sentences

Spoken French exhibits a bewildering array of interrogative constructions, illustrated by the following Wh-questions ; the sentences on the left contain a nominal in the NP subject whereas that element is pronominalized in the sentences on the right :

(6) INVERSION	
Où va Jean?	(6a) Où va-t-il?
(7) EST-CE QUE	
Où est-ce que Jean va?	(7a) Où est-ce qu'il va?
(8) WH-FRONTING	
Où Jean va?	(8a) Où il va?
(9) PRONOMINALIZATION	
Jean va où?	(9a) Il va où?

Commenting on this puzzling and overwhelming variety, Wandruszka (1970) observes :

> "Que signifie cette étonnante polymorphie instrumentale? Est-ce seulement, résultat des multiples facteurs hétérogènes ayant agi sur la langue française à travers les siècles, une surproduction de formes plus ou moins équivalentes, différenciées seulement en tant que disponibilités stylistiques, les unes intégrées à des niveaux de styles différents (langue littéraire, familière, populaire), les autres choisies pour des raisons d'euphonie ou de rythme, ou encore pour le simple plaisir de la variation? Dans quelle mesure y a-t-il aussi, dans la préférence donnée tantôt à l'un, tantôt à l'autre de ces moyens, une motivation sémantique?"

Since all available descriptions of French interrogative constructions limit themselves to the domain of the sentence, no answers to Wandruszka's questions are readily forthcoming. It is no doubt the case that at the level of discourse these various constructions are not equivalent. Within a careful style utterance (6) entails different implications and presuppositions than (9). So-called "interrogative" constructions are also utilized for other types of speech acts than question. Thus, the global question corresponding to (9) is often used to elicit confirmation :

(10) Jean va à Paris? [Est-ce que vous voulez dire que Jean va à Paris?]

If, given the absence of studies on discourse analysis in French, we must assume that at the sentence level sentences (6)-(9) are synonymous, i.e. they carry the same representational meaning, we possess on the other hand sufficient information to assign them different sociolinguistic and stylistic value. Questions such as (6) and (6a) are characteristic of careful, monitored style and would occur with greater frequency in the speech of middle class than working or lower class speakers. Questions like (7) and (7a) are more characteristic of spontaneous style whereas those like (8) and (8a) and, particularly, (9) and (9a) are often qualified as "incorrect" or "vulgar" by middle class speakers. The order in which the four types of Wh-questions are listed reflects, then, their sociolinguistic ranking.

Constructions of the type (8) and (9) which are considered colloquial or downright vulgar by educated native speakers despite the fact that they use them extensively in unmonitored daily speech, do not as a rule appear in teaching materials. Instead, the beginning student is offered a random mixture of questions of the INVERSION and EST-CE QUE types. Here are, for example, the questions types presented in the introductory lessons of a recently published beginning high-school French text (idioms such as

Quelle heure est-il?, Comment ça va?, or *Comment allez vous?* have been excluded from consideration since it may reasonably be claimed that they are learned as individual lexical items rather than as productive syntactic processes) :

(11) EST-CE QUE : Qu'est-ce que c'est?, Qu'est-ce que tu aimes le mieux?
(12) NP INVERSION : Où est le livre? Quels sont les mois de l'année?
(13) PRO INVERSION : Combien de livres avez-vous?, Pourquoi aimez-vous le printemps?

Errors resulting from ungraded input

What are some of the pedagogical consequences of mixing EST-CE QUE and INVERSION type questions on the ability on the part of the learner to produce semantically appropriate and grammatically well-formed questions? As might be expected, errors are found that involve confusion of the two interrogative types :

(14) *Où est-ce que tu habites-tu?

Attempts to produce INVERSION questions show expected errors in the ordering of syntactic elements :

(15) *Va-t-elle Alice à Nice?

and wrong copying of the subject NP :

(16) *Où vous habitez-vous (3)?

But more surprising in the analysis of a large set of questions produced by a group of beginning students is the generalization of the WH-FRONTING type. Since this type of question was absent from the input data, it constitutes in fact an "error".

As part of a semester-final oral production test in the beginning French program at Indiana University we required a pilot group of sixteen students to formulate Wh-Questions. The students were told to imagine

(3) Py's data in the paper contained in this volume and in his 1973 article offers a wider range of ill-formed questions. Thus he observes :
1. overgeneralization of *est-ce que* insertion :
*Où est-ce que sont les enfants?
*Est-ce que tu as rencontré qui?
*Qui est-ce que avez-vous invité?
2. Violation of constraints on the application of inversion :
*Pourquoi sont les enfants en vacances?
*Pourquoi sort le concierge?

that they had just met a Frenchman and that they were to find out various information. They were given instructions in English before each question, for instance, "ask him what time it is". For the purpose of the study of learning errors this type of elicitation procedure is eminently suitable since it permits the collection of a restrictive number of interrogative constructions for each instruction. The data collected is illustrated by the responses to four representative instructions appearing in Table 1.

TABLE 1. — *Errors in the use of French interrogative structures produced by beginning French college-level students (1971 study)*

Well-formed question	*Deviant question*
1. Ask him where he lives.	
INVERSION	
Où habitez-vous? (9) Où habites-tu? (2) *Où habites-vous? (2)	*Où habites as-tu? *Où vous habitez-vous?
2. Ask him how many brothers and sisters he has.	
INVERSION	
Combien de frères et de sœurs avez-vous? Combien de frères et combien de sœurs avez-vous? (3) Combien de frères et sœurs avez-vous? (7)	?*Comment de frères et de sœurs avez-vous? ?*Comment frères et sœurs avez-vous?
FRONTING	
*Vous combien le frères et le sœurs?	
PRONOMINALIZATION	
*Combien de frères et sœurs?	

3. Ask him why he came to Bloomington.

FRONTING

Pourquoi vous êtes allé à Bloomington?	
?Pourquoi avez-vous visité Bloomington?	
?Pourquoi tu vas à Bloomington?	
?Pourquoi vous avez à Bloomington?	
*Pourquoi tu êtes venu au Bloomington?	
?*Pourquoi vous montez au Bloomington?	
?*Pourquoi vous allez à la Bloomington?	

INVERSION

Pourquoi êtes-vous allé à Bloomington?	
Pourquoi avez-vous visité Bloomington?	
?*Pourquoi allez-vous à Bloomington?	
*Pourquoi avez-vous venu à Bloomington?	
?*Pourquoi avez-vous au Bloomington?	

4. Ask him with whom he studies last night.

WH-FRONTING

Avec qui vous étudiez hier soir?	?Qui vous avez étudié dernier soir?
?Avec qui vous étudiez le soir?	
?Avec qui vous étudiez ce soir?	
Avec qui vous avez étudié ce soir dernier?	
*Avec qui étudiez hier soir?	
*Avec qui avez de étudié ce soir?	

INVERSION

Avec qui avez-vous étudié hier soir?	?Qui avez-vous étudié hier soir? ?Qu'avez-vous étudié hier soir? ?Qui avez-vous étudié dernier soir?

EST-CE QUE

*Avec qui est-ce que vous a étudié?	

PRONOMINALISATION

Vous étudiez avec qui hier soir?	

Sentences preceded by a question mark are situationally inappropriate and those marked with an asterisk are ungrammatical ; a distinction is made between those sentences that are grammatically or semantically deviant with regard to interrogative structures and those marked by errors in other areas of the structure of French. The most striking feature of the data presented in Table 1 is the relatively high incidence of the WH-FRONTING type of questions for responses to instructions 3 and 4. Since no two students provided the same answer, it may be assumed that unlike instructions 1 and 2, these required on their part the construction of a response by appeal to the stock of "available" lexical items and syntactic patterns rather than the use of an item memorized in part. Thus, the handling of these instructions reflects more accurately the given state of the learners' approximative system than does that of the first two instructions. Table 2 provides a statistical breakdown of the type of questions produced for each of the nine instructions in the test ; a distinction is made between idiomatic expressions such as *Comment s'appelle NP?, Quel âge avez-vous?* or *Quel temps fait-il?*, no doubt learned as individual lexical items, and those that require a constructed response. It will be noted that excluding obvious idiomatic expressions, approximately thirty per cent of the questions produced were of the WH-FRONTING type. The subjects from whom the data in Table 1 were elicited were exposed only to the INVERSION and EST-CE QUE types of Wh-questions. Since they had little opportunity to hear French outside of formal classroom activities and teaching materials — they had no recourse to native speakers outside of the instructional program or to radio broadcasts — it can be asserted with confidence that the WH-FRONTING type questions they produced were generated by some sort of restructuring process rather than direct imitation.

The influence of the corresponding structure in L_1 can be rapidly eliminated as a potential source. The normal English Wh-construction entails inversion of the auxiliary and the subject NP :

(17) Where is he going?

In fact it would appear that the EST-CE QUE construction provides the best one-to-one matching of the surface structure features of the English construction. Compare :

(18) Où	est-ce que	Jean	travaille?
↕	↕	↕	↕
(19) Where	does	John	work?

TABLE 2. — *Relative Occurrence of Synonymous Wh-Questions in 1971 and 1973 Studies*

Item Type	*Pronominal Inversion*	*Fronting*	*Est-ce que*	*NP Inversion*
1. ... how old he is *Quel âge avez-vous?*	16			
2. where he lives *Où habitez-vous?*	16	1		
3. how the weather is in Nice *Quel temps fait-il à Nice?*	10	1		1
4. how many brothers and sisters he has *Combien de frères et de sœurs avez-vous?*	13			
5. why he came to Bloomington *Pourquoi êtes-vous venu à Bloomington?*	5	8		
6. with whom he studied last night *Avec qui avez-vous étudié hier soir?*	3	6	1	
7. what he is studying here *Qu'est-ce que vous étudiez ici?*	4	3	7	
8. when he is going to return to France *Quand allez-vous rentrer en France?*	2	3	6	
9. what his wife's name is *Comment s'appelle votre femme?*				12
Total: Study 1 (1971)	61	22	14	13
Total: Study 1 (excluding idioms)	14	20	14	12
Total: Study 2 (1973)	2	25	190	8

Both languages have semantically empty elements occurring in the same linear order. This matching also holds in the case of English Wh-questions that contain a semantically full auxiliary:

(20) Qu' est-ce qu' il fait?
(21) What is he doing?

There is another potential indirect source of interference from the L_1 which the inadequate experimental design of the study failed to totally eliminate. It will be noted that the English instructions were given in the form of indirect questions:

(22) Ask him where he is going?

It is possible — though unlikely — that the subjects were led to restructure the INVERSION and EST-CE QUE questions in which they received formal drill on the basis of the form of the instruction. Finally, it should be mentioned that in a stage of child language and certain non-standard dialects of English there exists a Wh-question similar to the Fronting type:

(23) Where he is going?

It would seem that faced with a situation where they had to formulate a message under conditions approximating those of natural language contact and where they could not employ, as it were, pre-fabricated units, the learners resorted to simplification of outer form whose sources are to be found in internal relationships among L_2 structures to which they have been exposed as well as in universal principles of linguistic organization and processes of language learning.

We would hypothesize the following restructuring process. The learners have been taught global interrogative consisting of the use of normal subject NP + predicate order:

(24) Il va à Paris?

This construction was introduced first in the teaching material although the learners have had more practice with a synonymous construction involving the prefixing of *est-ce que*

(25) Est-ce qu'il va à Paris?

and, particularly in idiomatic expressions, have also used another variant construction entailing inversion of subject pronoun and verb:

(26) Va-t-il à Paris?

In a typological study of interrogative structures in a large number of natural languages Russel Ultan (1969) points out that, for languages in

which Wh-questions contain a Wh-element, the latter generally occurs in the initial position. The insertion of the Wh-element at the front of a clause in which the subject NP and the various elements of the verb group are in the normal declarative order would appear to constitute the simplest construction available to the learner at that particular stage of his acquisition of French.

Whatever its source, the use of WH-FRONTING on the part of the subjects of the study constitutes a deviation from the model interrogative types presented in the course materials. It should be pointed out that, except for this deviation, the learner responses in the 1971 study (Tables 1 and 2) contained only two cases of ill-formed questions, both involving INVERSION:

(27) *Où habites as-tu? (Où habites-tu?)

where the inverted subject pronominalized NP is attached to an auxiliary and

(28) *Où vous habitez-vous? (Où habitez-vous?)

resulting from a confusion between WH-FRONTING and INVERSION. Nonetheless, if the use of WH-FRONTING is counted as an error, the percentage of ungrammatical questions (considering only situationally appropriate or deviant responses containing an error in some syntactic feature of interrogation and leaving aside errors in other areas of the structure of French) is relatively high: twenty per cent.

Graded presentation based on learner "errors"

The results of the pilot study described above, which was conducted in the summer of 1971, as well as informal observations made during classroom visitations led us to attempt to devise a more facilitative selection and ordering of French interrogative structures. Materials were prepared in which WH-FRONTING was the first type of Wh-question introduced. It was taught in the first preliminary lessons (corresponding roughly to the first ten hours of classroom instruction) concurrently with the so-called INTONATION type of global questions, e.g., *Tu t'appelles Jean?, Tu ouvres la porte?* For instance, the first communicative task students were taught to handle in the course was to identify themselves and to ask other people's name: *Comment tu t'appelles?, Comment il s'appelle?* Instead of being taught to use INVERSION with non-pronominalized subject NPs, students were trained to extrapose the NP and use a pronominal copy. Except for such idioms as *Comment allez-*

vous? or *Quels temps fait-il?*, no PRO-INVERSION questions were introduced. NP-INVERSION questions were used in the materials when introduction of WH-FRONTING would result in grammatically deviant or questionable sentences (*?Combien trois et quatre font?* for *Combien font trois et quatre?*, *?Où vos parents vont?* for *Où vont vos parents?*) and where the insertion of *est-ce que* would be judged awkward and thus questionable (*?Combien est-ce que trois et quatre font?*; *?Où est-ce que vos parents vont?*). Next, EST-CE QUE was introduced for both passive exposure and active control. In the second half of the semester (after approximately forty hours of classroom instruction) EST-CE QUE was reserved for spoken drills and INVERSION for written exercises. Instructors were urged not to use constructions that were not introduced in the materials, although, while in the majority they were not native speakers, they were sufficiently acculturated to puristic middle class French attitudes toward language to consider WH-FRONTING as "incorrect" and tended to lapse into the use of INVERSION, particularly PRO-INVERSION.

Indeed sample classroom observations conducted in the early part of the semester showed the following relative frequency of the various interrogative types in classroom activities:

PRO-INVERSION	9%
NP-INVERSION	52%
EST-CE QUE	23%
WH-FRONTING	15%
PRONOMINALIZATION	2%
	100%

The NP-INVERSION questions noted contained Wh-adverbials such as *où (Où est ta fille?)*, *comment (Comment s'appelle la cousine de Jacques?)* and *combien (Combien de cousines a Suzanne?)*. The PRO-INVERSION questions involved a broader range of structural types (*Où allez-vous?*, *Peux-tu compter jusqu'à vingt?*) and included some alternates to WH-FRONTING questions appearing in the materials (*Comment s'appelle-t-il?* for *Comment il s'appelle?*). But the fact that these materials contained a strong partially self-instructional component consisting of recorded program and accompanying workbook helped to insure, we believe, general adhesion to the pedagogical sequence selected. In the spring of 1973 a variant of the oral production test used previously was administered to the entire beginning French group consisting of about 300 students. In order to avoid contamination from the English instruction

TABLE 3. — *Errors in the use of French interrogative structures produced by beginning French college-level students (1973 study)*

Well-formed question	*Deviant question*
1. Ici les cours commencent à six heures.	
WH-FRONTING	
A quelle heure commencent les cours? (4) Quand les cours commencent? (3) *Quelle heure les cours commencent? (3) *A quelle heure a cours commence? *A quelle heure a votre cours commencer?	
EST-CE QUE	
A quelle heure est-ce que les cours commencent? (9) Quand est-ce que les cours commencent? (14) A quelle heure est-ce qu'ils commencent? *Quelle heure est-ce que les cours commencent? (2) *A quelle heure est-ce que cours commence?	*Quand est-ce que votre les cours commencent?
INVERSION	
A quelle heure commencent les cours? (4)	*Quand les commencent les cours ici?
PRONOMINALIZATION	
Les cours commencent à quelle heure?	
2. Nous sommes allés au Canada.	
WH-FRONTING	
	*A que vous allez?

EST-CE QUE

Où est-ce que vous êtes allés? (9) Où est-ce que tu es allé? ?Où est-ce que vous allez? (11) ?Où est-ce que tu vas? ?Où est-ce que tu vas aller? ?Où est-ce que tu allais? (2) ?Où est-ce que nous sommes allés? (6) ?*Où est-ce que vous en allez? *Où est-ce que tu sommes allés? *Où est-ce que tu suis allé? *Où est-ce que vous sont allés? *Où est-ce que tu as allé? *Où est-ce que sommes allés?	

3. Pierre va passer ses vacances chez ses parents.

WH-FRONTING

Où Pierre va passer ses vacances?	?*Quelle heure je fais Pierre commence? ?*Comment Pierre passer ses vacances? ?Pourquoi Pierre va passer?

EST-CE QUE

Avec qui est-ce que Pierre va passer ses vacances? *Avec qui est-ce que Pierre passer sa vacance (3) ?Avec qui est-ce que Pierre? ?*Avec qui est-ce que tu passer son vacation? Où est-ce que Pierre va passer ses vacances? (6) *Où est-ce que Pierre passer ses vacances? *Où est-ce que Pierre passer les vacances? *Où est-ce que Pierre passer vacances? ?Où est-ce que Pierre va passer? ?Où est-ce que Pierre va? (5) ?*Où est-ce que Pierre va avec? *Où est-ce que il va passer ses vacances?	?Qui est-ce que Pierre rencontre? ?*A qui est-ce que Pierre chasser les vacances? ?*A qui est-ce que Pierre va passer sa vacance? ?Qui est-ce que Pierre va passer? ?Qui est-ce qu'il va passer? ?*Qui est-ce qu'il passer ses vacances? ?*Qu'est-ce que Pierre va passer vacances? ?*Quand est-ce que tu passer tu vacances? ?*Comment est-ce que vous passez le vacances, Pierre?

INVERSION

	*Où va Pierre passer sa vacance? *Où va Pierre passer ses vacances? (2) ?Où va Pierre? ?*Où va les gens? ?*Où va Pierre sa cance? ?*Où est Pierre la vacances? ?*Que va Pierre va passer commencer?

("Ask him how old he is"), it was decided to have the students formulate the question that would have most likely elicited statements they heard. To reduce problems of listening comprehension, students heard three alternative statements. For example, they heard *Parce que je n'ai pas bien dormi, Parce que j'ai étudié toute la nuit, Parce que je me suis couché tard* and were expected to ask *Pourquoi est-ce que tu as sommeil?*, etc. They heard one example in which the correct question was given in four alternative forms: PRONOMINALIZATION, WH-FRONTING, EST-CE QUE and INVERSION.

Analysis of fifty-two representative sets of responses shows dramatic differences with those of the 1971 pilot run (see Table 3). Approximately eighty-five per cent of the complete and interpretable questions are of the EST-CE QUE type and, although they were formally introduced and drilled in the beginning of the course, WH-FRONTING type questions constitute only about ten per cent of the total corpus (see Table 2). Table 3 shows that very few of the responses were marked by an error in the use of any of the four synonymous interrogative patterns. Thus, the corpus is relatively free of faulty generalizations, wrong applications of constraints, or confusion between the various interrogative types. In fact, such errors occurred only with INVERSION. In three cases learners failed to add the pronominal copy before inverting the subject NP:

(29) *Où va Pierre passer sa vacance? (Où Pierre va-t-il passer ses vacances?)

In another case the learner appears to have begun with WH-FRONTING but, after uttering the determiner switched and correctly inverted the subject NP:

(30) *Quand les commencent les cours ici? (Quand commencent les cours ici?)

Conclusion

Admittedly, more sophisticated observational techniques and more refined statistical treatment are required before it can be asserted without reservation that the differences in type and frequency of errors noted in the two studies described here are attributable to pedagogical treatment. But as John B. Carroll (1966) has cautioned us, perfectly controlled research, particularly that of the method comparison type, that answers significant and relevant questions in second language learning, is an illusion. The research we conducted was not designed to compare two different ways to order interrogative structures in French, nor would we think it useful to attempt to conduct such research with all necessary controls. The aim of our studies was simply to evaluate the pedagogical effect of a significant change in the ordering of grammatical material. That change, it will be recalled, was motivated by a restructuring of L_2 grammar that we inferred from student responses in a simulated communicative task. I believe that the modest results obtained warrant the following two conclusions. First, that in incorporating results from the analysis of observed student errors in pedagogical practices, including the elaboration of teaching materials, we must go beyond the preparation of punctual drills aimed at isolated errors. Since errors reflect the way in which learners acquire linguistic competence, they must serve as a basis for the ordering of grammatical features and, beyond that, for the establishment of objectives and aims of instruction. Second, any program of second language instruction that aims at the acquisition on the part of the learner of a minimal degree of communicative competence, by which is meant the ability to understand and to respond to native speakers in near-natural communicative situations, must (1) greatly limit the grammatical structures and lexicon over which the learner is expected to attain communicative competence and (2) provide facilitative teaching sequences. In carrying out this type of selection and pedagogical ordering, it is often necessary to make decisions that may offend linguistic authoritarians and purists. Thus, in choosing and ordering French interrogative structures we chose to reject PRO-INVERSION although it is considered most elegant and "proper" by native speakers. Instead, we elected to include WH-FRONTING, a sociolinguistically stigmatized construction which many educated speakers consider downright ungrammatical.

One of the disadvantages of the type of control of input data our pedagogical grading entails is that it leads to the use in the classroom of a

neutralized variety of the L_2 that fails to provide the learner with the data necessary for the attainment of genuine communicative competence. Recently, applied linguists and psychologists (notably, Candlin 1972, Jakobovits 1970, Roulet 1973, Widdowson 1973) have suggested that communicative competence — in the narrow sense of the term used by Hymes (1970) — may be developed only if the learner is exposed to authentic speech acts from which he can abstract rules of language use. Roulet adds that in view of our inability to characterize such rules and to integrate them with microlinguistic structure in terms of a unified theory grading is premature and doomed to failure (1973 : 39) :

> "Il est absurde, par conséquent, de prétendre enseigner systématiquement, scientifiquement, une matière que l'on ne peut décrire et expliquer que de manière très incomplète. Il faut, au contraire, utiliser au maximum la capacité de découvrir et d'apprendre des étudiants".

One may argue against this position on two grounds. First, it is clear that the teaching of a foreign language in an academic setting requires prior selection and grading of L_2 structures, lexicon and communicative situations. It is no doubt the case that current practices in selection and grading, whether they adhere to traditional criteria or whether they be inspired by structural linguistics, programmed instruction, generative-transformational grammar, etc. are inadequate and fail to take into account powerful processes of language acquisition. But even recent proposals, such as notional analysis (Wilkins 1973), presuppose selection and grading. If appropriate switching between varieties of the L_2 is an integral part of the acquisition of communicative competence, then it too should be amenable to some sort of grading. To present, from the very beginning the full range of dialect, sociolect, and style level variations within the L_2 would overwhelm the learner.

The second argument is based on an examination of varieties of natural languages used for transitional contacts, in particular, pidgins. A comparison of pidgins and their base languages reveals a reduction of morphophonemic alternations which privileges full over reduced forms. Hymes (1972) hypothesizes that this tendency toward morphologically invariance reduces the burden of the speaker in the encoding of the message and facilitates comprehension. Ferguson (1972) has proposed that native speakers of many languages have available special registers which they use in appropriate circumstances with linguistically disadvantaged beings, such as foreigners. Thus he makes an integral part of communicative com-

petence phenomena which early creolists ascribed to a processus of willful simplification. It would therefore appear that communicative competence includes the ability to grade and otherwise modify one's speech to make it more accessible to persons who are not members of the community (4).

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(4) The ordering of French interrogative structures proposed here is conservative on two counts. First, it entails a choice among synonymous constructions and does not involve reduction in the inner form of the L_2. Second, the intermediate form (WH-FRONTING) selected as the first step in the pedagogical sequence (i.e., WH-FRONTING, EST-CE QUE, INVERSION for written exercises only) is not ungrammatical and in fact occurs with high frequency in the unmonitored speech of educated speakers of the L_2.

When the aim of second language instruction is the attainment of a minimal degree of communicative competence in very early stages of the course, one might advocate the teaching of intermediate forms which are in fact ungrammatical. For instance, Gerhard Nickel (1973) proposes the teaching of morphologically reduced types of German to foreign migrant workers whose contact with native speakers will be limited but immediate. Casual inspection of pidgin and creole languages, which arose precisely from the need of language learners to attain immediate communicative competence of a limited nature, reveals the existence of a large number of such intermediate forms whose total effect is to reduce the number and the complexity of syntactical rules the learner needs to acquire and to minimize his memorization of individual lexical items and grammatical categories.

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COMMENTAIRE DE B. PY (Université de Neuchâtel)

EXPÉRIENCE SUR L'ACQUISITION DES STRUCTURES INTERROGATIVES DU FRANÇAIS

Le Centre de linguistique appliquée de l'Université de Neuchâtel est en train de mener une expérience assez semblable à celle de A. VALDMAN, sur l'acquisition des structures interrogatives du français par des étudiants étrangers. Il s'agit de suivre cette acquisition chez un nombre relativement élevé de sujets (entre 80 et 100), en les soumettant, à intervalles réguliers, à trois batteries de quatre tests chacune (trois batteries en trois mois).

Chaque réponse fausse, si elle répond à la définition que donne CORDER de l'erreur (1), est interprétée comme infraction à une grammaire de référence décrivant les formes interrogatives enseignées aux étudiants ; cette grammaire comprend une vingtaine de règles de transformation (2). En combinant l'analyse statistique et l'étude des cas particuliers, on peut formuler certaines hypothèses sur les étapes de l'acquisition et les stratégies d'apprentissage les plus fréquentes.

Avant de donner un aperçu de nos résultats, il convient de préciser certaines différences entre l'expérience de A. VALDMAN et la nôtre :

a) Notre population est hétérogène à de nombreux points de vue : langue maternelle, formation scolaire générale, méthode et temps d'apprentissage du français, motivations, etc.

b) Notre population vivant en milieu francophone, l'école (par conséquent la norme linguistique enseignée, représentée par la grammaire de référence) ne constitue qu'une situation d'apprentissage parmi d'autres.

(1) Cf. par exemple «Le rôle de l'analyse systématique des erreurs en linguistique appliquée», *Bulletin CILA* 14, 1971, 6-15.

(2) La grammaire de référence et les conditions générales de l'expérience sont présentées respectivement dans les deux publications suivantes :

PY, Bernard (1972) : *Analyse des erreurs et grammaire générative : la syntaxe de l'interrogation en français*, Québec, Université Laval, CIRB.

PY, Bernard (1973) : «Analyse des erreurs et acquisition des structures interrogatives du français», *Bulletin CILA* 17, 21-29.

c) Les batteries contiennent des tests écrits seulement, mais assez variés pour faire appel à différents comportements linguistiques chez l'étudiant : composition de phrases à partir d'éléments non-ordonnés, choix multiples, création d'une question à partir d'une phrase affirmative, création libre de répliques dans un dialogue lacunaire. Chaque batterie contient environ 60 items.

d) Les étudiants n'ont pas reçu un enseignement *systématique* de l'interrogation pendant la durée de l'expérience.

Dans le dépouillement, nous n'avons tenu compte que des erreurs (3) relatives à la morphosyntaxe de l'interrogation proprement dite. Nous avons ainsi obtenu environ 2'300 erreurs réparties dans une cinquantaine de catégories en fonction de la règle enfreinte et du type d'infraction. Une partie seulement de ces catégories méritent d'être mentionnées ici, ceci en fonction de leur importance statistique et de leur portée pédagogique. On peut les résumer et les interpréter de la façon suivante :

1. Pour un nombre important de catégories, on assiste à un phénomène de «fossilisation» : la fréquence des erreurs reste à peu près constante ; elle se stabilise après une diminution initiale, ou même, elle augmente. C'est le cas des infractions suivantes :

1.1. Omission des conditions d'application de l'inversion du sujet nominal. Exemples :
- * Où sont les enfants en vacances?
- * Pourquoi sort le concierge?

1.2. Malformation des morphèmes *qui est-ce qui, qui est-ce que, qu'est-ce qui, qu'est-ce que*. Exemples :
- * Qui est-ce que s'arrête?
- * Qui est-ce qui vous appelez?

1.3. Omission de la règle d'antéposition du syntagme interrogatif (règle obligatoire dans la grammaire de référence, mais facultative pour la norme parlée familière). Exemples :
- * Tu téléphones à quelles personnes?
- * Est-ce que tu as rencontré qui?
- * Es-tu dans quelle chambre?

(3) Nous utilisons le terme *erreur* dans un sens strictement technique, c'est-à-dire pour désigner une infraction à la grammaire de référence. Une erreur peut donc être par ailleurs acceptable en fonction d'une norme différente, représentée par une grammaire différente. Par exemple, la phrase *tu vas où*? est une erreur dans la mesure où notre grammaire de référence impose l'antéposition du syntagme interrogatif, bien que la norme familière admette une telle phrase. La grammaire de référence représente la norme des manuels scolaires utilisés par les étudiants. Une erreur signifie donc simplement que l'étudiant enfreint cette norme.

1.4. Choix erroné ou omission de la préposition devant les adverbes interrogatifs. Exemple :

* D'où passera-t-il?

1.5. Surgénéralisation de la règle d'introduction de EST-CE QUE. Exemples :

* Où est-ce que sont les enfants?
* Quand est-ce que part le train?
* De quel pays est-ce que vient ce garçon?

1.6. Introduction «globale» de l'interrogation sur l'identité du sujet. Exemples :

* C'est qui?

2. Une seule erreur diminue de façon statistiquement significative : la non-application des règles d'inversion du sujet ou d'introduction de EST-CE QUE. Exemples :

* Quand tu es parti?
* Comment ton frère voyage?

3. D'autres catégories d'erreurs méritent d'être mentionnées ici, bien que leur fréquence relativement faible ne permette pas de tirer de conclusions statistiques quant à leur évolution.

3.1. Surgénéralisation de la règle d'introduction de *qui est-ce que* et *qu'est-ce que*. Exemples :

* Qui est-ce que avez-vous invité?
* Avec qui est-ce qui vous partez?
* De qu'est-ce que vous parlez?

3.2. Surgénéralisation de la règle facultative introduisant EST-CE QUE dans les interrogations globales. Exemple :

* Est-ce que pourquoi tu restes au lit?

3.3. Suppression de la forme verbale EST lorsque la question contient par ailleurs le morphème EST-CE QUE. Exemple :

* Comment est-ce que cette table?

4. L'examen cas par cas de la progression des étudiants permet, au moins pour certains d'entre eux, de formaliser leur compétence intermédiaire par des règles de transformation. On retrouve alors les problèmes techniques de l'analyse contrastive : comment comparer deux systèmes linguistiques? Le fait que notre expérience fournisse moins des *états* que des *tendances* facilite quelque peu la comparaison. Envisagée dans une telle perspective, l'évolution qui conduit d'une étape de l'acquisition à la suivante se caractérise principalement par les traits suivants :

4.1. Introduction d'une nouvelle règle, accompagnée de phénomènes de surgénéralisation.

4.2. Délimitation du domaine d'application de la nouvelle règle.

4.3. Mise en place de certaines contraintes d'application. Exemple : inversion du sujet nominal.

4.4. Substitution d'une règle trop générale par plusieurs règles mieux spécialisées. Par exemple, dans une première étape, une seule règle peut expliquer la production des phrases suivantes :

Qui est-ce qui a téléphoné ?
* Qui est-ce qui vous avez rencontré ?
* Avec qui est-ce qui nous sortirons ?

Dans la dernière phase de l'acquisition, les structures sous-jacentes à ces trois phrases sont traitées par trois opérations distinctes.

4.5. Substitution d'une production globale isolée par une intégration à un complexe de règles, ou vice-versa. Ainsi, certains étudiants remplacent *c'est qui* ou *qui c'est* par *qui est-ce que c'est*, engendrée parallèlement à *qui est-ce que tu attends*. D'autres suivent le cheminement inverse.

4.6. Recours de plus en plus systématique à la structure profonde. Par exemple, on peut assister à la disparition progressive de formes erronées dont on pourrait peut-être rendre compte soit par un modèle de MARKOV, soit simplement par une traduction plus ou moins littérale à partir de L1. Exemples :

* Qui est-ce que ? (au lieu de «qui est-ce ?»)
* Qui partirez-vous avec ? (étudiant anglophone)

5. Les observations précédentes fournissent des indications sur la façon dont les étudiants étrangers apprennent l'interrogation française, mais elles ne permettent que partiellement de proposer, comme le fait VALDMAN, une progression linéaire optimale. En effet :

5.1. Le groupe le plus important d'erreurs provient d'interférences entre les divers procédés interrogatifs du français, essentiellement l'inversion et l'usage du morphème EST-CE QUE (surgénéralisations). Or, que l'on commence par l'un ou par l'autre procédé, le danger de créer des interférences existe.

5.2. Pour un grand nombre d'étudiants étrangers, l'inversion est le procédé le plus proche de leur langue maternelle (cf. allemand, espagnol, italien, etc.) ; c'est dire que ces étudiants produiront très tôt des questions avec inversion (donc de nombreuses erreurs), quelles que soient les précautions du maître.

5.3. Comme nos élèves vivent en milieu francophone, ils sont «exposés» simultanément et d'emblée à tous les procédés interrogatifs du français. Dès lors, la tâche du maître consistera surtout à *distinguer* entre eux les différents procédés interrogatifs du français. On y parviendra peut-être en liant étroitement l'enseignement de l'interrogation, comme phénomène syntaxique, aux différents usages que l'on peut en faire. Cette façon de faire semble d'autant plus aisée que l'emploi de ces procédés interrogatifs est

soumis à des contraintes sociolinguistiques. Par exemple, le maître, en plaçant ses élèves dans une situation familière, leur proposera comme unique procédé interrogatif le morphème EST-CE QUE ; puis, dans une situation plus formelle, l'inversion du sujet. De cette manière, on fragmentera l'ensemble du système de l'interrogation en plusieurs sous-systèmes, caractérisés chacun par un éventail d'emplois distincts. On peut espérer qu'une telle fragmentation diminuera la fréquence des interférences et surgénéralisations. Enfin, à l'intérieur de chaque sous-système, on pourra tenter l'établissement de progressions linéaires selon la proposition de VALDMAN. Ainsi, nous souscrivons volontiers à la proposition de topicaliser le sujet nominal afin d'éviter les infractions aux contraintes de surface de l'inversion, infractions que nous avons rencontrées en abondance dans les tests (cf. 1.1.).

6. Il nous paraît enfin important de relever l'influence souvent décisive de la forme du test sur la nature des erreurs. Par exemple, si l'on compare le début et la fin de la période d'acquisition envisagée, on constate que les erreurs du type de

* Avec qui est-ce qui vous partirez?

bien qu'en régression si l'on envisage le total général, tendent à se concentrer dans le test à choix multiples. Il nous paraît donc délicat de vouloir tirer des conclusions sur la base d'un test unique, lequel représentera nécessairement un comportement linguistique spécialisé, et rendra aléatoire toute généralisation.

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DE LA NÉCESSITÉ DE FONDER L'ENSEIGNEMENT DE LANGUES SECONDES SUR L'ÉTUDE DE LA LANGUE MATERNELLE

On admet généralement, sous l'influence des théories de Chomsky et des recherches récentes sur l'acquisition du langage enfantin, que l'apprentissage d'une langue consiste en une découverte et une reconstitution progressive des structures et des règles d'emploi de cette langue par des opérations déductives et inductives guidées d'une part par la connaissance d'universaux linguistiques (que ceux-ci soient innés, comme chez Chomsky, ou résultent [illegible] développement cognitif, comme chez Piaget) et, d'autre part, par l'observation d'échantillons de la langue dans des situations de communication. Dans cette perspective, Corder a présenté, lors de notre dernier colloque, un modèle d'apprentissage de la langue en trois étapes : formation d'hypothèses, vérification des hypothèses et pratique, et a montré que le problème pédagogique fondamental dans l'enseignement de L2 était la détermination du type et du degré d'aide (*guidance*) à apporter à l'élève dans ces opérations (Corder 1974 : 170) ; à ce propos, Dirven a mis en évidence la nécessité de fournir à l'apprenant, outre un environnement linguistique assez riche pour permettre le développement et la falsification des hypothèses, un grand nombre d'indications heuristiques propres à faciliter la reconstitution du système de L2 ; mieux le linguiste appliqué connaîtra le système de L2, plus il sera à même d'introduire dans le matériel pédagogique les indices propres à faciliter le travail de l'apprenant (Dirven 1974 : 27).

Cette conception ne peut porter tous ses fruits, surtout si l'on tient compte des tendances des pédagogues à favoriser l'individualisation de l'apprentissage, que si l'on prend la précaution de doter l'apprenant d'un bagage de concepts et de méthodes heuristiques qui lui permettra d'exploiter au mieux le matériel pédagogique ainsi conçu. Nul terrain ne con-

vient mieux que l'étude de L1 à l'acquisition de ces instruments heuristiques, ainsi que nous le suggérions dans la conclusion de notre communication au premier colloque de Neuchâtel (Roulet 1973 : 115). L'idée n'est pas nouvelle, puisque Sylvestre de Sacy publiait au XIX[e] siècle des *Principes de grammaire générale mis à la portée des enfants et propres à servir d'introduction à l'étude de toutes les langues*, mais elle a connu des vicissitudes diverses. Aussi nous paraît-il utile de la reprendre et de la préciser, à la lumière des recherches récentes sur l'acquisition du langage par des enfants bilingues en particulier, en illustrant notre propos par un exemple, l'enseignement de certaines constructions dites pronominales ou réfléchies en français, en allemand et en anglais.

Dans l'enseignement traditionnel fondé sur la grammaire et la traduction, on a toujours admis que l'étude de L2 devait s'appuyer sur l'étude de L1 (voire, parfois, sur l'étude du latin, considéré comme étalon), mais on peut douter que l'approche de L1 pratiquée alors fournît à l'élève les instruments propres à favoriser l'acquisition de L2. L'enfant apprend la «conjugaison des verbes pronominaux» en L1, puis des listes de verbes essentiellement ou accidentellement pronominaux, enfin quelques indications sur la valeur de ces formes : sens réfléchi, réciproque, passif, «zéro», mais sans référence aux constructions dans lesquelles elles entrent ni à celles avec lesquelles elles sont en relation. Ce mode de présentation est généralement repris dans l'enseignement de L2, dans le meilleur des cas avec un additif contrastif (liste de verbes pronominaux en L1 et non en L2, par exemple), assurant ainsi une approche à première vue unifiée du problème. De fait, en insistant dès le début de l'apprentissage sur les similitudes et les différences formelles, on oblitère complètement les systèmes en présence et leurs relations. Prenons les verbes pronominaux des constructions suivantes :

(1) *il s'endort* }	accidentellement	{ *il l'endort*
(2) *il se tue* }	pronominaux, voir	*il le tue*
(3) *il se suicide*	essent. pron. voir	* *il le suicide*

Le classement enseigné réunit deux constructions très différentes (le pronom «réfléchi» n'a pas la même fonction dans (1) et (2)) et sépare deux constructions identiques ((2) et (3)) ; si les effets de cette confusion sont insignifiants en L1, ils ne tarderont pas à se révéler catastrophiques en L2, l'enfant tendant à construire en allemand, sur le modèle de

(4) *er bringt ihn um*
(5) *er bringt sich um*

et (6) *er schläfert ihn ein*
(7) **er schläfert sich ein* au lieu de
(8) *er schläft ein* (1).

Partir des paradigmes d'une «conjugaison pronominale» qui recouvre en fait des constructions syntaxiques très diverses et de listes de verbes, c'est adopter une approche morphologique et lexicologique qui va charger excessivement la mémoire de l'élève et faire obstacle à la compréhension des mécanismes de L1 et de L2.

Plus récemment, les approches structuro-behavioristes de l'enseignement de L2 ont conduit à la condamnation de toute référence explicite à L1 (les résultats de l'analyse contrastive ne servant pas à confronter ouvertement les deux systèmes, mais seulement à déterminer le choix et la présentation des structures de L2) et ont abouti à une nette séparation des enseignements de L1 et de L2, qui se manifeste par l'absence de tous contacts entre les maîtres, le recours à des méthodologies différentes, etc. Cette conception nous paraît indéfendable au moins pour deux raisons : (1°) il est douteux qu'on puisse jamais empêcher l'apprenant d'approcher L2 à travers ses connaissances de L1 ; (2°) on se prive d'un auxiliaire précieux en négligeant, en contrecarrant même, une des stratégies d'apprentissage les plus naturelles de l'élève.

Sous l'influence des théories du langage qui remettent au premier plan les éléments communs à deux ou à plusieurs langues (pour ne pas parler d'universaux), linguistes appliqués et pédagogues n'ont pas tardé à se rendre compte de leur erreur, et l'on vient à la conception dont le principe a été énoncé clairement par Adamczewski :

«La L1 peut et doit jouer un rôle capital dans l'appropriation d'une L2, car c'est à travers elle que nous accédons au langage. C'est pourquoi l'enseignement de la L1 dès l'école primaire doit s'ouvrir au langage, non seulement pour permettre aux enfants de mieux maîtriser la L1 elle-même, mais aussi pour jeter les bases d'une acquisition rationnelle, en pleine lumière, d'autres langues» (1973 : 6).

Reste à définir avec plus de précision ce qu'on entend par là. Nous nous appuierons pour cela sur les résultats d'une des rares études portant sur l'acquisition de *deux* langues par des enfants en âge de scolarité : la

(1) Dans la pratique, cette tendance est partiellement corrigée par l'antériorité de l'introduction de *einschlafen* sur celle de *einschläfern* dans le cours de langue, mais cela n'empêche pas la production de formes telles que **er schläft sich ein*.

description par Kessler (1971), dans le cadre de la grammaire de cas, de l'acquisition de certaines structures syntaxiques en anglais et en italien par des enfants bilingues de six à huit ans. De ses conclusions tentatives, nous retiendrons ceci :

— «Child bilingualism appears to give empirical support to the concept of deep or universal structure and language-specific characteristics resulting from unique sets of realizations. Evidence that similar structures in Italian and English are developing in the same sequential pattern and at approximately the same rate suggests that these structures are shared in the deep structure» (96) ;
— «Of the structures examined, the most complex were those involving a transformation for rank shift in the hierarchy of case relations» (94) ;
— «The fact that structures shared by two languages followed approximately the same order and rate of acquisition strongly supports the theory that a bilingual's two languages are not encoded separately (...). The speed with which young children acquire a second language or two languages simultaneously suggests that bilinguals utilize the same set of rules to a considerable extent» (97) ;
— «Comprehension of syntactic variants, in which one member of a pair is a transformation, is somewhat beyond the ability of the age group tested. This is true for relating variants both within and across languages, reflecting both cognitive and linguistic development» (97).

Bien que l'étude ait porté sur des enfants «naturellement» bilingues, on peut en dégager un certain nombre d'implications pour les rapports entre l'étude de L1 et l'enseignement de L2. Tout d'abord, elle vient confirmer l'opinion de nombreux linguistes appliqués (Corder, Di Pietro, Krzeszowski, Nickel) selon laquelle la grammaire de cas, si elle est loin d'atteindre le degré de formalisation de la théorie générative transformationnelle classique, constitue un instrument heuristique très utile pour saisir les similitudes sémantiques et les différences formelles entre les structures de deux langues (2). Admettant avec Fillmore que les cas sont des relations sémantiques universelles, qui ne sont pas toujours apparentes, même pour les sujets parlants de L1, mais repérables intuitivement avec

(2) Précisons que pour nous la grammaire de cas n'est qu'un instrument utile parmi d'autres, les relations et les processus syntactico-sémantiques mentionnés dans la suite de cet exposé pouvant aussi bien être traités dans le cadre d'autres modèles (Chafe, Halliday, etc.).

l'aide de tests empiriques, on peut définir un premier objectif de l'enseignement de L1 :

A. *Apprendre à l'élève à découvrir et à identifier les cas sous-jacents à un énoncé de L1* ;

C'est ainsi que dans les énoncés anglais (L1)

(9) *John is washing*
(10) *This soap washes well*
(11) *This cloth washes well*

il est important de saisir les cas sous-jacents (Agentif, et sans doute Objectif coréférentiel, avec effacement en surface, dans (9), Instrumental dans (10) et Objectif dans (11)) pour pouvoir passer correctement aux énoncés de L2 (français ou allemand) :

(12) *Jean se lave bien*
(13) *Ce savon lave bien*
(14) *Ce tissu se lave bien*
(év. : *Ce tissu lave bien*)
(15) *Hans wäscht sich gut*
(16) *Diese Seife wäscht gut*
(17) *Dieser Stoff wäscht sich leicht*

Inversement, si on part des énoncés français

(18) *Il s'est noyé*
(19) *Ce livre se vend cher*
(20) *Cet espion s'est vendu cher* (*pour sauver sa peau*)

il est capital d'identifier correctement le nombre et le type des cas sous-jacents (A et O dans une des interprétations de (18) — «il s'est donné la mort en se jetant à l'eau» — et dans (20), O dans l'autre interprétation de (18) — «il est mort accidentellement dans l'eau» — et dans (19)), pour pouvoir passer correctement aux énoncés allemand correspondant à (18)

(21) *Er hat sich ertränkt* et
(22) *Er ist ertrunken*

et aux énoncés anglais correspondant à (19) et à (20)

(23) *This book sells at a high price*
(24) *This spy sold himself at a high price.*

Ce premier objectif ne peut être pleinement atteint que si on le complète par un deuxième :

B. *doter l'élève de méthodes heuristiques propres à faciliter la découverte et l'identification de ces relations syntactico-sémantiques et, plus généralement, des mécanismes de la langue.*

Carol Chomsky (1969) a montré que l'intuition de sujet parlant était suffisamment développée chez les enfants en âge de scolarité pour constituer un instrument de travail et de réflexion. Ici encore, il ne s'agit pas de doter l'élève de procédés mécaniques, de recettes, mais de lui apprendre à manipuler et à mettre en relation les énoncés de L1 de manière qu'il puisse en dégager les cas sous-jacents. Peut-on dire, à côté de

(10) *This soap washes well*

et de

(24) *This floor washes well*

(26) **This soap and this floor washes well*?

Non, indice sans doute que les deux sujets renvoient à des cas sous-jacents différents. Ou est-il possible de mettre en relation

(12) *Jean se lave bien*

avec

(27) **Jean est facile à laver*

de la même manière qu'on relie

(14) *Ce tissu se lave bien*
à (15) *Ce tissu est facile à laver*?

Non, indice que (12) et (14) sont des constructions bien différentes en L1 et susceptibles, par conséquent, de traductions différentes en L2.

Malheureusement, nous ne disposons encore que de fort peu d'informations (a) sur les méthodes heuristiques que les enfants, surtout ceux en âge de scolarité, emploient spontanément dans leur exploration de L1 et (b) sur les possibilités d'application en classe, selon l'âge et la maturité des enfants, des opérations heuristiques développées par les linguistes.

Équiper ainsi l'élève d'un bagage minimal de concepts et de méthodes heuristiques ne suffit pas, il faut encore, troisième objectif,

C. *lui faire saisir certains processus fondamentaux communs à plusieurs langues, voire universels, mais généralement dissimulés en surface.* C'est ainsi que toute action, tout changement d'état peut être envisagé et exprimé de deux points de vue, à partir du siège ou à partir de l'agent ; in-

trinsèquement, chaque verbe d'une langue exprime le processus sous l'un ou l'autre angle mais, corollairement, chaque langue dispose de certains mécanismes permettant de modifier cet angle : constructions causatives, qui mettent au premier plan l'agent, constructions moyennes, qui mettent au premier plan le siège du processus. La difficulté pour l'enseignant tient à deux faits :

(1) ces processus généraux se réalisent de manières très diverses dans la même langue, et plus encore dans des langues différentes : absence de modification (pour les verbes symétriques), auxiliaires (de causativité, de passivisation), suffixes, etc.
(2) ces mécanismes ont pour effet de modifier — dans L1 comme dans L2, mais pas nécessairement de la même manière — la hiérarchie et la position des cas dans l'énoncé, entraînant ainsi, comme l'a constaté Kessler, de sérieuses difficultés pour les élèves au plan de la compréhension ; on peut supposer que, mieux ces difficultés auront été perçues et maîtrisées dans L1, plus vite elles le seront en L2 (voir à ce propos nos observations sur les constructions causatives in Roulet 1973).

Pour en revenir aux constructions dites pronominales ou réfléchies, on ne peut en saisir correctement le système en français et les correspondances dans d'autres langues que si l'on reconnaît, à côté des fonctions réfléchie et réciproque, la fonction fondamentale de *se* comme marque de construction moyenne, faisant passer le point de vue de l'agent au siège du processus. Cette reconnaissance préalable en L1 est capitale dans la mesure où cette construction ne se réalise que dans certains cas en allemand, et jamais en anglais, par le pronom réfléchi correspondant. A

(28) *la branche s'est brisée* correspondent
(29) *Der Ast ist zerbrochen (worden)*
(30) *the branch broke*

Cette reconnaissance est d'ailleurs facilitée par l'existence, dans le système même de L1, pour certains verbes seulement, de constructions de surface proches de celles de L2 comme

(31) *la branche est cassée (a été cassée)*
(32) *la branche a cassé* à côté de
(33) *la branche s'est cassée*

Ces remarques nous amènent tout naturellement au quatrième objectif de l'apprentissage de L1 :

D. *apprendre à l'élève à reconnaître les formes particulières sous lesquelles ces relations syntactico-sémantiques et ces processus généraux se réalisent dans L1.* Nous entendons par là prendre conscience des règles générales et des traits idiosyncratiques qui commandent le choix des sujets et des objets de surface, reconnaître les formes que prennent en surface les cas (prépositions, formes casuelles) et les processus (différentes marques des constructions causatives ou moyennes, par exemple).

Si l'on admet l'hypothèse de Kessler selon laquelle les éléments et les règles communs à L1 et à L2 seraient encodés dans un tronc commun et les éléments et règles propres à L1 ou à L2 séparément, on peut supposer que l'approche du système de L2 se fera en trois étapes :

(1) reconnaissance dans L2 des relations syntactico-sémantiques et des processus fondamentaux découverts en L1 avec l'aide des instruments heuristiques acquis à l'occasion de cette découverte de L1 ;
(2) tentative d'application à L2 des mécanismes commandant la réalisation en surface de ces relations et de ces processus en L1 pour mesurer les limites du tronc commun syntactico-sémantique ;
(3) pour toutes les structures de L2 auxquelles les mécanismes découverts en L1 ne s'appliquent pas, tentative de découverte des mécanismes propres à L2 *avec l'aide des instruments heuristiques acquis lors de la découverte de L1*, mais qui se révèlent ainsi avoir un domaine d'application beaucoup plus vaste ; encodage et pratique de ces structures.

L'étude de Kessler, qui confirme sur ce point celle de Carol Chomsky, met enfin en évidence un point important, dont il faut tenir compte avec soin dans la réalisation des objectifs susmentionnés, à savoir que certaines structures syntaxiques courantes de L1 sont loin d'être acquises à l'âge de huit ans. Fonder l'apprentissage de structures de L2 sur l'étude préalable de structures encore incertaines en L1 comme, par exemple, la construction passive à l'âge de huit ans, ne peut que donner des résultats décevants. On prendra garde par conséquent à ne pas surestimer la compétence intermédiaire en L1 acquise par les élèves les plus jeunes.

Ces hypothèses sur la nécessité de préparer l'enfant, par une certaine approche de L1, à l'acquisition de L2 demandent à être discutées, développées et surtout expérimentées sur le terrain. Nous aimerions, en guise de conclusion, préciser deux points pour éviter tout malentendu :

(1) à ceux qui jugeraient aberrant de définir certains objectifs de l'étude de L1 en fonction de l'enseignement de L2, on répondra (a) que l'apprentissage d'une L2 ne constitue plus le privilège d'une élite, mais

tend à se généraliser à toutes les couches de la population de tous les pays, comme l'étude de L1. (b) que le travail de découverte intuitive de L1 suggéré ici, loin de se faire au détriment des objectifs traditionnels de l'étude de L1, acquisition de normes et développement de la compétence de communication, en favorise la réalisation, ainsi que l'ont montré les expériences anglaises de Doughty, Pearce et Thornton (1971) ;

(2) à ceux qui se demandent si cette approche étroitement linguistique du système de L1 et de L2 est compatible avec les tendances actuelles à l'enseignement de la compétence de communication, on répondra que (a) tout ce qui a été suggéré pour l'approche des systèmes de L1 et de L2 s'applique dans doute aussi bien à la découverte de l'emploi de ces systèmes comme instruments de communication : nul doute qu'une découverte intuitive des valeurs illocutoires des énoncés de L1 ne favorise la compréhension et l'acquisition de l'emploi de L2 ; enfin, (b) quelle que soit l'approche (grammaticale, notionelle, situationelle, etc.) mise en œuvre dans les débuts de l'enseignement de L2, il vient un moment où l'apprenant cherche à reconstituer et à intérioriser globalement tel ou tel sous-système (causativité, interrogation, etc.) de L2. C'est à cette étape de l'apprentissage que les suggestions faites ici se révéleront utiles, voire nécessaires.

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